



THE NORTHWARD TREK

STANLEY PORTAL HYATT





THE NORTHWARD TREK





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[W. & D. Downey.

THE NORTHWARD TREK

BY
STANLEY PORTAL HYATT

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TO
ALL WHO HAVE STRIVEN
FOR THE IDEAL OF
A BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA

P R E F A C E.



IT is no easy task to write the history of events which have happened within the memory of the living generation, and the task becomes even more difficult when, as in my own case, many of the principal actors, and the scenes of their actions, are personally known to the author. Inevitably, prejudices creep into the narrative; true perspective becomes difficult—some may even say impossible—to attain; incidents which future historians may consider trivial, seem of paramount importance; men whose right to be remembered, coming generations may ignore, appear of absorbing interest to the writer of to-day.

For these reasons I am sending this volume out, prepared to meet with a certain measure of criticism, even of denial; and perhaps, in the end, the volume may but serve as an aid to some future historian, who, viewing events from a greater distance, will see them in a clearer light, unobscured by the dust of controversy. Yet, none the less, I feel that the book is justified, on the grounds that it will preserve records which might otherwise be lost. The very difficulty which I have encountered in obtaining material from the men who took part in the later stages of the Northward Trek proves how hard it would be for the writer of twenty years hence to construct anything in the nature of a living narrative.

PREFACE

When I undertook the work, I was in hopes of getting assistance from many of what may be called the rank and file, but in this respect I have been disappointed. On the other hand, I must acknowledge, most gratefully, the kindness I have received at the hands of Mr. F. C. Selous, Major Frank Johnson, and Mr. Alfred Bromwich of the British South Africa Company. With regard to the latter corporation, I have been a critic of it in the past—too bitter a critic, perhaps, although I had good reason to feel sore—and in this book also I have written of things as I know them to have been ; yet, none the less, I am only too glad to be able to admit that the British South Africa Company to-day is carrying on its work in a spirit of sane, cool Imperialism ; and, whatever may have been its mistakes in the past, its present, and the bright promise of its future, should be sufficient atonement for these.

Finally, if I am described by my critics as a fanatic on the subject of the British Empire, I shall accept the description gratefully, as a high compliment ; for, whenever I have been in a colony under direct Imperial control—and I have lived in many of these—there I have found the government carried on in accordance with the highest traditions of our race.

STANLEY PORTAL HYATT.

11th September 1909.

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THE NORTHWARD TREK



BOOK I.

THE GATE OF THE NORTH.

CHAPTER I.

THE Northward Trek, the forward movement of the white races from the southernmost point of the Dark Continent towards Central Africa, may be said to have begun when the first Boer found his way round to the back of Table Mountain, and it has gone on ever since. It will be finished only when the two sections of the Cape-to-Cairo line join somewhere by the sources of the Nile. On that day, the now dying Romance of Africa will receive its actual deathblow, and the occupation of the Pioneers of the Northern Expansion will be gone for ever.

The Northward Trek has always been a natural movement, due partially to the desire for new land, partially to the fascination of the Unknown, the longing to discover what lay beyond the horizon, what possibilities of wealth, what strange peoples, what dangers. The honours of having pushed the frontiers of civilisation northwards must be divided evenly between Briton and Boer; for though, during the last two decades, the work has been

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done almost exclusively by the former race, in the earlier stages the Dutch were ahead always of their rivals. On the other hand, whilst the love of adventure has been one of the greatest, if not the greatest, of the forces driving the Briton onwards, it has played but a small part in the case of the Boers, who originally trekked northwards and eastwards to escape from the hated British Government, and continued the movement afterwards because they had learned to covet the rich lands which they believed to exist in the heart of the continent. Moreover, after the first Boer War, a new element, political ambition, entered into the life of the Transvaal, and though the individual Boer might still follow the dangerous occupation of a pioneer for the sake of what he could get out of it financially, the energies of himself and his fellows were directed, and concentrated, by those amongst his leaders who were scheming to make the South African Republic the dominant power of the sub-continent.

It may, of course, be argued that, in its later stages, the British advance was not only political, but was tempered by sordid financial motives as well, that, though the Chartered Company aimed at, and succeeded in, acquiring South Central Africa for the Empire, its ultimate object was to earn dividends for its shareholders. To a certain extent, this cannot be denied, though, if one but succeeds in disassociating the Company, the soulless corporation, from the men who created it and carried out its work, the accusation loses much of its sting ; for through the conduct of most of those men one can trace the influence of a spirit of adventure, almost Elizabethan in its intensity ; and it is safe to say that the enterprise would still have been carried out had there been no prospect of financial

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gain attached to it. Possibly, one may almost say unquestionably, in that case one or two of the moving spirits would have taken no part in it, but the rank and file, and the actual leaders as well, would have remained the same.

The Boer ambition was as legitimate as the British—that is a point about which there can be no question, provided it be admitted that civilised man has a right to destroy a state of barbarism and replace it by a government based on his own ideals. On the other hand, Boer civilisation is on a far lower plane than British, and from the point of view of humanity, the British triumph was a most desirable thing; for this question of Northern Expansion was not merely a matter of political or financial advantage to one or other of the rival white races, it affected also the future of millions of natives, who, deprived of the power of effective resistance, would be placed entirely at the mercy of their conquerors.

The native problem lies at the back of every South African question. It would be well for the Empire if the British nation could be made to realise that fact. It caused the first bitterness between Boer and Briton, and one of the prizes which the Empire won so hardly during the great war, and surrendered so feebly a few years later, when it granted self-government to the conquered territories, was the right to solve the problem in its own way. Reduced to its simplest expression, shorn of all sentiment and pretence, the issue is this—what is to be the future status of the native of South and South Central Africa? There are only three alternatives possible—(1) He must remain the social and political inferior of the white man; (2) he must be raised to a position of equality; (3) he must disappear altogether.

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The Boers understood the gravity of the native question. The knowledge was born in them. It was a legacy from their forefathers, who had maintained their footing in the countries they conquered at infinite cost, and had handed down to their sons a tradition of distrust, almost of hatred, for any man with a black skin. Had they been left to themselves, had the British never taken the Cape, they would long since have reduced the native population to a state of slavery, or have perished in the attempt. The British, however, have always taken a more humane, and, in a sense, a more sane view. No reasoning white man who has come into contact with the African native, and learned to understand his ways of thought, regards him from what may be called the "man and brother" point of view. "A white man is a white man, and a Kafir is a Kafir," two separate worlds, with practically nothing in common. Nature herself drew the line between them, and separate worlds they must remain. No fusion is possible, nor can the two races find a common meeting-ground. On the other hand, whilst the Boer policy has been practically to deny that the native has any rights, the British policy has been to grant him the fullest liberty compatible with the safety of the community, and to give him every opportunity to work out his salvation in his own way.

It is necessary to keep this native problem in mind when studying the history of the Northward Trek, for though it may appear on the surface but seldom, it is always in the background, forming the determining factor in the conduct of many, if not of most, of those concerned. The men on the spot understood the question, and, frequently, the fear that the Imperial Government

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would not take a sane view, made many who would otherwise have been staunch Imperialists, take the side of the local politicians.

Prior to the retrocession of the Transvaal, the movement northwards was essentially spasmodic. The discovery of diamonds at Kimberley led to a great advance ; and yet that was merely the result of an accident, and not of any definite plan. So far, the men who had been able to see sufficiently clearly into the future to realise that the northern territories, Bechuanaland, Matabeleland, Mashonaland, even Barotseland and the Tanganyika Highlands, were destined to come into Imperial politics within a decade, were extraordinarily few in number. Sir Bartle Frere understood it, and, daring to say so, died discredited, before the nation had time to learn that he had been right after all. Cecil Rhodes, busy in Kimberley making the money which was to render him independent of the small-minded men, saw it, vaguely at first, as a matter of Colonial, rather than of Imperial, concern ; but John Mackenzie, the Scotch missionary, had seen it ten years before Majuba was fought, and had laid his plans accordingly, not to gain wealth or position for himself, but to ensure the honour and welfare of his own people.

South Africa does not love a missionary, usually for good and sufficient reasons ; and yet, if it could weigh up its obligations, it would probably find it was under a debt to the Missionary Societies. It was the missionaries who opened the road into Umzilakazi's country, missionaries who made Khama into the best native ally the British ever had ; but even if this were not so, even if there were only the record of the miserable mistakes made at a notorious Scotch institution in Cape Colony and by

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the Dutch Reformed and American preachers in Rhodesia, the record of John Mackenzie, the missionary who became an Imperial statesman, ought to outweigh them all; for, whilst the ill-effects of the teaching of the others will pass away, John Mackenzie left a mark on the history of South Africa which nothing can ever efface. It was mainly through him that the Gate of the North passed into British hands.

When Cecil Rhodes was still stumbling in the dark, a local politician, obsessed by the local interests which must afterwards have seemed so small and pitiful, Mackenzie grasped the whole situation, and it is due to him, rather than to the far better known "Empire-builder," that South Central Africa is not under the Boer flag to-day.

It is with the entry of Mackenzie and Rhodes into the political arena that the later, and most important, stage of the Northward Trek, the stage with which this book is concerned, really begins.

CHAPTER II.

THE tragedy of South Africa, the ill-fortune, amounting in many cases to positive disaster, which seems to dog the footsteps of every really able man who goes out to the sub-continent on the Imperial Service, was only too well exemplified in the case of Sir Bartle Frere. He was one of the very few who realised to the full British responsibility, true Imperialism, a British South Africa for the British nation, as opposed to mere Colonial expansion on narrow and sordid lines. He had the power of insight, and he urged the adoption of a bold and statesman-like policy, which, if adopted, would have settled, once and for all, the question of British supremacy, not only throughout South Africa, but through Central Africa as well.

Unfortunately, Sir Bartle Frere had to struggle not only against the incapacity and apathy of the Home Government and the Home Press, but also against the growing opposition of both the Colonial and the Boer elements in Cape Colony. Already the Colony was beginning to regard the northern territories as being, for some mysterious reason, its peculiar heritage; whilst the disloyal element was equally determined to secure them for the Boer people. In 1878, Sir Bartle Frere reported to the Imperial Government his agreement with those who contended "that it will be found necessary, sooner or later, to extend the British dominions and Protectorate, in

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some form or other, over all the tribes between the Orange River and Lake N'Gami, and between the sea and the present Transvaal border, and the longer it is deferred, the more troublesome will the operation become." To this he added, as his own note, "By refusing to accept the position of a protecting power, habitually acting as arbiter in tribal disputes, we escape nothing, save the name and the responsibility. Its reality is already incurred, and when at length we unwillingly undertake the burden of these dominions, we shall find it greatly aggravated by delay and neglect." Wise words these, words such as one might have expected from the man who was probably the greatest and the most sincerely patriotic of all the High Commissioners the nation has sent out to South Africa, and yet, none the less, no holder of that office, before or since, has been the subject of so much embittered criticism.

At the time Sir Bartle Frere was urging the policy of Northern Expansion as an Imperial duty, Colonel Lanyon was administering Griqualand West, and finding the task no easy one. Land-grabbing, both by Boers and Colonials, was already becoming something nearly akin to a recognised industry, and the native mind was greatly exercised in consequence. Nothing has disgraced the white man's rule in South Africa more than the attempts to obtain the black man's land by a kind of pseudo-legal process. The whole story of concessions and grants obtained from native chiefs is a scandal of which the British nation has good reason to be ashamed, and for which, in the end, the British nation has usually had to pay heavily, in both blood and money, whilst the spoils have always remained in the hand of the original forgers and prevaricators. True, the latter have seldom, if ever, been of Home birth, the

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industry being essentially a South African one, but it has been carried out under the shelter of the British Flag, and the nation cannot avoid a share of the responsibility.

So far as the natives were concerned, their national independence was doomed when the first settlers landed at the Cape and found the land fit for white occupation. Whatever the ethics of the case might be, it was inevitable that the black men must ultimately be reduced to the position of a subject race. No fusion was possible, and they could not live on equal terms beside the newcomers. On the other hand, the evil effects of the process might have been reduced greatly had the Imperial Government realised its responsibilities in the matter from the outset of its rule in South Africa, and, whilst not attempting to prevent white expansion on safe lines, acted at the same time as protector of the natives. Of course, the task of the authorities was never an easy one. On the one side was the Colonial element, always impatient of control, often inclined to regard the Law with contempt, and seldom well-disposed towards the natives as a whole, eager to become rich quickly, as a compensation for the hardships and risks inseparable from the life in the new country. On the other side was the negrophil element, mainly composed of missionaries, perhaps the most courageous of pioneers, yet too often narrow-minded and obsessed with a sense of their duty towards the natives, feeling they were regarded with suspicion, if not with actual dislike, by the Colonials, and, for that very reason, becoming more and more confirmed in their pro-native ideas. There was practically no middle party, that difficult role being reserved for the Imperial authorities, who usually managed to fill it in the most indifferent manner, mainly because the Colonial Office

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would not take the trouble to try and grasp the true situation. In these circumstances it is not unnatural that the Imperial policy should have resulted in a ghastly series of blunders, equally irritating to Colonials, missionaries, and natives. Still, it must be remembered that, whilst Colonial politicians and writers have had a great deal to say concerning the failures of Downing Street, the latter has been debarred from replying; and, moreover, it is possible, or even probable, that the mistakes and disasters would have been far more numerous had the Colonials been left to themselves. The history of a score of native wars, in which the Imperial troops have had to go and extricate the men on the spot from the difficulties in which they had landed themselves, is a proof of the necessity for Imperial control. In South Africa, most of these little wars resulted directly from the operations of unscrupulous land-grabbers, who obtained land from natives, usually from some deposed chief for whose claims they conceived a sudden enthusiasm, and then, at the first hint of opposition, clamoured to have their rights enforced by means of military occupation.

Such was practically the state of affairs in Griqualand West during Colonel Lanyon's term of office. The Griquas were still unused to the idea of white control, which had become a matter of absolute necessity, and this, added to the growing resentment caused by the action of the Boer farmers, or would-be farmers, soon culminated in actual rebellion. Early in 1878, Colonel Lanyon had led a small force against some Griqua marauders, and had been driven back with considerable loss. In a few days the whole tribe was in a ferment, and shortly afterwards one or two murders of white men showed that the situation was becoming serious. The Europeans in the district quickly came into

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Kuruman, where Mackenzie was then in charge of the mission station. In Kimberley, the wildest rumours were afloat ; volunteers were raised under the command of Commandant Ford, and started hurriedly for the relief of Kuruman. At Ko, however, the force fell in with the enemy, and once more the white men lost heavily. It was at this stage that Colonel Warren, afterwards Sir Charles Warren, who had come up to investigate the land, and other, questions, took the field. The campaign was not a very long one, but at its close, instead of the Imperial Government taking the obvious step of annexation, and so placing the whole territory under proper supervision and control, it left matters in much the same chaotic state as they had been before. "People at Home would not agree to annexation with all its attendant risks and expenses," was the gist of the answer given to those who, like Mackenzie, urged the taking of that step, to which Mackenzie retorted, with obvious logic, that the spread of white settlement in itself constituted unofficial annexation, and it would be far better to place the matter on a proper footing, once and for all.

In 1879, out of eight of the most important chiefs in South Bechuanaland, with whom Colonel Warren had dealings, no less than six sent in formal petitions begging to be taken under the protection of Her Majesty's Government. Practically speaking, the result of the war had been to place the entire territory in the hands of the British ; tribal authority, if not destroyed, was entirely disorganised, and it was difficult to see how a withdrawal was possible ; yet, none the less, it did take place, and by the end of April 1881, not a single trooper was left in the country. No betrayal could have been more shameful ; in its way, it was every whit as bad as the surrender after

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Majuba. The reason must be sought in the state of politics at Home. The Zulu War had, most unjustly, brought discredit on Sir Bartle Frere. A General Election was imminent, and it was generally believed that this would result in the return of Gladstone, who was notoriously opposed to anything in the nature of a policy of Imperial expansion in Africa. No one could prophesy what would become of any of the African Colonies under his rule, and so, in the end, the outgoing Ministry took the feeble course of doing nothing, and leaving the Bechuana chiefs to their fate, which came quickly in the form of a Boer invasion.

So far, the Transvaal Boers, as such, had hardly been a serious factor in the case of Bechuanaland. They had come there, as Colonials and Cape Boers had come, as individuals, to acquire land or to raid cattle, but they had not constituted a definite political organisation. Their country was too poor, too much beset by difficulties and dangers, to give much thought to the question of enlarging its own borders. But the annexation by Sir Theophilus Shepstone changed everything. Credit was restored, Sekukuni's power was broken by Sir Garnet Wolseley, and when, after Majuba, Gladstone made the disgraceful retrocession, the cause of so much misery and bloodshed, the Transvaal was soon in a position to take an active share in what quickly became the scramble for the North. The idea of a United South Africa under the hegemony of the Transvaal, ceased to be a mere unattainable longing, and became part of a definite political creed.

The effect of the surrender on Cape politics was immediate. The Cape Dutch party, absolutely disloyal to the country which had protected it from external enemies, aided it against internal foes, which practically guaranteed

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its credit, and yet asked nothing in return, was whole-hearted in its support of the Transvaal, whose policy stood for reaction, ignorance, and corruption. The Colonial party, which at this juncture received a new and powerful recruit in the person of Cecil Rhodes, had as its ideal an United South Africa, under the hegemony of the Cape Colony, a greater Cape Colony in fact, independent of Imperial control, yet, in the early stages at least, under the British flag. How far the latter point was considered essential, it is difficult to say. The declaration that no separation was contemplated was repeated whenever the small group of real Imperialists raised the charge of disloyalty; but as the underlying idea of the plea for Colonial, as opposed to Imperial, expansion was self-interest, the material, tangible benefits which would accrue to the Colony itself, it is quite possible that the men behind the movement realised that so long as their "United States of South Africa," whilst virtually independent, was able to obtain the protection of the British Navy, and the benefit of British credit, gratuitously, it was well worth while remaining part of the Empire. Subsequent events certainly proved that the loyalty of many, if not of the majority, went no deeper than this. Their patriotism was a wholly sordid scheme to get something for nothing.

The true Imperialists, who looked on the Empire as a whole, in which local subdivisions and petty local jealousies should be impossible, were very few in number, and none of them, except John Mackenzie, had any great influence on the course of events. They were hopelessly outnumbered, and the fatal Gladstone policy of surrender had cut the ground from under their feet. It was useless for them to say that, sooner or later, the nation would awaken,

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and repudiate the actions of the Liberal Government. The harm had already been done, and the Transvaal and Southern Bechuanaland could only be recovered by force of arms.

The new High Commissioner, Sir Hercules Robinson, was destined to play an unfortunate, and at times an ignominious, part in the history of South Africa. A strong man was needed; but, knowing that strong men mean strong policies, the Imperial Government appointed a "lath which was painted like iron." Sir Hercules Robinson meant well, and, on one or two occasions, as for instance when he agreed to the appointment of Mackenzie as Deputy Commissioner for Bechuanaland, he took the right course in the face of bitter opposition from the Colonial party; but his resistance was never long-lived, and, in the end, he ceased to struggle for the purer Imperial ideal. He fell completely under the influence of Cecil Rhodes, and became little more than the mouthpiece of the great Cape politician.

In justice to the High Commissioner, it must be admitted that the position had always been a difficult one, and as the Cape Parliament grew more and more impatient of control, so the post grew almost impossible for a man who wished to preserve any vestige of independence of action. A High Commissioner should have been a servant of the Crown, and of the Crown alone, entrusted with the duty of safeguarding the interests of the Empire, and placed high above all local influences—a Viceroy, in effect. But in South Africa this almost viceregal office was combined with the very different post of Governor of Cape Colony; and, whilst the High Commissioner might wish to take a lofty and unbiassed view of affairs, the Governor

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was bound to be guided by the advice of the Cape ministers, who were often untravelled men of narrow sympathies and small ideals. A strong man might have triumphed, even under those unfavourable circumstances; but Sir Hercules Robinson was far from being strong, and, as a result, he went down before the powerful personality of Cecil Rhodes.

How completely the High Commissioner surrendered to local influences was shown in his farewell speech at Cape Town on 27th April 1889, when he said: "There are three competing influences at work in South Africa. They are Colonialism, Republicanism, and Imperialism. As to the last, it is a diminishing quantity, there being now no permanent place in South Africa for Imperial control on a large scale. With responsible government in the Cape, and Natal soon likely to attain that status, with the Independent Republics of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, and with Germany on the West Coast and Portugal on the East, *the idea of the permanent presence of the Imperial Factor in the interior, of a South African India in the Kalahari, is simply an absurdity*"—a truly strange confession of faith for Her Majesty's High Commissioner to make. Yet on 16th August 1883, Cecil Rhodes had said practically the same thing, in referring to Bechuana-land in the Cape Parliament. "*We want to get rid of the Imperial factor in this question, and to deal with it ourselves, jointly or with the Transvaal.*"

That farewell speech of Sir Hercules Robinson's furnished the key to much that had happened during the six years which had elapsed since Rhodes' speech in the Cape House. The High Commissioner had become lost in the Governor, the local official swayed by the advice of local men,

CHAPTER III.

ONE of the conditions made by Gladstone after the surrender to the Boers was that the British Resident at Pretoria should act as a species of Protector of Natives. No more futile arrangement was ever made and solemnly ratified. If there was one point on which it was absolutely certain that the Boer Republic would not brook dictation, it was the native question. The Boer regarded, and always will regard, the British native policy with a mixture of contempt and disgust, and in 1881, puffed up as he was with his easily won victory, none but a madman would have pictured him as ready to yield up one of the most precious fruits of that triumph, the right to deal with the unfortunate savage in the Afrikander way.

The last police trooper had hardly been withdrawn from Bechuanaland before the natives learnt by bitter experience what the change meant. The Transvaal had now begun in earnest its policy of expansion, and the first step to be taken was the acquisition of Bechuanaland, the closing of the Northern Gate against the British, and the forming of a junction with the Germans on the West Coast. True, the German territory was not as yet formally annexed, but its occupation was already an actual fact, and, as Kruger knew, the Teuton was not in the habit of relinquishing what he had once taken. He may be the worst colonist in the world, and his colonies may be, and

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probably will continue to be, merely sources of weakness and expense to him ; but none the less, his presence in South Central Africa would have meant the absolute exclusion of the British.

The Transvaal Boers moved slowly, as is their way, but they knew what they wanted and had no fear of opposition at home. They entered Bechuanaland in small parties, unofficially, and proceeded to stir up strife amongst the natives. In the southern district, a long-standing quarrel between Mankoroane and Massow, two local chieftains, was fanned into flame. Mankoroane had resolutely stood by the British during the recent war, and, perhaps for that reason, the Boers conceived a great and sudden admiration for his rival. Under the leadership of a certain Van Niekerk, a party from the Transvaal offered its services to Massow, an offer which was accepted, possibly because it amounted almost to a command.

On January 1st, 1882, Massow issued a proclamation announcing his intention of raising a force of three hundred white volunteers to aid him in his campaign against Mankoroane ; on May 3rd he issued another proclamation asking for an additional hundred white men. The terms offered were liberal. Each volunteer was to receive a farm of three thousand morgen in extent, whilst half the total loot was to be divided amongst the white men. The proclamations were, of course, merely to furnish an excuse for a Boer invasion. There were plenty of volunteers, certainly, but instead of taking up their military duties, they merely settled on the land, appropriating the more desirable farms. Their headquarters, the meeting place of their committee of management, was at Vryburg, where they started a regular settlement. The

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next move was to obtain from Massow a further proclamation, or, rather, a charter, conferring on them the right of self-government within that part of his territory then inhabited "by the white inhabitants, volunteers, and other persons authorised by us thereto." On August 6th, the Chairman of the Board of Management proclaimed himself Administrator of the Republic of Stellaland in the following terms :—

"I, Gerrit Jacobus Van Niekerk, Administrator of Stellaland, duly authorised and empowered by David Massow, the territorial paramount chief, declare the Republic of Stellaland, with Vryburg as its seat of government."

The fact that David Massow was not the paramount chief and therefore had no right to make any such grant, was not a consideration of great importance in a matter like this. As a certain man named Honey afterwards learned to his cost, the Stellaland Freebooters did not worry about trifles.

Whilst Van Niekerk and his band of marauders were engaged in settling Stellaland after the manner of the Boers, another party under Gey Van Pittius had crossed the border further north and invaded the country of the Baralongs. Montsoia, the old chief of the Baralongs, a native of fine character, had been a lifelong foe of the Boers. He had fought them more than once, and when the progress of the Northward Trek brought the white men practically to his doors, he had turned to the British for protection. Not once, but several times, he had offered his country as a free gift to the Queen, knowing that by that means alone could he preserve any semblance of freedom for his people.

The Bechuana chiefs were perfectly well aware that the Imperial Government was prone to make mistakes, but they

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had learnt, too, that it always wished to be just, and that Imperial officers were neither land-grabbers nor cattle thieves. However, Montsoia's offer had been ignored. Downing Street was apathetic, Cape Town hostile to any extension of the Imperial control. So in the end nothing was done, and when Van Pittius suddenly decided to support the claims of Moshesh, a rival young chief on the Transvaal border, Montsoia found himself in an almost hopeless position, as the Boers were preparing to establish yet another miniature Republic, the "Land Goshen," in the immediate neighbourhood of Mafeking, his own capital.

Mackenzie, the foremost authority on Bechuanaland, was quick to see the dangers of the situation. When the Freebooters first started to harry the natives, two years before the proclamation of the Stellaland Republic, he began that long campaign which led, first to the Warren Expedition, and, ultimately, to the defeat both of the Boers and of the advocates of a Greater Cape Colony extending to the Lakes. In 1882, Mackenzie went Home. He could do nothing more in South Africa itself, and he saw that the one chance was to rouse the British themselves, and so force the Gladstone Administration to abandon its attitude of feeble inaction.

Looking back now, it is difficult to picture what would have happened had Mackenzie not undertaken the defence of Bechuanaland at that time. The Boer party in Cape Town was very strong; the Colonial party, or at least a large section of it, was wavering in its loyalty, reckoning that, after all, the Boers too were South Africans; whilst the Cabinet at Home, and a very considerable section of the Liberal Party, certainly the most noisy section, was ready then, as afterwards, to abandon the whole of South Africa

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to the Dutch. The rest of the nation, sore and ashamed at the events of the last two or three years, knowing little or nothing of the true state of affairs, was unable to judge for itself, and, save for Mackenzie, there was no one possessing the ability and the information necessary to enlighten it. Mackenzie's speeches and writings during 1882 and 1883 changed the entire course of events. He awakened the nation to the real meaning of what was going on both in Bechuanaland and at the Cape; he laid bare, not only the plot of a "Dutch South Africa," but also showed what the inevitable results of the success of that plot would be, the disgrace to the Empire, the set-back to the cause of civilisation, the utter ruin of the natives as a whole. But the effect of his campaign was probably even greater in Cape Town than at Home, for he practically forced the Colonial party to separate itself definitely from the Cape Boers, who, under the leadership of Hofmeyr, were straining every nerve to help the Northern Freebooters. True, he incurred the bitter enmity alike of the pro-Boer Liberals at Home, and of both the Colonial and Boer parties in South Africa; but the fact troubled him little. His enemies were not, in any case, men whom he would have desired to have as friends.

In August 1883, immediately after Van Niekerk's proclamation of the Stellaland Republic, Rhodes found it necessary to take a definite step regarding the Freebooters. It was perfectly obvious now that the Transvaal was behind the movement, and that it was hostile to anything in the nature of the supremacy of the Cape. If Kruger had his own way, the Northern territories would go to the Boers or the Germans; if Mackenzie were successful at Home, they would become an Imperial Protectorate. In either case,

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the Cape would have little or no share in the plunder. Rhodes put the issue clearly in proposing that the Cape Colony should appoint a Resident at Mankoroane's kraal. He said :—

“I look on Bechuanaland as the Suez Canal of the trade of this country, the key of its road to the interior. The House will have to wake up as to what is to be its future policy. The question before us really is this—whether this Colony is to be confined within its present borders, or whether it is to become the dominant state in South Africa.” Later on in the same speech he said, apparently referring to Mackenzie's campaign, “But this question of Bechuanaland will not be in our hands, and that is why this House should now approach very seriously the consideration of this question. If we part with this question now, we shall find that the limits of the Colony will be Griqualand West”; and then he went on to make his confession of faith, “We want to get rid of the Imperial factor in this question, and to deal with it ourselves, jointly with the Transvaal.” He threw in his lot with the Colony, as opposed to the Empire, and he held to that faith throughout, until the last few years of his life, when the Colony itself proved to him that his trust in it had been a mistake.

Rhodes' motion for the appointment of a Resident was lost. The House would stand no interference with the rights of the Boers. Even the appeal to Colonial self-interest and the repudiation of the Imperial claims did not satisfy it. Just as, later on, a Cape Premier delayed the passage of British munitions of war and forwarded those of the Boers, so on this occasion the Cape Parliament and Ministry put the interests of the

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Transvaal first. The Afrikaner Bond was now formed, an anti-British, and in the Colony at least, a treasonable, organisation, having as its creed "Africa for the Afrikaner." The Bond was destined to do incalculable harm in the future. But for it, the South African War might have been averted, though that is doubtful, both President Kruger and Germany having decided on a last desperate effort to carry through their schemes. On the other hand, the immediate effect of its formation was probably to the advantage of the Empire, for it divided Cape politicians into two distinct groups, and proved to Rhodes and the other advocates of the "United States of South Africa," that they would get no assistance from the Boers, at any rate whilst Kruger remained in power. The Dutch and Colonial schemes ran on parallel lines certainly, and the Empire stood to lose if either of them were to become an accomplished fact; but as both were based on self-interest, with little that was sentimental behind them, it was difficult to see how any fusion was ever possible. The advocates of each wanted the whole spoils for themselves, and would not have been satisfied with a part.

True, there was nothing sordid in Rhodes' ambition. At this juncture, as later when the Chartered Company was formed, money was not his object. He wanted power, he aimed at being little less than the autocrat of South Africa, a position he knew would be equally impossible to obtain if the Imperial authority remained, or if the hegemony of his United States passed to the Transvaal. He was quite ready to sink all racial distinctions, to welcome alike British, Colonials, or Boers, provided they agreed with his ideas. The fact that he

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practically turned his back on the land of his birth, and threw in his lot with the Colony, proves that the sense of nationality in him was not very strong ; but he certainly would have resented any foreign interference, and the fear of this probably had a good deal to do with his determination to try and keep his United States under the British flag.

President Kruger, on the other hand, was sordid. He showed that to the whole world at the time of his last pitiful flight ; and it is quite possible that, if he had succeeded in forming his Dutch South Africa, he would, in the end, have sold his people to Germany rather than see one of his rivals succeed him.

The two men, the President and the Cape Premier, were so utterly different in all their essential characteristics, that, even had their schemes been amalgamated, one or other of the leaders must have retired altogether.

CHAPTER IV.

TOWARDS the latter end of 1883 the Transvaal delegates, Kruger, Du Toit, and Smith, arrived in London on a mission, the impudence of which was equalled only by its success. Relying on the notorious weakness of the Gladstone Ministry, and encouraged by the Little Englander element, they arrived, prepared to make, and expecting to have granted, four demands. These were :—

(1) That the name “South African Republic” should be recognised.

(2) That part of the debt to Great Britain, over £200,000, should be cancelled.

(3) That Gladstone’s futile system of British control over the treatment of the natives should be abolished.

(4) That the Transvaal should be allowed to extend its borders so as to include the whole of Bechuanaland.

Practically speaking, the Transvaal desired to be freed from all forms of British restraint, and to be granted the right to join hands with the Germans on the West Coast and so exclude the British from the Northern territories. The mere fact that such proposals were made shows the contempt which had been inspired by the retrocession of the Transvaal, and that those proposals should have been discussed, and three of them granted, proves how thoroughly well deserved that contempt was.

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John Mackenzie saw the Boer aim at once, and tried to make the Ministers see it too, to convince them that the Transvaal was aiming at nothing less than to become the paramount power in South Africa. He failed, of course, as so many other men who really know their facts have failed in like cause ; but the whole of his work had not been wasted, and when, soon after they landed, the delegates published a most astounding statement of their claims, relating at length their own righteous doings in Bechuanaland, they found that a large section of the British public already knew the facts of the case, having read Mackenzie's articles or heard him speak.

The conference was a long and dreary business, carried on mainly in writing. The first claim of the delegates, that they had come to make a treaty with Great Britain, was disallowed promptly, Lord Derby pointing out the distinction between a convention and a treaty. Yet, as if to make up for this initial rebuff to men who were supposed to be ignorant farmers, they were given, without much discussion, three of the principal things for which they asked.

Utterly regardless of future complications, never pausing to think that he was practically creating a hostile state on the borders, almost in the midst, of British territory, Lord Derby gave the Transvaal international recognition as the "South African Republic." Equally regardless of any duty the British might have owed to the natives, he agreed to withdraw the British control of the Republic's native policy. Certainly, this system of control had proved perfectly inefficient ; but at least it gave a definite claim to interfere, which would have been invaluable in later years. A considerable portion of the Republic's debt

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was also remitted, a perfectly unnecessary piece of generosity, or rather a piece of absolute folly under the circumstances, for the Transvaal was at that time in such severe financial straits that, with the additional burden of the British debt hanging over it, it would have been an easy matter to bring it to a sense of decency as regarded its doings in Bechuanaland.

It is difficult now to understand why these Transvaal delegates should have been granted any concessions. The Boers had received infinitely too much already, in 1881, and it was a notorious fact that, despite their own unctuous smugness, the leaders laughed at the pseudo-philanthropic reasons which had prompted Gladstone's withdrawal. Possibly it may be due to geographical or climatic causes, or it may simply arise from accident, but the fact remains that the Afrikander is curiously like the native in many of his characteristics. Give him a little, as a gift, and he will immediately demand a great deal more, as a right. He has no sense of gratitude, though he feels an intense irritation when he fails to impose upon his benefactor.

It was for the latter reason that the delegates were bitter with Lord Derby. He had given them much, infinitely more than he should have given them ; but they could not obtain the final and most important boon, the right to close the Gate of the North. Probably, the Ministry would have agreed to that point too, being prone to surrender Imperial rights ; but John Mackenzie's campaign had raised up an Opposition which it dare not ignore entirely, while Germany had recently showed her hand so plainly that no one could fail to perceive her intentions.

The virtual occupation of South-West Africa, the strip of

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coast from Portuguese West Africa to the mouth of the Orange River, had begun long before. On the 1st May 1883 the German flag had been hoisted at Angra Pequena, and when a British cruiser was sent from Cape Town to investigate, she was met by a German man-of-war, and informed that she was now in German waters. In August of the following year, formal possession was taken of the whole stretch of coast. Undoubtedly, Bismarck's object in annexing such an absolutely unpromising strip of country was to gain access to the interior, and so join hands with the Boers. Fortunately, that scheme was defeated, the original plan being foiled mainly by Mackenzie's efforts, the later one, the junction through what is now Rhodesia to German East Africa, by Cecil Rhodes ; and the Fatherland has paid an enormous price for its ambition in both blood and money, the Herero War being one of the most disastrous native campaigns of modern times ; but still Bismarck saw much further than did his British rivals, and, in the end, he was only defeated because Great Britain possessed two men of unusual capacity, whilst he had to depend mainly on the slow-moving Boers.

The Transvaal delegates found plenty of unofficial assistance in their attempt to obtain control of Bechuanaland. It is not easy, even now, to write with restraint of the attitude of the Little Englander leaders at this crisis. Some of them were unquestionably mere narrow-minded fanatics of a type only too common in Great Britain ; but the lengths to which others went gave rise to unpleasant suspicions as to the true reasons for their conduct. It is certain now that the help which President Kruger was given in 1884, and the pernicious advice he received from the circle by which he was surrounded, had a great deal to

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do with his readiness to rush into war in 1899. He made the fatal mistake of judging the British nation by the noisy, unpatriotic clique with which he came in contact in London.

Lord Derby was, however, firm on the question of Bechuanaland, though the discussions on that point dragged on from the beginning of November 1883 until the middle of February 1884. In the end, the delegates had to give in, defeated, owing chiefly to the untiring energy of Mackenzie, who had not only acted throughout as unofficial adviser to the Government, but had also continued to carry on his anti-Boer campaign more vigorously than ever. He had his reward in the second article of the Convention, which began—"The Government of the South African Republic will strictly adhere to the boundaries defined in the first Article of the Convention, and will do its utmost to prevent any of its inhabitants from making encroachments on lands beyond the said boundaries. The Government of the South African Republic will appoint Commissioners upon the eastern and western borders, whose duty it will be strictly to guard against irregularities, and all trespassing over the boundaries. Her Majesty's Government will, if necessary, appoint Commissioners in the native territories outside the eastern and western borders of the South African Republic to maintain order and prevent encroachments."

In effect, an Imperial Protectorate had been proclaimed over Bechuanaland. Lord Derby, having got so far, was anxious to complete his work by ridding the new territory of Van Niekerk, Van Pittius, and their gangs of ruffians; but the task promised to be no easy one, not because of the strength of these bands, but because of the opposition of the Little Englanders, who were already clamouring

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out against any strong measures on the excuse of economy. It was the miserable plea which, coming from the same party, has been the cause of almost every frontier disaster in the history of the Empire. A little makeshift expedition sent first, to be eaten up by the enemy; then, when the latter has had time to gather in and train the recruits which victory brings, an army has been needed to finish the war.

In this case, Sir Hercules Robinson solved the difficulty for Lord Derby by suggesting the appointment of Mackenzie as Commissioner, trusting that the Scotchman's strength of character would enable him to carry out the task without the aid of an armed force. In view of subsequent events, it may seem curious that the High Commissioner should have made such a selection, but the explanation lies in the fact that for months past he had been closely associated with John Mackenzie, and had fallen under the influence of that powerful personality, just as, a few months later, he fell under the influence of Rhodes, and, as a result, once more changed his ideas and policy.

The news of Mackenzie's appointment caused consternation in Cape Town amongst both the Colonial and the Boer politicians. Each saw in it, if not the deathblow, at least a serious menace to his plans, knowing Mackenzie to be an Imperialist who cared only for the honour and greatness of the Empire, and was entirely above local influences or sordid considerations. For a time at least, the advocates of the "United States of South Africa" found themselves compelled to join hands with the "Dutch South Africa" party in a campaign against the rugged old Scotchman, who, practically single handed, had won the initial victory at Home, and now was coming out to face the rest of his country's enemies in Africa itself.

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When Mackenzie arrived in Bechuanaland in April 1889, matters were in an extremely serious condition. The country round Vryburg was entirely in the hands of Van Niekerk and his Stellaland Freebooters ; whilst further north, the so-called Rooi Grond had become the centre of yet another new Republic of an even more lawless character, the Land Goshen. The land agents, mostly men of extremely doubtful character, were furious at the threatened extinction of their trade, and did not scruple to endeavour to stir up both natives and Dutch against the new Deputy Commissioner ; in fact, all the dangerous elements, both the disloyal classes and the criminal classes, made common cause against the Scotchman, who was calmly journeying up country, absolutely without escort or police, to break up the two worst communities in South Africa.

Mackenzie's first task was to negotiate a treaty with Mankoroane, whom he found at Taungs. As usual, there was a small group of white men round the chief who stood to lose under the new régime, and their opposition to Mackenzie was extremely bitter ; but Mankoroane knew perfectly well what the advantages of regular Imperial protection would be, and, after three days of argument, he signed the document placing his territory unreservedly in the Queen's hands.

From Taungs, Mackenzie went right into the heart of the enemy's country, to Vryburg. It was, under the circumstances, not only the most courageous course, but the wisest. In a way, it seemed to overawe the Freebooters, and when, on the afternoon of his arrival, Mackenzie read his commission, and announced the establishment of Her Majesty's Protectorate over Bechuanaland—and

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Stellaland—the population was almost too astonished to protest.

The following day, Van Niekerk himself arrived, and, after several days of wearisome discussion, Mackenzie's terms were accepted provisionally. The land question was the main difficulty, but that was to be settled by a commission, volunteers' rights to farms being recognised, though not necessarily their rights to the particular farms they had seized ; whilst, as to the debts of the Republic, these were to be paid by the settlers themselves, not out of Imperial funds.

The Volks Committee, however, added to their provisional acceptance the clause by which they agreed to the appointment of Van Niekerk himself as Assistant Commissioner “ until such time as it should be decided whether the Colonial Government takes over this territory.” Therein lay the menace to Mackenzie's settlement. The Colonial party, desperate at the prospect of Mackenzie succeeding in settling the Bechuanaland question on an Imperial basis, had got the Stellalanders to petition for annexation to the Colony, a plan to which Van Niekerk and his followers had assented readily, knowing it would enable them to gain time in which to perfect their real scheme of union with the Transvaal. Yet the Cape took the idea seriously, and on July 15th, 1884, the Premier, supported by Rhodes, proposed and carried the motion for annexation.

CHAPTER V.

MACKENZIE'S stay in Stellaland was cut short by the imperative necessity of going further north to the "Land Goshen," where with the miserable little settlement of Rooi Grond as their headquarters, Van Pittius' band of border ruffians had established themselves. These northern Freebooters were of an even rougher type than the Stellalanders, the very scum of the Transvaal, and it needed a brave man to go amongst them as the Queen's representative, though probably fifty police of the type which afterwards filled the ranks of that finest of South African forces, the Bechuanaland Border Police, would quickly have sent them hurrying back to their own veld.

Major Stanley Lowe was left as temporary Resident in Vryburg, whilst the Deputy Commissioner himself went on to Mafeking, the headquarters of Montsoia, the chief of the Baralongs. For years, this old man, a black statesman of the type for which there is no longer any room in Africa, had seen in British protection the only hope for his people, and he gladly signed a convention by which he gave the Queen jurisdiction over his country, and the power to raise taxes to defray expenses.

It is well to remember, in view of what happened afterwards, especially in the case of Lobengula, that none of these natives, even the most civilised of them, Khama, regarded their treaties as anything else than direct engage-



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ments between themselves and the Crown. They were dealing, as they thought, with the Queen, through her local representative, and not in any way with the Colonial governments. Their minds were not subtle enough to understand that, when they made a bargain with Her Majesty's High Commissioner, they also made it with the Governor of Cape Colony. In many cases they detested the Colony almost as much as they detested the Boers, and they would not have agreed to a Protectorate, had they suspected that it was the first step towards annexation, nor, for that matter, would John Mackenzie have undertaken the Commissionership had he not hoped to secure the country for the Empire itself.

From Mafeking, Mackenzie went on to Land Goshen itself; but he could not repeat his Stellaland success. The Freebooters refused to listen to his proclamation, and showed their utter disregard of the British claims by looting the Baralongs' cattle whilst the natives themselves had gathered in the town to see the Deputy Commissioner. Nearly two thousand pounds' worth of oxen were driven off, and taken into the Transvaal; but though Mackenzie followed as far as Zeerust, when he entered a formal protest against the raid, the magistrate refused to take any steps.

Mackenzie's efforts to reach the Boers having proved fruitless, he went south again to Stellaland; though he was hardly out of Land Goshen before actual hostilities began between Montsoia's men and the raiders. The natives burned some of the huts at Rooi Grond, and the Boers retaliated by firing on them. Not much harm was done on either side, though the Transvaal Government magnified the burning of unoccupied shanties into a

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massacre of women and children, and so strengthened the hands of Mackenzie's enemies at Cape Town.

Both the Colonial and the Boer parties were straining every nerve to check Mackenzie's scheme. For the moment, there was a truce between them. Kruger and the other delegates arrived in Cape Town, and conferred both with Hofmeyr and with the Ministry. The High Commissioner reported the fact to Mackenzie, with the comment that the Transvaal considered the Colony would be a better neighbour than the Imperial Government, and that Kruger had promised that, if the Colony annexed Bechuanaland and the Deputy Commissioner were withdrawn, the Transvaal Government would endeavour to get the Freebooters to return to their homes.

When Mackenzie got back to Stellaland he found that Van Niekerk had already deserted him, taking the Boer element with him; that the Volks committee had been in communication with Cape Town and had not succeeded in coming to terms; and that there was a growing feeling in favour of Imperial annexation. This feeling culminated a few days later in a definite resolution that the British Flag should be hoisted. At first, Mackenzie hesitated; but after a second meeting he yielded to their request.

Meanwhile, Sir Hercules Robinson had heard of the proposition, and wired, in obvious alarm, too late, however, to prevent the definite step being taken. His message ran: "Hoisting the British Flag is technically the symbol of sovereignty; Bechuanaland is only native territory under a British Protectorate; and you are not justified in altering the status without the express sanction of Her Majesty's Government."

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Possibly Sir Hercules was entirely in the right from the strictly official point of view ; but the case was one which called for strong measures. Van Niekerk and his party were openly preparing for a junction with their kinsmen in the Transvaal ; whilst any hesitation would undoubtedly alienate many whose loyalty was only lukewarm, and would be construed by the natives as showing fear of the Boers. In these circumstances, it is difficult to see what else Mackenzie could have done ; and one can easily understand and sympathise with, the indignation he showed when he replied :

“ As to the Flag, please remember the flag of Stellaland was flying when I entered Vryburg. The people themselves went and quietly took it down. I declined then to hoist our flag until the public meeting had taken place. After the first meeting I was importuned to hoist it. I declined till the second and adjourned meeting had taken place. After it I felt bound to hoist it. They had voluntarily pulled down their flag, which had been handed to me. *There is such a thing as inducing people to distrust you.* Had the flag not been hoisted after the meeting, I should have lost the support of the best people here. All the officers have taken the oath. We have been exercising sovereignty in Stellaland since we first set foot in it. From the first, there has been more than a Protectorate here.”

It is interesting to read these old telegrams. Everyone at Home knows of Cecil Rhodes, the Empire builder, the man who coloured the map of South Central Africa red. A vast territory has been named after him, and, in his later years, when he had acquired in bitterness a sense of proportion, he was an Empire builder. He did great work,

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and the Empire owes him a great debt. He was not a Warren Hastings, nor was he a Chatham. Those two tower, magnificent and misunderstood, above the lesser men ; but Rhodes certainly ranks high amongst the latter class, perhaps the highest of all, because he left a definite mark behind him. John Mackenzie, on the other hand, is well-nigh forgotten. He never sought advertisement, and so he was never advertised. Yet, none the less, he was one of the greatest, if not the greatest, Imperialist who ever set foot in South Africa. In the end, Rhodes, Mackenzie's bitterest foe, had to steal Mackenzie's thunder, and, it is safe to say that, but for what Mackenzie did in the eighties, there would have been no British South Africa to-day. Mackenzie saw clearly, whilst all the others, save Paul Kruger, were stumbling in the dark. He was a foe worthy of Kruger's steel, and Kruger showed that he realised this fact when he threw himself, heart and soul, into the intrigue which resulted in the sudden termination of John Mackenzie's official career.

The same day on which Mackenzie sent his telegram about the flag, he received a message from Sir Hercules Robinson, recalling him to Cape Town, and appointing Cecil Rhodes in his place. The High Commissioner's views had changed completely, or, perhaps, it would be more correct to say, he had begun to regard the matter from his other standpoint, that of Governor of Cape Colony, and, as a result, had taken the advice of his Ministers on a matter which, hitherto, he had regarded as mainly one of Imperial concern. It is hard not to sympathise with him, as his position was one of extreme difficulty ; and, though he might make a stand in Mackenzie's favour when he was in London, in Cape Town, surrounded as he was by viru-

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lent politicians, independence of thought and action became almost impossible, at least to a man of his nature.

Sir Hercules had practically no funds wherewith to assist Mackenzie. The Imperial Government would not supply the police necessary to clear out the Freebooters, and the Colonial Ministry, now fully determined on annexation, was not likely to tax its people for the benefit of the opposite party. The attitude of the Cape was perfectly intelligible and its ambitions perfectly legitimate. It wanted the northern territory, and if the authorities at Home were too weak, or too slow, to annex Bechuanaland, then it was better that it should go to the Colony than to the Boers. On the other hand, it must be remembered that the Colony was actuated mainly to self-interest. It was looking for an immediate return in the form of land; whilst Mackenzie and his supporters took a far wider view, based on the theory that Great Britain had made herself responsible for the security of life and property in the interior, and that she should carry out her duty to both white and black, irrespective of the question of financial advantages. There would be time enough to think about the latter when the Freebooters had been expelled or reduced to submission.

The Cape Ministry itself was in a difficult position, as Sir Hercules admitted in writing to Mackenzie. The Bond practically controlled the situation, and the last thing the Bond desired was to see the British flag flying at Vryburg and Mafeking. In the Transvaal Volksraad, President Kruger had denounced both Mackenzie and Robinson with the utmost virulence, stigmatising them as liars and intriguers, and declaring that, owing to the way in which they had deceived the British public at the

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time of the conference in London, the Transvaal had lost Bechuanaland, its legitimate inheritance.

On being appointed Deputy Commissioner for Bechuanaland, Rhodes went straight to Vryburg, arriving there early in August. He found a very large section of the Stellalanders anxious to have the new status of their territory confirmed ; but, instead of agreeing to this, Rhodes insisted on negotiating with Van Niekerk, who, in company with the avowed advocates of Boer supremacy, had crossed into the Transvaal.

The meeting between Van Niekerk and Rhodes took place at Commando Drift, and as the Deputy Commissioner reported he found them "exceedingly embittered against Mr. Mackenzie and the section in Vryburg which had accepted his government," a state of mind not unnatural under the circumstances. After some rather bitter discussion, Rhodes made a new settlement in place of Mackenzie's temporary arrangement. The Imperial factor was eliminated. The Stellalanders were to keep the farms they already had—the land register of the Republic being considered sufficient title, irrespective of how the land had been obtained—and they were to continue their form of local self-government, pending formal annexation to the Cape Colony. Needless to say, this settlement was far from being acceptable in Pretoria, and Rhodes practically threw down a challenge to the Bond when he made it. Cape Town politicians had been expecting half-measures, but they did not yet know the strength of the new Deputy Commissioner, who, hitherto, had not held any really important position. Rhodes was strongly opposed to Mackenzie's scheme of an Imperial Protectorate ; but, none the less, he was not going to have his adopted country,

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the Colony, cut off from the North by the Boers and the Germans.

From Stellaland, Rhodes hastened to Rooi Grond, where he arrived on 25th August. The High Commissioner had called on the Transvaal Government to fulfil its obligations, and assist in pacifying the border, and, as a result, General Joubert had been dispatched to Rooi Grond as Special Commissioner. Rhodes, however, soon found that his task was hopeless. The Transvaal had not the least intention of abiding by the terms of the London Convention, and Joubert's policy plainly was to secure Montsoia's territory for the Boer Republic. He had complete control over the Freebooters, yet he would do nothing towards restraining them, even when, in barefaced defiance of the British Commissioner, they attacked Montsoia's kraal under Rhodes' own eyes. In consequence of this outrage, Rhodes took the only possible course, and left the Land Goshen immediately, returning to Commando Drift, where, instead of taking a firm stand against any form of Boer aggression, he entered anew into negotiations with Van Niekerk, a step which was calculated greatly to weaken the British position, as Van Niekerk was openly opposed to annexation by any State except the Transvaal. Meanwhile, Captain Bower, the Imperial Secretary, had come north, and in his anxiety to save the British Flag at Taungs from insult, had sent it out of the country ; whilst he had brought back the Stellaland flag, which Mackenzie had taken to Cape Town, and had sent it over the border to Van Niekerk. Probably, this constitutes about the only instance in the history of the Empire when the Flag was lowered tamely, without a fight. Even the retrocession of the Transvaal had been preceded by the disaster at Majuba,

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and, for the moment, the Boers had been the victorious party.

On September 8th, Rhodes made a definite agreement with Van Niekerk, the first article in which formally cancelled "all transactions entered into between Mackenzie and the Volks Committee, and the proclamations issued by him." The second article provided that "pending negotiations with the Cape Colony, Stellaland should continue its own government, recognising, however, Her Majesty's Protectorate, and subject to the conditions that all executive acts must be taken in concert, and with the consent of the Commissioner for Bechuanaland." The third article dealt with land titles, promising recognition of all those granted by the Stellaland Government.

Possibly, these three articles in themselves, if upheld by a force of police, would have sufficed to ensure the peaceable annexation of the territory; but their entire effect was neutralised by the fifth article, which postponed the authority of the second clause for three months, and so, for all practical purposes, restored for that period the state of affairs which had existed on Mackenzie's arrival.

It is difficult to understand the reason for the delay, unless it is to be found in the weakness of the Cape Ministry, which would not, or could not, furnish anything in the nature of an efficient armed force. The Rhodes of later years would certainly have declined to agree to such a proposition, and it is by no means easy to picture him giving way easily in the early days, even when he was still comparatively new to public work. The fact seems to be that he had already gone further than the timid Ministry had expected him to go, or desired him to go, and he preferred a delayed settlement to no settlement at all.

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But, whatever the reasons for the postponement may have been, that fifth article in the agreement destroyed the whole ; for on September 18th, but ten days after the document was signed, Van Niekerk and his band suddenly descended on Vryburg, seized the Government offices, and re-established the Republic of Stellaland.

Meanwhile, the Transvaal was taking a high hand as regarded the Land Goshen. General Joubert had been replaced by Du Toit, who went even further, for, not only did he not attempt to control the Freebooters, but, in insolent defiance of the London Convention, he actually annexed Montsoia's territory to the Transvaal by a proclamation published in Pretoria on 16th September, two days before Van Niekerk seized Vryburg. All pretence about the Rooi Grond brigands being independent of the Transvaal was now dropped, and the insult to the Imperial Government was complete. Montsoia's men who had been killed were British subjects ; the cattle, which had been driven off into the Transvaal, were nominally protected by British law ; the boundaries of the Transvaal had been laid down definitely by the Convention ; and yet Kruger, presuming on the Bond influence in Cape Town, and on the apathy of the Cabinet at Home, dared to crown the whole series of outrages by calmly declaring the scene of the raids to be the property of the South African Republic. It was a daring move, and, perhaps because of its very insolence, it was very nearly successful in the end. The Cape ministry repudiated the arrangement under which it was to make a grant of money for the purposes of the Protectorate ; the Cape Dutch attempted to intimidate the Imperial authorities by threatening a revolt in the Colony itself if any force were sent to the Protectorate ; and, for the

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moment, the defeat of both the advocates of Imperial Expansion and the advocates of Colonial Expansion seemed to be complete. When Rhodes left Bechuanaland, his work, as well as that of Mackenzie, had resulted in little else than the exasperation alike of loyal whites and of natives.

CHAPTER VI.

PRESIDENT KRUGER'S annexation of the Land Goshen can be defended on the ground that it was the logical result of British folly and uncertainty. Mackenzie's mission had been to establish a Protectorate over the territories of Montsoia and Mankoroane; yet the High Commissioner had been able to give him neither men nor money to aid in upholding his authority. He had certainly succeeded in Stellaland if he had failed at Rooi Grond, yet before he had a chance to consolidate his work, he was recalled at the instance of the Cape Ministry, which itself held office only by permission of the Afrikaner Bond. Rhodes had followed Mackenzie, to fail like him in the Land Goshen, and to hand Stellaland back to Van Niekerk and his band. In these circumstances, seeing that his intrigues at Cape Town had been crowned by success, that the High Commissioner was unable, or unwilling, to adopt a vigorous policy, it was but natural that the Boer President should take advantage of the situation. His mistake lay in the way he carried out the annexation. His measures were crude, premature, and the open insult to the British conveyed in them roused many who might have acquiesced tamely in a gradual absorption. His haste to snatch the spoils of victory defeated his whole policy.

The annexation of Montsoia's country by the Transvaal gave John Mackenzie the greatest opportunity of his life.

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He had done important work in London at the time of the Conference with the Colonial Office ; but the rousing of Cape Colony, which resulted in the Warren Expedition, was an even greater triumph. His resignation of his office as Deputy Commissioner had been cabled to Lord Derby on August 9th, but the definite acceptance was not received until September 18th, two days after the proclamation at Pretoria. During the intervening weeks he had been staying at Government House ; but, as soon as he was free once more, unmuzzled, he went into private lodgings, and threw himself heart and soul into the work. The issue now had changed, or rather had grown broader. It was no longer a question of Imperial Expansion versus Colonial Expansion, but of British Supremacy versus Boer Supremacy. Moreover, the public generally was beginning to see, behind the Boer schemes, the figure of Prince Bismarck, and the fear of Germany decided the attitude of many who might have regarded a purely Boer plot with indifference. In the Colony, the Boer himself was a neighbour, almost a relative, but the Teuton was essentially a foreigner, and a possible enemy.

The tide of indignation against the Government rose quickly. If Sir Hercules Robinson had been in any doubt as to the sentiment of Cape Town as a whole, he was quickly reassured. On September 24th a great meeting, one of the most important in the history of the Colony, was held in the Exchange Hall, Cape Town. Colonials and Imperialists were able to meet on a common platform, for the danger was common to both. The two principal speakers were the Hon. T. W. Leonard, Q.C., and John Mackenzie, and between them they laid the whole situation bare, baldly and mercilessly. The meeting was the first

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of many similar ones Mackenzie had addressed, and though a Colonial Ministry had endeavoured only a few months before to discredit him, and had actually compassed his recall, the Colony as a whole took a very different view. The Opposition campaign organised by the Afrikaner Bond proved, on the other hand, a complete failure, possibly because of the extreme difficulty of justifying the gross breach of the London Convention.

The effect of the campaign was speedily seen. Sir Hercules Robinson could doubt no longer, whatever his ministers might say, and on October 8th, 1884, he wrote to the Boer President: "I am desired by Her Majesty's Government to call upon the Government of the Transvaal to disallow the recent acts by which the South African Republic has assumed jurisdiction over Montsoia, as a violation of the Convention of 1884."

A few days later, the need for an armed force was too evident to be ignored, and the High Commissioner, who, only three months before, had been loth to grant John Mackenzie a handful of police, was actually found proposing that Sir Charles Warren should lead a small army into the Protectorate. The idea filled the Cape Ministry with consternation. It meant the virtual deathblow to the schemes of the Afrikaner Bond, and, whilst it would destroy the last hope of Boer Expansion, it was by no means certain that it would even lead to an enlarged Cape Colony. As a last desperate resource, the Ministry requested to be allowed to negotiate direct with the settlers in the Land Goshen. It was at best a forlorn hope, a frank confession of weakness, almost an appeal to the mercy of Kruger, who, by calling his Freebooters to order could prevent Sir Charles Warren from being sent to the Protectorate. At

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first, the High Commissioner hesitated, being weary of futile negotiations ; but at last he gave way, and the Premier, Mr. Upington, and Mr. Gordon Sprigg started northwards, in the vain hope of succeeding where John Mackenzie and Cecil Rhodes had failed. The result of their mission was a series of proposals so unfavourable to British interests that the High Commissioner refused to consider them at all ; and, on the night of their arrival in Kimberley, the two delegates suffered the humiliation of being burned in effigy, an insult which was repeated at Cape Town. After that, the Warren Expedition became inevitable.

It is only necessary to contrast President Kruger's conduct in the latter end of 1884 with his conduct in the months immediately preceding the Boer War, to understand the enormous effect which the discovery of the Witwatersrand Gold Reef had on the history of South Africa, and even on the history of the Empire as a whole. When Sir Charles Warren went north, the Transvaal was not in a position to fight. Even the extreme section of the Bond knew that, and ceased to mutter threats of rebellion in the Colony itself. The South African Republic was in what had, up till then, been its usual condition. It was virtually insolvent. The burghers were then, as always, ready to fight for their country ; and, as a class, they were probably more formidable than those who took the field in 1899 ; but, besides being extremely poor, they had a rooted objection to any form of taxation, and, as a result, the national treasury was empty. War, under these circumstances, was impossible, and it was for this reason that President Kruger gave way with such apparent readiness. He had played his game of bluff as long as there was a chance of ultimate success, but he was

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too wise a statesman to go on with the game when he had nothing left in his hand. The discovery of the gold on the Rand changed everything. It gave him power and confidence, and often during those last few years, when he was preparing for the final struggle, he must have congratulated himself on his wisdom in submitting when resistance must have ended in total defeat, and would probably have led to a second, and final, annexation of his territory.

The history of the Warren Expedition is uneventful. With a picked force of four thousand men under him, the General's progress was marked by unbroken success from a military point of view. He overawed South Africa, and, long before he reached the Land Goshen, the worst of the Freebooters had realised that the only hope of safety lay in flight. Politically, however, the General was less fortunate. From the day of his arrival in Cape Town, he was the centre of political intrigue. The mere news of his appointment had sufficed to settle the question of Boer aggression, and, as a result, the Imperialist and Colonial Parties were once more placed in the position of antagonists. The common foe was no longer a danger.

In Cape Town, a determined attempt was made to keep Mackenzie out of the expedition, and, at first, the General yielded; but later on he changed his mind, and the Ex-Deputy Commissioner was formally attached to the Intelligence Department, greatly to the annoyance of Rhodes, who still held Mackenzie's former appointment.

The beginning of Sir Charles Warren's mission was marked by an unpleasant incident, around which a considerable amount of controversy has raged. On the second day after his arrival, he was asked, by Sir Hercules Robinson, to initial a certain telegram, which, he was assured, would

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have the effect of allaying uneasiness in Stellaland. The message was to Van Niekerk, and ran : " I desire to acquaint you that I am prepared to adhere to the settlement arranged between you and the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Rhodes." In itself, the promise was perfectly distinct. It was an undertaking to permit the annexation of Stellaland to Cape Colony, and to recognise the land titles which had been registered by Van Niekerk's government. Apparently, the advocates of Colonial expansion had secured an easy victory at the very outset. On the other hand, when the General reached Vryburg, and discovered the effect of his action in allowing the telegram to be sent, he immediately repudiated it, on the grounds that he had not realised its import, and could not, in any case, have agreed to settle so grave a question in such an off-hand way.

Not unnaturally, Rhodes took offence. The settlement was his own scheme, one which he had carried through in the teeth of great opposition, and he was not the man to suffer such a rebuff tamely. Consequently, he took the only step possible under the circumstances, and resigned the Deputy Commissionership, alleging that he could not hold office after such a breach of faith on the part of the Imperial Government. However, he had the support of Sir Hercules Robinson, and in the end he was victorious. His settlement was carried out, and Stellaland was annexed to the Colony.

On the other hand, no reasoning man ever believed that Sir Charles Warren deliberately broke faith with either the Cape officials or with the people of Stellaland. The suggestion is palpably absurd, and would never have been made had the political atmosphere been more tranquil. Probably, as he himself explained, he did not grasp



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the full sense of the message he was allowing to be sent in his name ; and when he found he had acted without due reflection, his first duty was to endeavour to retract what he had done. He was Her Majesty's Special Commissioner, entrusted with work of utmost importance to the Empire, and it was a far more serious thing for him blindly to ratify something which he might have done in error, than to pause and use his undoubted right to reconsider his decision. By comparison with the nation he represented, the Stellalanders were a pitiful little community of brigands ; whilst with regard to the exigencies of Cape politics, the Special Commissioner had no concern with these. His position placed him above such considerations.

Sir Charles Warren met President Kruger at Fourteen Streams early in 1885, and found his opponent in an unusually pliable mood, due partially to the presence of such a strong military force on his borders, partially to the desperate condition of the Republic's finances. The conference ended in the vindication of British claims, and a promise to discourage any further attempts on the part of the Freebooters. It was not in the President's nature to give way tamely, and he may have entered into the agreement with a mental reservation to try again should the chance occur ; but, for the time being, British supremacy seemed definitely assured, without the firing of a single shot.

One act of Sir Charles Warren's which aroused great wrath in Cape Government circles, was his arrest of Van Niekerk on a charge of murder. A man called Honey had been murdered in 1883 under peculiarly atrocious conditions, and Van Niekerk was charged with having instigated the crime. At any rate, it had been committed by his

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band, in the interests of his Republic ; and the General had very good reasons for bringing him to trial. In Cape Town, however, a very different view prevailed, and strenuous attempts were made to stop the trial, with the result that, in the end, the prisoner was released on technical grounds before the evidence had been completed.

From Vryburg, the expedition went on to Mafeking, which it reached on 11th March, to find that there was no longer any Land Goshen. Both Mackenzie and Rhodes had arrived at Montsoia's kraal, only to see the Boers firing on the natives and driving off their cattle ; but now all was peace, and there was nothing to detain the General, who continued his journey to Shoshong, Khama's capital, which he entered on 8th May. The chief himself, alarmed at what had been occurring in the southern districts, was unaffectedly glad to find that the Imperial Protectorate of Montsoia's country had become an actual fact, and lost no time in offering his own territory to the Queen ; but apparently the Colonial Office considered that Imperial interests did not run so far to the north, and the offer was received with supreme indifference.

From a military point of view, Sir Charles Warren's task was now over. He had broken the power of the Freebooters, brought the South African Republic and its grim old President back to a sense of what treaty obligations meant, had reassured the loyal natives, and, at the same time, impressed them with the power of that Imperial Government, which had formerly seemed so distant, and so slow either to punish or to protect. In one sense, the expedition had been an unqualified success. On the other hand, the Special Commissioner was recalled just as his political work was beginning, and though he had accom-

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plished much, he might have accomplished a great deal more had he been allowed to remain. Much remained unsettled. Bechuanaland was left as a Protectorate, a vague responsibility which entailed risk and expense, with few countervailing advantages. The chance of declaring the whole of South Central Africa to be within the British sphere of influence was allowed to go by, and the greater part of the benefits from the expedition—which might have been secured without any additional expense—were lost, because the Colonial Office maps only extended as far as 22° southern latitude, and its advisers in Cape Town were disinclined to remedy the defect. Still, the essential fact remained, that both German and Boer schemes had been checked, and the Gate of the North kept open for the British advance.

BOOK II.

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CHAPTER VII.

THE Warren Expedition changed the whole focus of affairs in South Africa. Whilst the question of supremacy in Southern Bechuanaland remained undecided, the more northerly territories were not of immediate interest. They seemed very distant, almost beyond the horizon, and at the moment they hardly came within the range of practical politics. True, Matabeleland with its reputed wealth, its innumerable gold reefs and wonderful pasture lands, was recognised as the greatest prize of the Far Interior; but few men knew much about Lobengula's country, and all recognised that, before any settlement or annexation was possible, the fate of Bechuanaland must be determined.

The Transvaal Boers were, of course, differently situated from the British as regarded the north, for their republic bordered on territory claimed by the Matabele king, whilst the route from the Colony lay through Bechuanaland. Geographically, the Boers had a distinct advantage in the race; but, as a matter of fact, conditions were more equal than they appeared to be on the map. The British had an immense superiority as regarded money, and, whilst the struggle for Bechuanaland continued, the Boers

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had neither men nor funds to devote to any other object. Moreover, the Matabele were generally recognised as the most formidable warriors in South Africa, and the Boers knew well that they could only obtain the country at the cost of a long and desperate war, for which they were in no way prepared. There was already a blood feud between them and the northern savages ; and, though President Kruger made one attempt to negotiate a treaty soon after the re-establishment of the Transvaal Republic, an attempt which ended in failure, he was well aware that a peaceable occupation of any part of Lobengula's kingdom would be quite impossible.

The British position was more simple. Neither the Imperial Government, nor the Colony, had ever come into conflict with the Matabele, and there were reasonable grounds for hoping that negotiations might result in some sort of concession being obtained. A footing in the country once gained, the destruction of the Matabele power would then become merely a matter of time.

The settlement of the Bechuanaland question was sufficiently definite to destroy the hopes of both Boers and Germans, so far as that part of the world was concerned ; but though one scheme had gone awry, the desire for expansion remained, and, moreover, the greatest prizes of all were still to be won. Consequently, in a very short space of time, the centre of intrigue had shifted northwards again, and Lobengula's country began to fill the place in men's minds which Montsoia's territory had once occupied.

The early story of Rhodesia belongs to the domain of the archæologist rather than to that of the historian. The problem of those days, the question of who were the builders of the famous ruins, is one of very great interest ;

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but the absolute lack of evidence, other than vague tradition and the existence of the buildings themselves, makes the whole matter one of conjecture only. Yet, none the less, these same ruins have played an important part in the developments of later years, for their fame, and the air of mystery surrounding them, were not the least of the attractions which the country held out for the adventurer.

Much has been written about those extraordinary stone structures scattered throughout the veld of Mashonaland and Matabeleland. Archæologists have quarrelled over them, producing long and dry books in support of their favourite theories; company promoters have referred to them in glowing terms, as evidences of the enormous value of the territory, arguing, with considerable show of reason, that gold alone can have been the lure which drew those long-vanished Ancient Builders from their homes. And still, to-day, the mystery remains a mystery; although the most generally accepted theory, that advanced by Bent and elaborated by Hall, seems to offer a fairly satisfactory explanation.

The ruins in Lobengula's former territory vary in size from the huge so-called Elliptical Temple of Zimbabwe down to little enclosures perched on the top of some bald kopje, often a mile from any permanent water; yet the same characteristics are found in all—the perfectly trimmed blocks of stone, hewn out of a hard granite which turns the edge of the white man's tools, fitted together without mortar or cement of any kind, and, round the top of the wall, the herring-bone pattern decoration. It is impossible, even yet, to say how many of these ruins exist. A rough estimate places the number at five hundred; but this is merely a guess, for, in the big stretches of forest

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and the outlying kopje districts, there may be buildings even larger and more important than the Great Zimbabwe itself, whilst there are few prospectors and hunters who do not know of one or two hitherto unknown ruins across which they have stumbled in the course of their work. Sometimes, these have been reported and marked on the map; more often, they have been forgotten altogether, and until a detailed survey of the whole country is made, no reliable figures will be available. Probably five hundred is a very conservative estimate, even when the doubtful ones, those which may be of native construction, are eliminated from the list.

Native tradition assert that down in the low country, somewhere in the Great Sabi valley, there is a structure vaster far than anything found hitherto; but, so far, all attempts to locate it have proved fruitless, though it must be admitted that, on a point such as this, native reports are usually to be trusted, despite their vagueness from a geographer's point of view.

The Ancient Ruins were in themselves sufficient to invest the country with a certain air of romance; but their importance, from a practical point of view, was increased enormously by the existence of the ancient gold-workings. Obviously, the two went together. The buildings and the mines were the work of the same people; and the fact that those vanished miners took the trouble to build such elaborate forts and temples seemed to prove that they must have found the gold reefs well worth working.

As with the Ruins, so with the Ancient mines, their number is still unknown, though it runs into many thousands; in fact, the whole country must have been prospected with the most patient care, and it has seldom happened

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that a really payable reef has been discovered without old workings being found on it. Whoever they may have been, the Ancients were certainly expert miners, knowing as much, or even more, of gold formation than their latter-day successors, who, in the majority of cases, have simply followed in their steps, searching, not for gold reefs, but for old workings, being well aware that the existence of the latter was a proof of the presence of payable quartz.

It is still uncertain what means were employed to break the rock in those prehistoric days. The only tools found, if tools they can be called, are quantities of stone balls from four to five inches in diameter. These have, for some weird reason, been classed as hammers, though a far more probable explanation is that they were used for pulverising the quartz after extraction. The ancient workings usually extend down through the very richest portion of the reef, though they are seldom of greater depth than seventy feet. On the other hand, they are often to be found driven through rock which has proved too hard to be payable even with the aid of dynamite and modern machinery, a fact which seems to suggest that, whilst these Ancients possessed either special patience or special means of breaking the rock, they were always stopped in the end by the difficulty of ventilating their works.

It has been suggested, and the suggestion has received an astonishing amount of support, that the method employed by these ancient miners consisted in lighting huge fires at the bottom of their shafts, and then breaking the quartz by dashing water on the heated face, though those who propound this theory have refrained from explaining firstly how a fire can be kept burning at the bottom of a

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long, and usually winding, working ; and secondly, how the cooling could have been effected without those employed being scalded to death by the sudden rush of steam.

Still, for practical purposes, it is not material what methods may actually have been used, just as the very nationality of the original workers is not a question of great moment, save to archæologists. The essential fact is, that the gold of Matabeleland and Mashonaland was worked on a vast scale in some bygone age, and that the knowledge of this was an enormous help to those who, immediately after the settlement of the Bechuanaland question, began to lay their plans for the seizure of Lobengula's territory. The latter had, or appeared to have, a definite value, not only to the politician, but to the individual ; it offered chances greatly exceeding those to be obtained in Stellaland, the Land Goshen, or Khama's country. In the two discreditable little Republics, the most a man could hope for was the grant of a stretch of barren veld, which might, or might not, serve as a base for cattle raids at the expense of the natives. In any case—save that of Imperial annexation, when no one would have been allowed to acquire unearned wealth—the main portion of the spoils would have gone to the land-agents and their partners, or backers, the Cape politicians. The settler would have got very little, and that little would have been taken from him at the earliest opportunity, unless he had been able to trim his sails to the constantly changing political breezes in Cape Town. But Matabeleland and Mashonaland offered very different prospects. Gold is a tangible thing, which you can extract from the rock and take away with you ; the possession of it does not tie you down to the country where you obtained it ; when

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you have succeeded in winning your wealth, you can bear it off and enjoy it in a white man's land. For these reasons, Lobengula's territory had an attraction which was wanting in the case of the more southerly districts, whilst the reputed ferocity of the Matabele, coupled with the vague tradition of the ancient miners, threw a glamour of romance over the whole scheme of occupying that land, raising it from the plane of the merely sordid to the level of a high adventure, worthy of Elizabethan times.

As regards the Ruins and the Ancient workings, the balance of probability seems to be in favour of their having been the work of some race from Southern Arabia, which wandered south in the very dawn of history, held sway in South Central Africa for a considerable period, and, probably for some domestic reason, ultimately abandoned its colony, leaving the remaining colonists to their fate, which took the form of virtual absorption by the natives. The theory propounded by the opposition school of archæologists, who hold that both buildings and mines are the work of natives, and are of later date than the Arab occupation, may be regarded as a reaction from the equally foolish theory which connects the Queen of Sheba with the River Sabi. Possibly, one might almost say probably, part of the enormous quantity of gold used in Solomon's Temple did come from the land now known as Rhodesia, for it is difficult to see what other ancient gold-producing country could have yielded the amount of precious metal—it is estimated that from fifty to seventy-five million pounds' worth of gold was extracted by the Ancients—but at the same time, there is no reason why the Northern occupation should not have terminated hundreds of years before Solomon was born; whilst the accidental resemblance

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between the name of the river Sabi—really M'Sabi—the home of the dirty and degraded M'Hlengwi tribe, and that of the Queen who visited the Jewish king, is surely the most flimsy ground on which a solemnly-enunciated theory was ever propounded. Yet the tale of Solomon's gold and the African Land of Ophir caught the popular fancy, and when the time came for public support to be needed in the work of Northern Expansion, the semi-religious, semi-romantic atmosphere was possibly more useful to the leaders of the movement than all the fears engendered by the German schemes.

It is tolerably certain that the island of Zanzibar was visited, and probably occupied, by Arab and Persian teachers as far back as the beginning of the Christian era. The modern town of Kilwa also seems to have been a settlement of some northern race, whilst there is reputed to have been a community of Idumean Jews in the Island of Madagascar as far back as the days of Solomon.

In his book, *Prehistoric Rhodesia*, Mr. Hall has collected most of the matter available on this subject. Amongst other interesting points, he mentions that “much later, about 739 A.D., the Zaide Arabs from Arabia settled on the East African coast, and extended considerably to the southwards, “as far as, if not south of, the Zambesi, and also into the interior, eventually becoming by mixture of blood incorporated with the natives, till they became hardly distinguishable from the Kafirs.”

About the middle of the tenth century, the Arabs founded Magadoxo and Brava on the East African coast, and a century later they had reached as far south as Sofala, a harbour which, though now practically choked with sand and useless for modern vessels, was at one time the principal

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port of South Central Africa, forming, in all probability, principal landing-place of the vanished builders of Zimbabwe.

In 1505 the Portuguese arrived at Sofala, and began their long and, as it turned out, unfortunate occupation of the coast. With their arrival, the definite history of South Central Africa may be said to start, although, even from this point, the material available is very scanty and unsatisfactory. Possibly, a search in the library of the Vatican would reveal a great deal of forgotten matter relating to those early days, but that seems doubtful. The Portuguese of the sixteenth century had too hard a struggle in maintaining their footing to have much time to spend in the writing of reports.

By the beginning of the seventeenth century the Portuguese had made their way right into the interior, had crossed the horrible stretch of jungle which extends inland for about a hundred and fifty miles, and climbed up through the kopje country to the very edge of the great central plateau. There they appear to have stopped, or to have been stopped, and it does not seem that they were ever aware of the existence of the open plains of the high veld. In 1610, by the instructions of the Count of Feira, forts were erected at Quibrabassa, Massapa, Luanza, and Bocutu, the first two being in the neighbourhood of what is now the frontier of Mashonaland.

At that time the country which to-day forms the eastern portion of Southern Rhodesia was ruled by a chief, to whom the Portuguese gave the high-sounding title of the "Emperor of Monomotapa." The capital of this great personage was at, or in the neighbourhood of, the Zimbabwe Ruins, where the newcomers found a small colony of Arab

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traders, which apparently had been established for a considerable time. There seems little reason to suppose that this Emperor was anything more important than the paramount chief of a loose confederation of savages, the ancestors of the so-called "Mashona" of to-day, a rather effeminate, unwarlike people, skilled in various handicrafts, such as metal-working and weaving, almost civilised by comparison with the majority of their neighbours, yet undoubted barbarians when judged according to the European standards. Their "Empire," destined to be swept away completely at the time of the Zulu irruption of two hundred years later, appears to have been equally indefinite both in nature and in extent ; consequently, when, in 1630, Dom Nuna Alvares Pereira, the Governor of Mozambique, obtained its Cession from the reigning Emperor, it cannot be said that he acquired any rights of great value, firstly, because it was doubtful whether the chief had any right to make the grant ; secondly, because neither then, nor at any subsequent time, were the Portuguese in a position to carry out effective occupation.

For a time, however, the Portuguese Government did its best to follow up the advantage it was supposed to have gained. In 1633, André de Alvorado took out a number of artificers and miners ; in 1677 a large expedition left Lisbon in four ships, the party consisting of six hundred men for the garrisons, as well as engineers, goldsmiths, and missionaries. At one time there were as many as nine Jesuit priests in the Manica country, and the Emperor himself was converted to Christianity ; but the conversion did not last long : Mohammedan teachers arrived on the scene, and acting, it is said, on the advice of these, the chief decreed a general massacre of the Christians. The

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immediate result was a punitive expedition, which, starting from the coast, endeavoured to make its way to Zimbabwe, a place it never reached. Some of the soldiers fell from the poisoned arrows of the natives, more fell from fever and exhaustion, and at last the remainder turned back, a mere handful reaching the coast again. With this disaster, the Portuguese occupation of Mashonaland—if occupation it can be called—came to an end; and for nearly two hundred years the country practically went out of history.

CHAPTER VIII.

MONOMOTAPA, if one may use the word to denote the great territory now known as Southern Rhodesia, comes into history again in the early part of the nineteenth century. From that time onwards its story is easy to follow, for its two rulers, Umzilakazi and Lobengula, were seldom without a white man at their chief kraal.

The Matabele, or Amandebele, to give them their correct name, were of pure Zulu origin in the first case, and though, in course of time, some inferior tribes adopted their distinctive dress and tribe marks, the aristocracy of the nation never regarded these as anything but slaves. The ruling class consisted of the Abezansi, or men from the south, who originally came up from Southern Natal with Umzilakazi ; whilst the lower class, as distinct from the Makalanga or Mashona, were known as Abenhla or Highlanders, being made up of the fragments of various Basutu or Bechuana tribes from Northern Natal, which had been conquered by the great chief on his march northwards, the pick of the survivors having been afterwards pressed into his service.

The history of Umzilakazi and Lobengula is the history of the Matabele nation. The two kings dominated their people so completely, that, outside of their doings, there is little to relate ; yet, curiously enough, even during his

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lifetime, it was difficult to get two of his followers to give the same account of Umzilakazi's early years.

The Matabele of to-day usually dismisses the whole question lightly by declaring that the great chief was a brother of Tjaka, the Zulu king, that they quarrelled over some cattle, and Umzilakazi fled with his own band of followers ; but, as a matter of fact, there seems to have been no relationship between the two men, and the following account, which was given to Mr. Thomas, one of the intrepid band of missionaries belonging to the London Missionary Society, which did so much to open up the road to the north, is probably the correct one.

Umzilakazi was the son of a chief called Umatzobana, by the daughter of a neighbouring chief. When the mother was able to go about again, the headmen of the tribe were summoned to the chief's kraal, and told that the name of the child would be Umzilakazi, and that he would be heir to the chieftainship. They were then ordered to take enough cattle for the boy and his mother to live upon, to the home of the maternal grandfather, where Umzilakazi was to live until Umatzobana's death. The latter event occurred before the boy had really reached manhood, and the neighbouring chiefs immediately attempted to take advantage of his youth. There are two different stories of what occurred after this. Mr. Thomas, in his book, *Eleven Years in Central South Africa*, says :—

“ One account is this : Tjaka, a very powerful, cruel, and greedy neighbouring chief, having heard of the brave Umatzobana's death, dispatched an army to attack the Amandebele in their unprepared state, who were easily defeated, spoiled of all they had, and made captives, with their young chief. Umzilakazi, being a shrewd and expert

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young man, soon raised himself in the estimation of Tjaka, who made him commander-in-chief of his army. Tjaka, coveting some one's cattle, sent Umzilakazi with a force against him, and the attack proving successful, numbers of cattle were taken and brought into the country of the great chief. Tjaka, as these Zulu always do, expected the young man to give him the spoil, but the latter seems to have retained most of the cattle in his own possession. Knowing how much attached to their leader the soldiers were, Tjaka was at a loss to know what to do. He determined to wait a while to consider, rather than risk his own life. The plan was cautiously to get hold of the offender and put him to death. He therefore invited the son of the great Umatzobana to pay him a visit, and pretending to be very fond of the skilful warrior, he slaughtered many oxen and made a great feast. To this feast most of the King's confidants were invited, to whom he disclosed his thoughts and plans, telling them that in the evening, when Umzilakazi would be at the meat pots, and all his men defenceless and off their guard, they must be at once attacked and dispatched. The conspiracy, however, was discovered by Umzilakazi, who at once informed his adherents, and prepared to flee, with all he had, a little before the appointed time for the murder. Thus Tjaka was greatly disappointed, and Umzilakazi escaped, taking with him his people, some of Tjaka's own soldiers, and as many cattle as he could."

This account is quite in keeping with the characters of the two famous chiefs, though the narrative told to Mr. Thomas by an old man who claimed to have been with Umzilakazi at the time is worth quoting: "Uswiti having killed Umatzobana, and having attacked his son, took him and his people prisoners. Umzilakazi having been kept in

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bondage for some time, Uswiti sent the most powerful of his fighting men against Tjaka. This gave the Amandebele their chance of escape, of which they availed themselves, plundering the whole country before them, and leaving only devastation and many wretched men behind, until they reached the country of the Bakhatla, where they settled down for some years."

Umzilakazi was about twenty-seven years of age when he fled from Zululand in 1827. It was in 1839 that he made his final move into the country now known as Matabeleland. The intervening ten years form the most eventful period of his life. His band seems to have been a very small one in the first case—at no time were the Matabele numerous compared to other races—but he was a born leader of men, and he fought as a savage loves to fight, with a determination to kill or be killed. He was utterly ruthless to his enemies, and, on occasion, to his own men, as for example when, shortly after his conquest of Matabeleland, he executed the headmen who plotted to form a new tribe under one of his sons, the place of their execution, a few miles from Bulawayo being still known as Intaba Yezinduna, the mountain of the indunas; on the other hand, he knew when to spare, and he was constantly increasing his forces, and filling up the inevitable gaps, by recruiting the more warlike of his captives.

From Zululand, Umzilakazi descended on Basutoland, only to be driven back by the Basutu, then, as now, the most formidable of African native races. It was in Basutoland that the name Amandebele appears to have originated. Mr. Thomas, who was probably the foremost authority on the subject, translates it as "the men with the long shields"; though a more generally accepted

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idea is that it simply means "the foreigners" or "the men from across the border," and was given by the Basutu to the invaders, who adopted it, possibly not realising that it had been applied to them in scorn, as strangers who had been driven back.

The derivation of tribal names is often obscure. For instance, no satisfactory explanation is forthcoming as to the meaning of "M'Tchangana," the name by which the other branch of the Zulu race, those who conquered Gazaland under N'Yamandi, is now known. Even the old men themselves shake their heads when asked for an explanation. Latterly, the name has become corrupted into "Shangaan," a wholly detestable word, but one which is, unfortunately, receiving official recognition.

Again, with the word Makalanga, the real name of the so-called Mashona. This is translated by some as "Children of the Sun," and by others, who declare it should be Makaranga, as "Children of the Evening Star." The Matabele used to class all their subject tribes as "Amaswina," literally "the uncleanly folk," and from that word, in itself little more than slang, the white man has evolved the term "Mashona," which is now being adopted even by the natives, who a few years ago had never heard it.

From Basutuland, Umzilakazi led his band north-west, burning and plundering as he went. The Griquas felt the weight of his hand, and for several years he made their country the chief scene of his raids. One fight they had with the Matabele will never be forgotten by the Griqua nation. Umzilakazi had been engaged on a raid and had left his cattle almost unprotected, when a large force of Griquas, coming up from the south-west, fell on his cattle

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guards and carried off a large herd. Intoxicated by their easy success, the victors forgot their habitual caution, and, instead of hurrying homewards with their loot, they laagered their wagons and proceeded to slaughter some of the oxen, gorging themselves with meat, as is the way of the native. Morning found them all in a heavy sleep, the result of over-feeding; it found also the Matabele outside the laager. News had been sent to Umzilakazi, and his men had travelled all night along the wagon spoor to avenge the insult. The Griquas scarcely had time to throw aside their blankets before the stabbing assegais were at work amongst them. The whole party was destroyed, and the wagons reduced to so many heaps of ashes.

Shortly after this, the Boers began to trek northwards from Cape Colony, and they soon came into contact with the Matabele, who, flushed with their recent victory, attacked the first party which appeared, and drove it back with heavy loss of both men and cattle; but the victory cost Umzilakazi dear, for the remaining Boers joined hands with his other foes, the Griquas, and in a great fight in the valley of Mosiga, the Matabele suffered a crushing defeat. Still, the allies knew by bitter experience the quality of their enemy, and did not linger in his country; the day of their victory saw them on their way south again, hurrying off with the cattle they had looted, before the Lion of the North could recover from his wounds.

As it happened, however, Umzilakazi was in a worse plight than the Boers thought, for Umtigana, (Dingaan) Tjaka's brother, was even then on his way up from the south-east at the head of a powerful force. Zulu met Zulu in a struggle even more desperate than a few weeks before, and though both claimed the victory, Umzilakazi again lost

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heavily in cattle, and as soon as Umtigana's men had started on their homeward journey, the Matabele chief himself ordered his villages to be burned, and, heading north-east, began that long journey which ended in the conquest of Matabeleland. When the Boers came back a little later, accompanied this time by a force of Bechuanas, they found their enemy was already far beyond their reach.

It was some years later before Boer and Matabele came into contact with one another again. On that occasion Hendrik Potgieter led a force of his countrymen and a number of their Bechuana allies into Umzilakazi's new country. Very wisely, as is turned out, the wagons, sixty in number, were left at the Shashi River whilst the white men went forward on horseback. At first, the raid was successful, a large number of cattle being taken from an undefended post; but as it had been in the case of the Griqua raiders, so it was again. A kraal had been made in the hills to prevent the cattle straying during the night, and the Bechuanas slept round it, though Potgieter deemed it wiser for the white men to camp a short distance away, a precaution which saved his party, for at dawn, whilst it was still too dark to see the sights of a rifle, the Matabele came down and destroyed the Bechuanas to the last man. The Boers mounted hurriedly and escaped unharmed; but from that time onwards they left Umzilakazi and his cattle alone.

The Matabele had met with practically no resistance from the natives of their new country. Much has been written about the virtues of the Mashona, especially by those who were seeking for arguments in favour of the destruction of Lobengula's power; but, as a matter of fact, the best that can be said for this race is that it is com-

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paratively harmless, so far as the white man is concerned. Possibly, before the coming of Umzilakazi, the Mashona may have been the most civilised of all the African native races ; but, at the same time, it is difficult to believe that they could ever have been in any sense a fine race. To-day they are dirty, untruthful, lazy, physically unfitted for any heavy work, finding almost the only serious interest of their lives in witchcraft and its attendant abominations. Their virtues are conspicuous by their absence, their vices only too evident. Sixty years of Matabele tyranny would doubtless suffice to destroy any knowledge of arts or handicrafts they may have possessed ; but it is hardly conceivable that it could have brought about such a universal degeneration that, out of the whole of a nation, infinitely greater numerically than the Matabele ever were, it should now be impossible to find a single man who rises above the dead level of apathy and uncleanness. Still, the plea that the Mashona needed help, and deserved sympathy, was not without its uses, and, though it may have been founded on a misconception, it helped to bring about a desirable result, the destruction of the Matabele power.

CHAPTER IX.

WHEN Umzilakazi conquered the Mashona and established himself on the high plateau, he acquired the finest part of the sub-continent. Probably his choice was accidental ; he had made the south unsafe for himself, and he went north because the natural line of retreat lay that way ; but in later years he must often have congratulated himself on having met with those very misfortunes which drove him out of Griqualand.

It is curious now to reflect what might have happened had Tjaka succeeded in his scheme to destroy Umatzobana's son. In that case, there would probably have been no Matabele race ; Umzilakazi's people would have remained part of the Zulu nation ; and though, possibly, another band might have trekked northwards, the chances are that it would have been destroyed either by the Boers or by the other native tribes. It was Umzilakazi's personality which saved the Matabele, his genius for organisation as much as his military skill, and he was able to succeed where a lesser man would have failed.

Had the Matabele never crossed the Crocodile River, the Boers would undoubtedly have conquered Mashonaland, probably between 1840 and 1850. They were not sufficiently numerous at that time to have attempted to settle both the Transvaal and the northern territory ; consequently, their choice would probably have fallen on

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the latter, as being by far the richer as regarded cattle, as having better veld and water, and, no small thing in those days, being farther removed both from the British and from the warlike Basutu and Zulu tribes. Had this occupation taken place, there might never have been a Transvaal Republic, and the wealth of the Rand would have come to the British ; but, on the other hand, the Gate of the North would have been closed against the Empire. It is not too much to say that Umzilakazi's escape from Tjaka in 1827 changed the entire history, not only of South Africa, but of Central Africa as well. The Money Market in London to-day is still feeling keenly the result of a savage chieftain's hurried flight over eighty years ago.

The greater part of the territory now known as Southern Rhodesia consists of high veld, usually healthy and bracing, and admirably suited to the purposes of a pastoral people. The plateau extends, roughly, north and south, terminating abruptly on the eastern side, finishing in many places almost like a wall, with a sudden drop, often of a couple of thousand feet in ten miles, into the kopje country, a land of wonderful beauty, though of little use to the white settler, on account of its unhealthy climate during the wet season, and the comparatively small area available for cultivation or pasture, practically all the land being already occupied by the natives, who fled thither in the first case to escape from the conquering Matabele, and remain there now to keep out of the way of their new rulers.

Beyond the kopje country, which really consists of a series of terraces, the whole about a hundred miles in width, is the low bush veld, a land of silence and gloom, peopled only by the dull-eyed, apathetic M'Hlengwi, who

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live in miserable little villages of five or six huts, a race which appears to feel no interest in the present, to have no hope for the future, as though the spirit of their surroundings, the grey desolation of the mopani scrub, had sunk into its nature.

Politically speaking, the M'Hlengwi are, and apparently always have been, a negligible factor. They may have been numerous at some bygone time, but that seems extremely doubtful, for their country shows no signs of former cultivation on a large scale ; and though the enormous ancient copper workings between the Sabi and Lundi River seem to point to there having been a higher state of civilisation at one time—the copper workings, unlike the gold mines, do not belong to the prehistoric period—the people who mined these were probably natives from the higher country.

The Matabele seem to have followed much the same route as that ultimately taken by the Pioneer Column, traversing what is now the eastern portion of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, and crossing the Crocodile River near its junction with the Shashi. For a time, they appear to have headed, as the Pioneers did, north-east, then, having heard of the splendid country on the high veld, to have turned sharply to the west and climbed on to the high plateau somewhere in the neighbourhood of the modern town of Bulawayo. It is fairly certain that they did not have any serious fighting with the Bamangwatu on their way up, and that the two races did not really come into conflict until Umzilakazi, having established himself on the plateau, began to covet the flocks of what was now his southern neighbour, the Bamangwatu chief Sekhome. From that time onwards, there was the most

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bitter enmity between the two races, the Matabele being in almost every case the aggressors ; but, in the end, the clever diplomacy of Khama, Sekhome's successor, was not the least of the factors which led to the hastening on of the preparations for Lobengula's downfall.

Umzilakazi was the greatest native warrior of the last century ; but he could not have founded a kingdom had he not been also a great administrator. The Matabele government was a mixture of the Patriarchal and the Feudal ; the kingship being hereditary, and the king being lawgiver, commander-in-chief, and, in theory at least, father of his people. Umzilakazi entered his new country with nothing but an army, and his first task, when he decided to remain in the land, was to transfer that army into a nation. He himself settled at a place not very far from the present town of Bulawayo, his residence being known as Umuzi Wagwomkulu, "the town of his chief wife." The country was then divided into provinces, which in turn were subdivided into districts, each of which had so many towns. There was a regular gradation of officers. The governor of a province, known as *induna enkulu*, "great under-chief," ranking next in order to the king, was a member of the Council of the Nation, and was in most cases actually of royal blood. He had jurisdiction in minor matters, and was held accountable for everything that happened in his province. Under him were the *izinduna*, chiefs of districts, who were responsible to the *enduna enkulu*, and had similar powers on a smaller scale ; whilst under the *izinduna* were the headmen of towns and villages. Every man was bound to obey his headman, the wives to obey their husbands, the children their mothers ; consequently, there was a regular system of discipline,

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wholly military in its character, which practically brought the king into touch with the lowest of his subjects. Everything was known to him, and there was no hope of escaping his vengeance or his justice.

The many wives of Umzilakazi played an important part in his system of government. They were so numerous, that one, at least, lived in each of the principal settlements, where they ranked almost equal with the *induna enkulu*, who was bound to consult them on all important points. Moreover, they practically acted as so many spies, of whose loyalty there could be little doubt, and had a considerable influence in preventing, or frustrating, schemes of insurrection.

Umzilakazi himself was constantly travelling about his kingdom, visiting all the principal centres in turn. He was very open-handed, and his arrival was always marked by a great feast of beef. He was also perfectly accessible to any of his people when at home in his own kraal, and, as a rule, a visitor was treated with kindness and hospitality. He could be severe on occasion, as, for instance, when he had the rebellious *indunas* slaughtered; but towards his own people, the faithful band which had held to him loyally through the years of wandering and danger, he showed himself both grateful and generous. In this respect he differed from the majority of successful native warriors, most of whom seem to have got drunk with the blood of their enemies, and to have continued their intoxication with the blood of their friends. Lobengula's rule differed greatly from that of his father, being marked by unbending severity; but in excuse it may be pleaded that the second Matabele king never had the unassailable position held by the first. His title to the throne was none too good, his accession was followed by an outburst of civil war, and he never

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had the chance of winning the admiration of his people by leading them to victory against a foreign army ; moreover, his father's old warriors were mostly dead, and the younger generation was composed of men of a different stamp, men used to easy victories in raids against the Mashona or Bamangwatu, knowing nothing of the desperate struggles and privations which their fathers had undergone, swaggering, boastful, insolent, a people to be ruled by fear, not by kindness.

Mr. Thomas, who knew Umzilakazi well, and has left by far the most reliable account of the early days of the Matabele kingdom, describes Umzilakazi's headquarters as primitive in the extreme. He says "the town, or rather encampment, was situated in a forest of amapane or other trees, on the north bank of the Umpembizu, upon a dry stony elevation, and at about two hundred yards from the bank of the river. It consisted of a large kraal, with some three or four thousand head of horned cattle, and a number of smaller enclosures for sheep and goats. Amongst the latter were several huts, which were the residences of the king and his wives. There was also a wagon or two standing between the huts, which served as royal coaches. Scattered here and there, without any apparent plan or order, were some scores of other and plainer booths. These belonged to the life-guards, and others who were now with the king. Umzilakazi himself was a middle-sized man, well proportioned, black, with full features, projecting and high forehead, cautious in appearance, but kind in manner, apparently combining much simplicity and genius. He wore a Scotch cap on his head, and a coat of nap. Seated in an old arm-chair, he received us very kindly and promised to treat us well."

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Umzilakazi's wives numbered about three hundred, most of them having been given to him by their fathers, instead of being purchased in the ordinary way, the position being one of real honour or profit, in which the relatives naturally shared. Amongst the many others, the king married two daughters of Uswiti, the chief who is reputed to have held him in captivity, as well as one daughter of the chief of the Swazi nation. By each of these, the Matabele king had one son; but, Uswiti being considered the greatest amongst his fathers-in-law, the child of his eldest daughter, Umoaka, was considered to be Umzilakazi's natural heir. This boy was named Umkulumana, the other two being respectively Ubhlelo and Ulopengule, whose name was afterwards corrupted into Lobengula, or, as official documents have it, Lo Bengula.

Umzilakazi appears to have married his principal wife under compulsion, and he never forgave either her, or her father Uswiti, for the death of his own father, Umatzobana; consequently, Umkulumana was always hateful to him. As the boy grew up, and the tribe began to treat him as the rightful heir, so this feeling of detestation more increased, until, at last, the old warrior determined to put him to death. The execution of his plan was entrusted to Umcumbata, his chief councillor, who, in turn, instructed one of his own personal followers, Uhabai. The latter lost no time. Early the following morning, he came on the young prince driving some calves to pasture, and told him that he was wanted by the king. Umkulumana followed, unsuspecting; but as soon as they had entered a clump of bush, Uhabai seized his victim, bound him hand and foot, tied him to a tree with his face towards the newly-risen sun, and then brained him with

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a knobkerrie. A little later, Ubuhlelo, the other grandson of Uswiti, was killed in the same manner.

At that time, Lobengula, then little more than a child, was in charge of a chief at one of the outlying kraals. For some inexplicable reason Umzilakazi decided to have him killed also, despite the fact that the boy was really his last surviving son. So far, nothing was known of the other murders, it having been given out that the princes had been sent to Zululand, where they were to remain until the time came for them to enter into their inheritance ; and the secret was so well kept, that when, on Umzilakazi's death, Umcumbata and Uhabai told the real facts, they were not believed. However, though the chief who was in charge of Lobengula had no suspicion of what had already happened, he feared that the king meditated something against his youngest son, so he hid the prince for some months until the danger was over, giving out that he had been lost.

By comparison with his early years, the history of the latter part of Umzilakazi's reign was uneventful. After the first onslaught, few of the Mashona chieftains made any attempt at resistance, deeming it wiser to retreat further and further into the kopje country, where they built their villages on the very summits of the great hills. Every year, raiding parties were sent out, some of which went across the Zambesi itself into the country of the Barotse, whilst, more than once, a Matabele impi ventured right into the low veld, where it came into conflict with men of its own race, N'Yamandi's M'Tchangana warriors ; but the latter, accustomed to fighting in the thick bush, were usually more than a match for their cousins from the high veld, and, after a time,

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the Matabele learnt the wisdom of giving them a wide berth.

The last important raid of Umzilakazi's reign was into the country of Usibambamo, one of the few Mashona chiefs yet unconquered. Usibambamo had abandoned his own country, and taken refuge in one of the most rugged mountain ranges of the east ; but, in 1866, his turn came, and a powerful *impi* was sent against him. Realising that it was useless to fight, the unfortunate Mashona retreated to the top of a large mountain, up the slope of which there was only one narrow path. There they remained, hoping that the Matabele would merely destroy their fields and villages and then return home. But at the end of two months, Umzilakazi's men were still there, and both the food and the water of the besieged was exhausted. As a last resource, Usibambamo decided to surrender. The Matabele leader promised to spare him and his people, and then redeemed his promise by killing all the men, and carrying off the women and children.

Once, in his old age, Umzilakazi's nerve seemed to fail him. Reports came up concerning a great army of Natal Zulu, who, accompanied by a force of Transvaal Boers, were on their way to attack the Matabele. So strong were his enemies supposed to be, that the king decided on flight. His wagons were actually loaded, and the whole nation commanded to hold itself in readiness to trek westwards towards Lake N'Gami ; but in the end neither Zulu nor Boers appeared, and the panic passed away as quickly as it had arisen.

On the 5th September 1868, the Old Lion of the North died, and from then onwards until 1870, when Lobengula was crowned, the country was in a state of civil war.

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As has been mentioned, the Matabele nation knew nothing of the murder of Umkulumana and Ubuhlelo, both of whom were supposed to be in Zululand ; and when, on the old king's death, Umcumbata proclaimed Lobengula as the rightful heir, both the people and the prince himself were equally astounded. At first, Lobengula suspected a plot against himself, arguing that Umcumbata's scheme was to set his half-brothers against him, by placing him in the position of a pretender to the throne ; consequently, instead of rejoicing over his supposed good fortune, he mounted his horse and rode fifty miles to Mr. Thomas's house, where he remained for three days, at the end of which time he agreed to go back to his own town, provided his white friend would accompany him. Meanwhile Umcumbata was acting as regent, and striving to convince the Council that the other princes were really dead. Some of the *indunas* accepted his assurance, but others, chief amongst whom was Umbigo, the *induna enkulu* of Uzwan-gendaba, refused to believe the news, and declared that, not only was Umkulumana alive, but that he was actually on his way back from Zululand to claim his inheritance. Lobengula himself, never having expected to succeed his father, and being entirely unprepared to take up the chieftainship, made Umcumbata's task infinitely more difficult by his own suspicious, vacillating behaviour, a fact which seems curious now, in view of the firmness he so often displayed in later years.

Meanwhile, a pretender to the throne appeared in Natal. It seems that, many years previously, two young men had left Matabeleland and made their way down to Zululand, where for a time all trace of them was lost. One was undoubtedly a son of Umzilakazi by an inferior





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wife called Ulolumbo, a woman from Inyati with no claim to royal birth ; the other was the son of a Bechuana chief named Sekemyela. In course of time, one of these men—it is uncertain which—drifted to Natal, where he entered the service of Sir Theophilus Shepstone. Whilst there, he heard of the death of Umzilakazi, and of Umcumbata's assertion that the other princes were dead. Immediately, it occurred to him to proclaim himself to be the missing Umkulumana. Hitherto he had been known as Ukanda, but now he went to his employer, declared that he was really the son of the Lion of the North, and the grandson of Uswiti, alleging that his reason for concealing his identity so long was the knowledge of the bitter feeling which the Zulu of Natal and Zululand had against his father. He told his tale so well, and evidently knew so much about the Matabele Royal Family, that he succeeded in convincing Sir Theophilus of the legitimacy of his claim. The Natal authorities, naturally anxious to secure an ally in the North, recognised him as the rightful heir, and supported him to the best of their ability, with the result that he obtained a large following amongst the Matabele themselves. In the civil war which followed there was considerable loss on either side, though the advantage almost always lay with Lobengula, who finally disposed of his rival's claims in a battle on the banks of the Umpembizu river, when Umbigo, the *Induna* of Uzwangendaba, the chief supporter of the pretender, was killed and his clan scattered.

From that time onwards, Lobengula's authority was acknowledged by the whole nation ; but for several years his position was one of considerable difficulty. He was a young man, entirely unversed in the art of managing men, with no record of warlike achievements behind him ;

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whilst, surrounding him, were his father's old councillors, ever ready to criticise his acts, to compare him with Umzilakazi, and to remind him that he owed his throne entirely to their efforts. Yet, in the end, he triumphed over his difficulties, and proved himself, if not as great a warrior as his father, at least as great a statesman.

CHAPTER X

DURING the earlier years of Umzilakazi's reign, few white men ventured into his country. The Boers had spread his fame, or rather the terror of his name, throughout South Africa, and it was not until Robert Moffat succeeded in winning his respect that either a trader or a missionary was allowed to live in Matabeleland. It was in 1859 that the London Missionary Society's party, of which Mr. Thomas was a member, really opened up the road to the North, and, from that time onwards, traders and hunters began to arrive in increasing numbers.

Trading was a profitable business in those days. If the risks from the natives, from the fever, from the lions, were great, the profits were correspondingly high. There was no money amongst the Matabele, certainly, but there were things to be obtained from them which fetched money in Cape Colony and Natal. The principal requirements of Umzilakazi's people were, of course, guns and ammunition, articles always easily saleable amongst African savages; but, beyond these, there was a great demand for less dangerous trading goods—blankets, beads, brass wire, knives and cooking utensils. As a rule these were bartered for ivory, ostrich feathers, skins, and cattle. The king himself was anxious to possess wagons and horses, the use of which he had had impressed upon him during his wars against the Boers and the Griquas. He

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would give as much as eight hundred pounds' weight of ivory for an ordinary bullock wagon, and two hundred and fifty pounds' weight for a horse. On the other hand, no trader was allowed to enter his dominions without his express permission, and he was by no means above levying blackmail on them once they had placed themselves in his power. Even the missionaries, for whom he seems to have entertained a sincere regard, were occasionally compelled to make him presents of things they could ill spare.

When the Matabele entered this new country it was a veritable hunters' paradise. The variety of game to be found was enormous. There was the elephant, the greatest of great game; the buffalo, the most dangerous. The rivers were full of hippopotami, whilst both varieties of the rhinoceros were very plentiful. All the larger antelope, eland, sable, roan, tssesebe, were to be found in hundreds of thousands, on the plains of the high veld as well as in the bush; whilst lions and leopards constituted a very real danger, especially to the unfortunate Mashona, who had been practically deprived of the means of self defence.

In these circumstances, it was not unnatural that the country should have attracted both the sportsman and the professional hunter, and that Umzilakazi should have been constantly visited by men who wanted permission to shoot in his territory, requests which he was usually very reluctant to grant, arguing that a hunter was always an explorer as well, and that, once the road into his country was known, his old foes, the Boers and the Natal Zulu, would be on his track again. Moreover, there was the constant risk of a white man quarrelling with some of the younger Matabele and being murdered; and, in this connection, it must be remembered that both the Matabele

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kings were most careful to guard those who put themselves under their protection, displaying a degree of chivalry which, unfortunately, was not always reciprocated by their guests, who were often too ready to prove the value of their civilisation by breaking the word they had given.

When permission to shoot was granted, usually in return for the present of a rifle, the hunter was only allowed to enter a specified district, and was always placed in the charge of some trustworthy *Induna*, who was responsible for his safety and also had orders to see that he did not go outside the limits set by the king. The worst offence a white man could commit was to sell firearms without Umzilakazi's consent. On this point the king would brook no disobedience: not only would he allow the Mashona to have no guns, but for a long time only his own immediate adherents were trusted with either rifles or horses, the rank and file being restricted to the assegai and battleaxe.

If a hunter behaved himself during his first season, he was tolerably certain to have his permit renewed the following year, on payment of another gun. In this way, the country gradually became known, and by the time of Umzilakazi's death, it had, to a great extent, ceased to be a land of vague danger and mystery.

The most important event of Umzilakazi's later years was unquestionably the discovery of the gold reefs by Carl Mauch. One of these was at Tati, on the borders of Bechuanaland, in the south-western corner of Matabeleland; the other was far away in the north, in the neighbourhood of the Zambesi River.

The news of these finds caused a great sensation. Men, with the memories of what had happened in those countries

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fresh in their minds, began to talk of a new California or a new Australia, ignoring the terribly long distance which then separated Matabeleland from any civilised post, and the fact that it was inhabited by one of the most savage tribes in Africa, and ruled by a king who set his face resolutely against anything in the nature of white colonisation. In a little while, however, these truths came home to the would-be gold diggers, and the threatened rush dwindled down to a race between a few score concession-seekers.

The first request for a mineral concession was made in 1868 by Jan Viljoen, a Boer farmer, who wished to acquire the Tati district for the Transvaal Republic. A proposal to buy any other part of the country would probably have met with a curt refusal ; but the case of Tati was different. It lay on the outskirts of the kingdom, was practically uninhabited, and, so long as the white men did not go beyond the limits of the district, they could not be the cause of much trouble. Still, Umzilakazi knew the nature of the Boers too well to give them an actual foothold in his country ; consequently, whilst allowing them to carry on mining operations, he would not grant them any territorial rights.

His answer, as translated by Mr. Thomas, is very interesting. It runs :—

“Umzilakazi grants the request of the white people to come and dig out the stone of gold, and to take it away into their own country ; but he cannot sell any part of his dominions, nor can he grant permission to any other nation to come and live, nor even to settle down for any length of time, in the land. He is convinced that this is the only reasonable answer they can expect from him ; inasmuch as they must know that two kings cannot rule

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the same country, and that to bring the white and black boys into too close contact with one another would result in their quarrelling, and thus involve their fathers in strife."

By the "boys" the king meant his followers and the white miners; by the "fathers" the respective governments.

The Tati goldfield proved a sore disappointment to the majority of the prospectors who actually reached it. They had been expecting something similar to the "diggings" they had worked in in other parts of the world, not a hard quartz reef, needing costly machinery and patient development before it could yield any return. None the less, however, some of those who had capital remained in the district, and, from that time onwards, the Tati goldfield has been worked with a very fair measure of success. Thomas Baines, who was up in Matabeleland at the time of the first gold discoveries, was the first man to obtain permission to form an actual mining settlement, and in that way he, rather than Mauch, whose reports were far too highly coloured, was really the father of what has now grown into one of the most important industries of the sub-continent.

Shortly after Umzilakazi's death, when the Matabele nation was still incredulous concerning the murder of Umkulumana, Sir John Swinburne, the head of an expedition sent out by the London and Limpopo Mining Company, received a most curious permit to prospect for gold in the Zambesi Valley. Lobengula had not then been crowned, and the permit was granted by him jointly with the regent, Umcumbata. Again taking Mr. Thomas' translation, it ran:—

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“That in consideration of Sir John Swinburne and his colleagues sending men southwards in search of Umkurumana (Umkulumana)—the rightful heir to the Amandebele kingdom—they are permitted, during the absence of such men on this errand, to visit Umatjizangompi goldfields, and thus to satisfy themselves as to what those fields contain, while no other party is allowed to enter the same fields at the same time with them.”

As has been shown in the last chapter, the search for Umkulumana was necessarily futile, as Umcumbata, who gave the permit, had the best of reasons for knowing. The only result was the discovery of the imposter Ukanda, for which neither Lobengula nor the regent was likely to feel a great measure of gratitude. Moreover, the country itself was in such an unsettled state, that Sir John Swinburne's visit was necessarily a very hurried one, and in the end led to nothing definite. Gold was discovered, though not in the quantities discovered by Carl Mauch; but, from that time onwards, prospecting in the country was stopped, first by the civil war, then by Lobengula himself, and was not really resumed until after the occupation of Mashonaland by the Chartered Company's Pioneers.

Those who expected, as many certainly did expect, to find Lobengula more pliable than his father had been where the granting of concession was concerned, were doomed to disappointment. For the first few years of his reign, the new king was entirely in the hands of the old councillors, who were not likely to depart from the policy laid down by their great leader, and by the time he was able to take the reins of government into his own hands, the son of Umzilakazi was under no misapprehension as to the danger of allowing a white settlement within his borders.

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In some ways, Lobengula was more civilised than the old Lion of the North had been. He seems to have realised that conditions were changing rapidly, and that the days of defiance and curt refusals were past. As he grew to know the white man better, so the warrior in his nature was overshadowed by the diplomatist, and the end and aim of his policy grew to be the avoidance of war with those white neighbours who were steadily pushing their roads and their outposts nearer and nearer to the borders of his kingdom. Umzilakazi would probably have chosen one of two courses when the clamour of the concession-hunters began to be a serious menace. He would either have turned on the white men like an old lion at bay, and endeavoured to drive them back to the South, an attempt which would possibly have solved the problem finally by leading to the destruction of his kingdom ; or he would have done as he had spoken of doing on several occasions, burned his towns and trekked away to the North, across the Zambesi, on to the Highlands of Central Africa, where a little outpost of the Zulu nation, the Angoni, was already established. More than once, at any rate during the latter days of his reign, Lobengula talked of adopting the same plan, greatly to the alarm of Lewanika, the king of Barotseland, who sent pitiful appeals for protection to the Imperial Government through the medium of Khama.

Looking back on Lobengula now, one of the most astonishing points about his character is the patience he displayed towards the concession-hunters, and the tact with which he staved off their importunities, whilst protecting them from the wrath of the Matabele, who detested both themselves and their mission. For eighteen

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years, Lobengula held out, refusing permission to prospect, and yet avoiding an open rupture with the petitioners. On the face of this, his final surrender may seem inexplicable, though, possibly, the explanation lies hidden away amongst the unpublished papers of the Colonial Office.

An important factor in the case was, of course, the dispute between Boer and Briton over the possession of Bechuanaland. Whilst this question remained unsettled, the value of a mining concession in the northern territory was very doubtful; for, had President Kruger succeeded in shutting the Gate of the North, a British mining company in Matabeleland would have found itself so hampered by heavy transit duties on its machinery that its existence would soon have come to an end; whilst, when Matabeleland had been conquered by the Boers—and the destruction of Lobengula's power was certainly the next item on the President's programme—all concessions made by the king to British speculators would certainly have been cancelled. For these reasons, no official assistance was given to any would-be concessionaire prior to the Warren Expedition, a fact which doubtless weighed considerably with the Matabele chief.

The history of Lobengula's reign, from his accession in 1870 until the granting of the Rudd Concession, is very similar to that of the closing years of Umzilakazi's rule. There were annual raids into the Mashona country, with all the attendant horrors of massacres and burnings; there was at least one disastrous expedition to the Kalahari Desert, from which only a handful of the Matabele returned; there was a battle with a looting party of M'Tehangana about seventy miles from the Zimbabwe Ruins; whilst Khama and his Bamangwatu suffered heavily on more

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than one occasion. Yet, all the time, there was a subtle change going on within the nation itself. The old warriors and *Indunas*, the survivors of Umzilakazi's original band, had died off, and the new generation consisted of a very different class, less amenable to discipline, and, as a natural result, less formidable in the field, whilst the improvement in firearms, coupled with the fact that their bases of action were now much further north, rendered both the British and Boers infinitely more dangerous neighbours than they had been before Lobengula ascended the throne. The king himself was well aware of these facts, and when the settlement of the Bechuanaland question and the proclamation of the Protectorate over Khama's country brought the British within striking distance of his country, he became more than ever anxious to avoid anything in the nature of a war. Probably, he realised that the case was hopeless, that sooner or later, during his own lifetime perhaps, the tide of civilisation must sweep the Matabele kingdom away; but, none the less, he made a splendid stand for the rights of his people, and in all his dealings, even when badgered almost to desperation, his conduct never sank below a certain high level. He was kingly to the end, the last of the great savage chieftains of South Africa.

BOOK III.

THE CONCESSION AND THE CHARTER.

CHAPTER XI.

THE beginning of the year 1887 found Lobengula thoroughly alarmed at the prospect of his country being overrun by a horde of white adventurers, both from the British territories and from the Transvaal. Already, a change had come over his attitude towards the concession-hunters. Now, he temporised and prevaricated where formerly he would have made a blunt, unqualified refusal. It seems as though he felt that the net of civilisation, or of what then passed for civilisation, in South Central Africa, was being drawn more closely round him with every succeeding month. The days of isolation were over, for the European nations were beginning to realise that the great prizes of Africa lay, not in the south, but in the centre of the continent.

On Lobengula's south-western border, Khama, his ancient foe, the astute chief of a pseudo-Christian race, had secured the support and sympathy of a powerful section at Home. Had Bechuanaland been of any value, either for mining purposes or for agriculture, probably the Bamangwatu would have met the same fate which ultimately befell their neighbours ; but, fortunately for them, their country was of no use to the white man, save as the

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gate to Matabeleland ; whilst Khama was always careful to conciliate the British by maintaining an unswerving hostility towards both Boers and Matabele. Probably he was sincere in his attitude, for he had suffered much at the hands of these two races ; certainly his policy was wise in inception, wholly successful in its results ; and the chief himself will deservedly go down to history as one of the few great Kafir statesmen, a fact the more remarkable because his people are an effete and worthless race, which would have been crushed out of existence had it attempted to resist the passage of the white man. By 1887, Khama's country was, so far as the Matabele were concerned, entirely in the hands of the British, and there was nothing to prevent the latter from establishing a strong military force within striking distance of Bulawayo itself.

In the Northern Transvaal, the white settlements were steadily increasing both in size and numbers. The Crocodile River formed a species of natural border, but the Boers had never showed much regard for the rights of independent native races, and it was the fear of British interference, rather than the dread of the Matabele warriors, which prevented them from attempting to settle in the territory claimed by Lobengula. The latter was, of course, aware of this, as is obvious from his treatment of the various Transvaal representatives ; but he was sufficiently experienced to know that the mutual hostility of his enemies was a very uncertain protection for himself. The Cape Colony was using its utmost endeavour to induce the Imperial Government to give it the control of Bechuanaland, and, even at that time, a great proportion of those in the Colony were intensely pro-Boer, saturated with the doctrine of " Africa for the Afrikaner," and prepared to

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co-operate with the Transvaal Boers in the Northern movement, if not actually to allow them to acquire the Northern territories for the Afrikaner Republic.

On Lobengula's eastern border, his kinsman M'Zila, the chief of the M'Tchangana, was already being pressed by the Portuguese, who were re-establishing their station on the coast, and endeavouring once more to assert their claim to the country, out of which they had been driven by M'Zila's predecessor, N'Yamandi. So far, the possibilities of danger on that side may have seemed remote ; but, owing probably to the enervating nature of the country they had conquered, the M'Tchangana were very different from their Zulu forebears of sixty years before, and were not likely to make an effective resistance, even against a Portuguese army.

When Lobengula succeeded to the throne, he inherited also the nominal sovereignty of an enormous area north of the Zambesi, and though the claim was at best a shadowy one, based mainly on the success achieved by various raiding parties, his rivals were, at least, all of his own colour. The white man was virtually unknown in Central Africa. By 1889, however, matters were in a very different position. There were steamers running on the Zambesi, and regular white settlements far up in the interior, whilst British and Portuguese were competing eagerly for alliances with the various native rulers. On south and east and north, the Matabele were gradually being shut in by the white man's power ; whilst on the western side the desert already formed a practically impassable boundary.

In his own country, too, Lobengula's position was growing precarious. He was a magnificent example of a savage chieftain, and, had he lived fifty years earlier, his

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fame as a warrior would probably have eclipsed even that of Tjaka ; but, as it was, he came too late. Circumstances forced him to be a diplomat, rather than a soldier, yet his followers knew no trade save that of war, and neither could, nor would, understand the changed conditions. Khama realised that the days of irresponsible barbarism were over, and drilled the fact into his people ; Lobengula realised it too, being the mental equal of Khama, but he failed to transmit the knowledge to his tribesmen, who remained savages to the end. True, whilst they were actually under his eye, they were completely, almost pitifully, obedient. He was the King in the fullest sense of the term. He brooked no questioning of his authority, and he punished so swiftly and remorselessly that his enemies have since denounced him as brutal and tyrannical. But he knew his people, and, so far as possible, he kept them in hand. A weak chieftain would have allowed the Matabele to hurl themselves against Khama and his British supporters, or against the Boers on the Crocodile border : Lobengula risked everything, his kingship, his own life even, in an attempt to stave off the inevitable. He failed in the end, because he tried to make his people live in contact with civilisation without adopting its tenets ; because, once they were away from his immediate neighbourhood, outside the influence of his commanding personality, the Matabele had no thought of anything except war against the invader ; but, at least, he failed as a great king, not as a mere savage.

In 1887, the traders and hunters in Lobengula's territory realised that the Matabele were getting out of hand. The older regiments were steady enough ; but the younger men, whose sole experience of war had been gained in expeditions against the miserable Makalanga, were burning for

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a fight with the encroaching white man, and bitterly opposed to their chief's policy of negotiation. Lobengula saw the danger too, and many of those raids, and so-called brutalities, with which he was afterwards charged by his white enemies, were simply the result of his attempts to find occupation for his semi-mutinuous troops, and so keep them from attacking the Europeans.

In July 1887, after three weary months of negotiation, Frank Johnson¹ obtained a verbal concession from Lobengula, allowing him to prospect for gold between the Hunyani and Mazoe Rivers, in return for which he was to pay a hundred pounds down, whilst, in the event of payable gold being found, a legal deed of concession was to be signed, under which the chief was to receive two hundred pounds, a year so long as the mines were being worked. The Council of *Indunas* gave a very reluctant consent to the arrangement, and, before Major Johnson had gone far on his journey northwards, orders were sent, without the chief's knowledge, for the escort of Matabele to turn the expedition back. Ultimately, however, Lobengula learned what had been done, and the wagons were allowed to go on; but when, two months later, Major Johnson returned to the royal kraal, he found the chief's attitude altered again, owing to the behaviour of an ex-member of the Cape Legislative Assembly, who had broken faith with Lobengula by prospecting for gold whilst supposed to be hunting. Several more parties of prospectors had followed in quick succession without waiting for permission, and, as a result, a veritable panic appeared to have seized the headmen, who saw in these small expeditions the fore-runners of an army of gold-seekers. Consequently, instead

¹ The "Major Johnson" of later years.



FRANK JOHNSON.

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of having his concession confirmed, Major Johnson was summoned before the Council of *Indunas* and charged with :—

(1) Poisoning the headman of the escort—who had died of fever.

(2) Writing a letter saying the king had “two tongues.”

(3) Being a spy sent to prepare the way for a white army then on the Crocodile River.

(4) Having dug for gold with an “iron spade.”

After a farcical trial, the Council proposed to fine the Major three hundred pounds, wagon, oxen, and guns ; but the king reduced this to a hundred pounds, ten tins of gunpowder, and ten blankets. The victim paid the fine under protest, and left the country in disgust.

In itself, the incident was, perhaps, trivial ; but it showed clearly the weakness of Lobengula’s position. Personally, he seems to have believed that the granting of a certain number of concessions was inevitable, and he was ready to keep faith with the white men who came to him ; but, on the other hand, he was largely in the power of his council, and the fact that nine-tenths of the would-be concessionaires were not prepared to keep faith with him not only exasperated him, but also placed him in a false position in the eyes of his people.

In the latter part of 1887, Mr. Moffat, the Assistant Commissioner for Bechuanaland, was sent on a mission to Bulawayo. The direct cause of his visit was a series of disquieting rumours regarding certain negotiations between Lobengula and the South African Republic. True, these stories emanated from Pretoria, always the home of diplomatic untruths, but the action of the British Government in sending a representative to the Matabele was justified

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fully a month or so later, when the rumours crystallised into a definite statement to the effect that the king had signed an offensive and defensive alliance with the Transvaal.

Five years earlier, the High Gods of Downing Street would probably have received the news with utter indifference, unless, by chance, they had welcomed it as setting a definite boundary to British expansion northwards; whilst the Cape Government, if not actively supporting the Boer policy, would certainly have worked against anything in the nature of Imperial interference. But John Mackenzie had already changed the whole course of South African history. He had forced the Imperial Government to recognise its responsibilities, both towards the nation and towards the natives; whilst he had paralysed the action of those conspirators, alike in the Afrikaner Bond and in Government House, Cape Town, who had been plotting for years "to eliminate the Imperial factor," and convert South Central Africa into either a Colonial or an Afrikaner preserve. Cecil Rhodes and his party were now Imperialists, because the stubborn, rugged old Scotchman at Kuruman had rendered service under any other banner impossible.

The alleged treaty with the South African Republic was an interesting document. It purported to have been negotiated by Pieter Johannes Grobler under authority from President Kruger, and to bear the marks of Lobengula and four of his *Indunas*. Its provisions were:—

Article I. "There shall be between both parties a perpetual peace and friendship."

No violation of territory on either side shall take place.

Article II. The chief Lobengula is acknowledged as an

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independent chief. He shall be an ally of the South African Republic.

Article III. The said chief Lobengula binds himself at all times, whenever he is called upon by the Government, or by an officer of the South African Republic, to grant any assistance, either with troops or otherwise, to furnish such assistance, and his people shall then have to stand under the authority and command of the commanding officer, or of a subordinate officer under him, without showing the least disobedience to him or one of them.

Article IV. The chief Lobengula shall cause all offenders who fly from the South African Republic into his country to be caught and extradited if it shall be asked.

Article V. Allows hunters and traders to enter Matabeleland freely if provided with a pass from the President.

Article VI. If the President shall appoint a person to live in the territory of the chief Lobengula, and to have charge there as Consul of the subjects of the South African Republic . . . he shall have criminal and civil jurisdiction over all subjects of the South African Republic. . . .

It is doubtful whether any savage chief has ever been induced to enter into a contract under which the white man did not even profess to give him anything in return for the concessions he was making; moreover, though he could neither read nor write, Lobengula was no mean diplomatist; consequently, his emphatic repudiation of this amazing treaty was a matter of surprise to no one. It is, however, astonishing that the Boer Government should have attempted so palpable a fraud. A more reasonable forgery might have carried weight; but this one defeated its own object.

There is no doubt that Lobengula did sign a certain

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document at Emganweni on July 30th, 1889; but it is equally certain that he spoke the truth when he declared that he understood the paper to be merely a copy of an old agreement made, many years before, between his father, Umzilakazi, and Potgieter, the Boer representative. It is inconceivable that either he or his *Indunas* would have put their marks to the treaty, had the real contents been translated to them. The Imperial Government very rightly accepted the king's repudiation, and refused to recognise the alliance with the Transvaal; although the precedent set on this occasion proved distinctly embarrassing later on, when Lobengula brought the same charge of mistranslation against British Concessionaires; possibly, however, during the intervening months, the High Commissioner and his assistants had found various excellent reasons for conceiving a different estimate of Lobengula's veracity.

The Transvaal Government lost no time in recognising the most valuable services of Pieter Grobler, the author of the treaty, by appointing him as Consul in Matabeleland, his mission apparently being to stir up strife between Lobengula and Khama over the Disputed Territory, a strip of land lying between the Shashi and Macloutsie Rivers. Frederick Grobler, the brother of the Consul, even went so far as to offer to lead a Matabele *impi* into Bechuanaland, a step which must have led to a savage tribal war, out of which the Boers doubtless hoped to reap their profit. True, Khama was under British protection; but President Kruger knew the ways of the Imperial Government, and knew too the measure of the loyalty of Cape Colony.

Fortunately, Lobengula was fully prepared to stand by his promises of friendship to the British. Moffat found

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that "He has been so worried with importunities during the last twelve months to enter into engagements, that he turns away from any approach to anything of the kind, and no wonder." But, none the less, on 11th February 1888, the Assistant Commissioner succeeded in getting Lobengula to put his mark to a document, which, after confirming the treaty of friendship entered into in 1836 between Umzilakazi and the British Government, went on to agree that Lobengula should "refrain from entering into any correspondence or treaty with any Foreign State or Power to sell, alienate, or cede . . . any part of the Amandebele territory without the previous knowledge and sanction of Her Majesty's High Commissioner for South Africa."

In this case, the *bona fides* of the treaty was never in question ; its provisions were such as the king could understand easily, although, had he been able to realise the inevitable results of that unfortunate arrangement by which the High Commissioner was also Governor of Cape Colony, he might well have demanded the right of direct appeal to the Imperial Government.

Khama received the news of the treaty with mixed feelings. Lobengula was his hereditary foe. To the Bamangwatu chief, the Matabele had been a lifelong source of anxiety, an ever-present menace on his border. He wrote bravely to Sir Sidney Shippard, the Commissioner of British Bechuanaland : "I fought Lobengula when he had his father's great warriors from Natal, and drove him back, and he never came again." But he did fear that one result of the treaty would be a settlement of the question of the Disputed Territory in favour of the Matabele, which would "bring the lion to the very door of

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my hut." If given the strip of country in question, Lobengula would, Khama believed, hand it over to Wood, Chapman & Francis, a firm of traders which the Bama-ngwatu chief had expelled from his country for contravening his liquor laws. "Then I should be overwhelmed with drink," he continued. "I fear Lobengula less than I fear brandy. . . . Lobengula never gives me a sleepless night. . . . I dread the white man's drink more than all the assegais of the Matabele, which kill men's bodies, and it is quickly over." Again, "to allow Lobengula to come to Macloutsie would be like a man encouraging a lion to come and live among his cattle."

From the Zambesi, too, came a warning, through Khama, who wrote: "It is well known to me that the Matabele wish to leave their present country and cross the Zambesi River, and it is on their plan to make a great raid on my cattle when they go. The Matoko have prepared canoes for this purpose, and invite the Matabele to come and assist them against the Barotse. Lewanika, the chief of the Barotse, writes to me. He says, "I understand that you are now under the protection of the Queen of the English people. I do not know what it means. But they say there are soldiers living at your place, and some headman sent by the Queen to take care of you and protect you from the Matabele. Tell me all as a friend. Are you happy and quite satisfied? Are the ways of the white men burdensome to you? Tell me all. I am anxious that you should tell me very plainly, your friend, because I have a great desire to be received like you under the protection of so great a ruler as the Queen of England."

In the same letter, Khama says: "I make an offer of

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my country to Sir Charles Warren in May 1885, which your Honour informed me in March 1886 Her Majesty's Government felt themselves unable to recommend the Queen to accept"—it was two years since the Cape politicians had managed to stay Sir Charles Warren's successful career and put a stop to those dangerously Imperialistic schemes of John Mackenzie's, saving South Central Africa by a hairsbreadth from becoming a wholly British territory, yet, apparently, Khama still failed to appreciate the necessity of eliminating the Imperial factor. He looked to the Imperial Government for protection, just as the Barotse king, Lewanika, was beginning to look to it, and, as, in another way, their mutual enemy, Lobengula, was looking to it. Each was trying to preserve his own people, and two at least of them, Lobengula and Khama, saw in the Afrikaner their worst foe. Whatever might have been the opinion of their tribes, the chiefs certainly realised that the days of crude barbarism were over, that it was mere suicide to try and repel the white man altogether; consequently, they were ready, and in Khama's case eager, to put themselves directly under the protection of the Queen. Unfortunately, however, the way to the Throne lay through the High Commissioner's Office, and the High Commissioner himself was as wax in the hands of the Cape Ministry; he was Governor of Cape Colony first, a Colonial official.

The Moffat treaty with Lobengula was not long in bearing fruit. No sooner was it made public than Senhor de Carvalho, the Portuguese Consul in Cape Town, issued a protest, the dignity of which was equalled only by its futility. The Mashona territories were claimed for His Most Faithful Majesty on the grounds of cession and

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conquest, though it was not until some eighteen months later, when the question had become one of academic interest, rather than of political moment—the charter being an accomplished fact—that the Portuguese Ministry was able to explain fully from whom the concessions had come, and at whose expense the conquests had been made. Then, it appeared that in 1630, a long-forgotten governor of Mozambique, Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira, obtained the cession of the whole of the Empire of Monomotapa, a territory extending “from North-East to South-West, from the region where the Kafue meets the Zambesi, along the course of the Umniati, down to the ocean at Inhambane.” The plea of conquest was founded on various military expeditions during the two succeeding centuries, and on the establishment of certain forts, the actual existence of which could neither be confirmed nor denied. Doubtless, from an historical standpoint, as well as from that of morality, the concession of Dom Nuno Alvares Pereira was every whit as good as that afterwards obtained by Messrs. Rudd and Maguire ; but, unfortunately for the Portuguese claims, the Zulu irruptions in the early part of the nineteenth century had swept away every vestige of their sovereignty, both in the so-called “Mashona” and “Makalaka” territories of the high and middle veld, as well as in the low lying M’Hlengwi country ; and, as a result, Lobengula and M’Zila, the chief of Gazaland, could show far better titles than could His Most Faithful Majesty, titles based, not perhaps on concessions, but on the far more tangible grounds of conquest and effective occupation.

CHAPTER XII.

THE Portuguese claims to Mashonaland were treated with proper deference, from the diplomatic point of view, and became the subject of many official communications which were duly embodied in the Blue Books; but in practice no notice was taken of them. On the other hand, the treaty between the Matabele king and the South African Republic was a more serious matter. True, it was an obvious forgery, hopelessly discredited from the outset; but it had been propounded seriously by the Government in Pretoria, with the support, or rather with the connivance, of the Afrikander Bond in Cape Town. Consequently, unlike the Portuguese claims, it was a factor in the situation.

The Transvaal Government lost no time in appointing a Consul for Matabeleland, and, not unnaturally, its choice fell on Pieter Grobler, the author of the treaty, who had already proved himself eminently suited for the position, having formerly been a horse dealer in Bechuanaland, which country he had left hurriedly to avoid arrest at the instance of the chief. In the official correspondence, he is described with admirable reticence as "an absconding debtor of Khama's"; but the real charge—which was never denied—was that of fraud in selling as "salted" horses which he knew not to be so.

The main road to Bulawayo, the regular trade route,

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lay through Khama's town, and the chief himself had the very strongest objections to wagons taking any other track without his express permission. So well was this rule recognised, that even old acquaintances of the chief's, such as F. C. Selous, invariably asked his authority before branching off across the veld. On the other hand, no reasonable request was ever refused, and no obstacle placed in the way of those who respected Khama's laws. Mr. Consul Grobler, however, found himself in a delicate position. He was the accredited representative of the South African Republic, yet if he travelled up the main road he ran the risk of being arrested on a charge of defrauding Kafirs, which, unpleasant enough for an ordinary man, would be doubly galling to a diplomat. The way out of the difficulty chosen by Grobler was particularly offensive to Khama. A pont was put on the Crocodile River, some distance above its junction with the Shashi, well within the borders of the Protectorate, and from there a track was cut to Bulawayo, right across the Disputed Territory, which was treated as though belonging to Lobengula. Moreover, camped at the pont, with Grobler's party, were Chapman and Francis, two traders who, having been expelled from his country by Khama, were now known to be intriguing with the Boers to bring about a war between the Matabele and Bamangwatu.

The Consul paid a flying visit to Lobengula, who did not receive him cordially, but pointed out bluntly the fraud in the alleged treaty; whilst, on being told by Grobler that he was going back immediately to fetch his wife up from the pont, the king flatly refused to have the lady at his kraal. Grobler, however, determined to proceed with his plans, and returned to the Crocodile,

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brought his wagons across the river, and started northwards again. Meanwhile, the news had been carried to Khama, who sent orders to Mokhuchwane, the chief in command of the frontier guard on the Macloutsie River, to arrest the Consul. On 8th July 1888, a small guard of Bamangwatu attempted to stop the wagons, but they were quickly driven off by the Boers and a number of their arms captured. On arriving with the main body, Mokhuchwane was greatly disturbed, and, after a parley with Grobler, signed a preposterous agreement, by which he undertook to pay two hundred and fifty head of cattle as damages for the insult to the diplomatist's dignity. At the same time, it was arranged that a further conference should be held later in the day, at which both sides should attend unarmed. Mokhuchwane, however, had recovered his courage by the second meeting, and laid his plans for a fresh attempt to seize Grobler. Whilst the agreement was being read aloud, the Bamangwatu suddenly rushed at the Boers. The latter defended themselves with fists, knives, and revolvers, and then opened fire with the rifles which the women brought from the wagons. Once more, Khama's men were driven off, leaving behind them some thirty guns and six horses. The Boers were completely victorious, but after the *mêlée* was over, Grobler himself was found lying on the ground, shot through the leg by a Snider bullet from the rifle of Greef, one of his own men. Sixteen days later, the Consul died.

Two nights after the first fight, Francis and Chapman, accompanied by some twenty Boers, made an attack on a native camp, capturing a few guns and blankets; but with that hostilities ended, greatly to the disappointment of the Boers, who wanted nothing better than a war with

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Khama, in which they counted on the assistance of the Matabele. Unfortunately for their plans, however, Lobengula was fully aware of the value of their friendship, and fully prepared to abide by his engagements with the British, whilst Khama had been consistently averse to war ever since his succession to the chieftainship.

The Grobler affair, though insignificant in its actual proportions, caused great excitement throughout South Africa, as well as amongst that rapidly-growing section at Home which was beginning to realise the importance of the Northern territories. The Transvaal Government was loud in its denunciation of Khama, and, at first, it seemed highly probable that a Boer raid would be made on his country. However, any immediate danger of such a thing passed away quickly, owing probably to the influence of the President himself, though it was not in accordance with the nature of the Boers that the killing of one of their leaders by natives should remain unavenged.

It is not easy to understand the official policy of the South African Republic at this juncture. The Boers disliked Khama intensely, and would gladly have fought him, had it been worth their while; but they did not covet his waterless, bush covered country, and, being essentially a practical people, they may have considered that his cattle and goats would not repay the risks of a campaign, which must, ultimately, have brought them into conflict with the British forces. On the other hand, they did, undoubtedly, covet the high veld of Matabeleland and Mashonaland, ideal country from their point of view; and it is rather curious that, when the signing of the Moffat treaty showed clearly that the British also were thinking seriously of an extension northwards, they did not en-

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deavour to be the first in the field, relying on the fact that effective occupation on their part would probably have worked little more than a non-effective protest from the Imperial Government. They were in a favourable position to strike at Lobengula ; they could quickly have assembled both the transport and the men, and they had no fear of serious political opposition amongst themselves. Probably, the explanation lies in the fact that they underrated the energy, ability, and determination of Cecil Rhodes. They thought there was plenty of time, and, for that reason, made their preparations in leisurely fashion. Certain it is that, in the end, the British advance took them by surprise, though they should have known that, by their clumsy and abortive attempt to establish a consulate at Bulawayo, they were giving the fullest warning to their rivals.

President Kruger himself took up a characteristic attitude over the Grobler incident. With calm insolence, he affected to ignore the British protectorate, and addressed a peremptory letter direct to the chief, demanding the payment of a fine of thirteen hundred and fifty oxen and the punishment of Mokhuchwane, a step which aroused even Downing Street, and caused the Colonial Secretary to point out bluntly that all communications to Khama must pass through the hands of the High Commissioner. Meanwhile, Sir Sidney Shippard had been holding an exhaustive inquiry on the spot, and out of a mass of perjured evidence on both sides, Boer vying with native in the concoction of falsehoods, had arrived at the decision that, whilst Khama's men had been guilty of premeditated treachery, Grobler's mere presence in the country, without the added defiance of Khama's laws on road-making, was sufficient

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to justify an attempt to arrest him. Khama behaved throughout the inquiry with dignity and moderation, and, in the end, consented without protest to pay the widow of Grobler an annuity of two hundred pounds, a rather surprising award in view of the findings of the court. The British Government upheld the chief's right to make, and enforce, his own laws ; yet Sir Hercules Robinson insisted on the payment of this heavy annual fine because he had ventured so to do. Possibly, had Grobler been an Englishman, instead of a Boer, the result would have been different.

The High Commissioner, however, took advantage of the Grobler incident in another way, and, to Lord Knutsford's obvious annoyance, used it as an argument in favour of his new scheme for strengthening the Bechuanaland Police. In May 1884 he had made endless difficulties over allowing Mackenzie fifty men wherewith to cleanse South Bechuanaland of the Freebooters, who were actually in the country, whose presence was a standing insult to British supremacy, a proof to the natives of the worthlessness of British pledges ; yet in November 1888 he was asking for an additional two hundred, or even three hundred men to prevent a problematical raid. The explanation of the High Commissioner's new attitude is to be found in the change which had come over affairs in Cape Town. The same men who had lowered the British Flag at Taungs, and sent it out of the country, were now talking of the Empire, and spelling the word in capital letters. The land question in Bechuanaland no longer interested them ; for the gold reefs of Lobengula's country had come within the range of practical politics. Already, the Charter was in the air ; and though two hundred extra police in Khama's

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country would doubtless give the Bamangwatu chief a sense of security against the Boers, they would be even more useful in keeping the road to Matabeleland open for a party of pioneers.

The High Commissioner did not seem to have feared any further official attempts on the part of the Transvaal to obtain a footing in Lobengula's territory, despite President Kruger's stubborn refusal to recognise the Moffat treaty; and in his despatch to Lord Knutsford he speaks only of "any possible private expedition that could be organised against him (Khama) in the outlying districts of the Transvaal, where the authority of the Government over the Burgbers is necessarily somewhat weak." In view of this, the Colonial Secretary demurred at the increase on the score of economy, the administration of the Protectorate being already a heavy burden on the nation, and suggested, as an alternative plan, the enlistment of fifty additional men, and the calling up of the reserves, who were settled on police farms in the territory. Sir Hercules Robinson, however, would not abate his demands, and on the 14th December 1888, Lord Knutsford informed him by cable that an increase of two hundred men had been sanctioned, and that Colonel Carrington would sail for Africa, to take command, as soon as possible.


Only three days later, Lord Knutsford cabled again:—

"*17th December.* Is there any truth in report grant of mining concession over the whole of Matabeleland to Rudd, in consideration of monthly payment of £100, and 1000 Martini-Henry rifles? If rifles part of consideration, as reported, do you think there will be danger of complications arising from this?"

The concession had been signed on the 30th October;

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a copy had been sent to the Colonial Office by the mail leaving on the 5th December ; but, possibly from reasons of economy, in view of the heavy expense which would be involved over the new police, the High Commissioner had refrained from advising Her Majesty's Government by cable of the engagement into which Lobengula had entered.



KHAMIA TRYING A PRISONER.

CHAPTER XIII.

THROUGHOUT the Grobler affair Lobengula's attitude was one of studied indifference. It was Khama's business, not his; and the Boer contention that it had really occurred in Matabele territory apparently left him unmoved. He had not asked Grobler to come up; he did not want a Transvaal Consul at Bulawayo; and if Grobler persisted in coming, and fell a victim to Khama's men on the way, that was a matter for the Boers and the Bamangwatu to settle between themselves. Such was the attitude he adopted when discussing the matter with Mr. Moffat, and it probably represented his real feelings. He was too deeply involved in difficulties of his own to feel much interest in those of other people.

Possibly, being a diplomatist, the king did not say quite the same things to both Boer and British, and when Frederick Grobler, the brother of the late Consul, paid him a flying visit towards the end of August 1888, he may have made the statements attributed to him by his visitor, and afterwards advanced by the Transvaal Government in support of its case. Charges of prevarication are so liberally strewn throughout Frederick Grobler's report, that the author was obviously a specialist on the subject, and, as such, worthy, if not of belief, at least of quotation. He wrote:—

“The reception of the Paramount Chief Lobengula, and his manner towards me, were exceptionally and

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particularly friendly; he and his great council, as well as his subjects, were exceedingly affected and hurt by what had happened to the Consul. . . . He asserted that the attack upon the Consul did not so much emanate from Khama as indeed from the English, and on pressure from English, such as Moffat, with the object of undoing the good cause between him and the Government (which cause he still valued as before).” Thus spake Lobengula.

“My first question to him was whether he still rightfully and lawfully acknowledged the road which he (Lobengula) had given in my presence to the late Consul-General as the public road to the South African Republic.

“His answer was that it was the same road given by him to the Consul upon which he now had been treacherously murdered by Khama. He at that time thought that he had only to deal with Khama, who is his lawful subject, but not with the English, such as he now learns is the case. . . .

“Now his humble but very urgent desire is that the blood of the late Consul-General will be demanded and avenged by the Government of the South African Republic. At the same time, he said he would step in and defend his rights by putting in order his territory, now inhabited by his Vaalpens,¹ Khama.

“Lobengula asserts that his country would never have fallen into such a deplorable condition were there not from time to time Englishmen and missionaries, and also Afrikander Boers, who have always spoken a good word and acted in favour of the evil-doer Khama, and that he (Lobengula) several times in former days had firmly resolved to annihilate the impudent Khama, and always

¹ Literally “Grey-belly,” a most insulting term, signifying vassalage.

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accepted the pleadings of the above-mentioned persons once more to spare Khama as good and reasonable (of which he mentioned several white persons as witnesses), whereby he has now been deceived, and has firmly resolved henceforth not to give ear to anything, but to maintain his rights. . . .

“He further denied most strongly that he ever entered into a treaty or any engagement whatever with Moffat or with any other person sent by the English, which he would continue to affirm from time to time with his great council jointly and separately, and that what was said and proclaimed by Moffat is lies. . . .

“I asked him if he had also signed a document with Moffat. To which he replied : ‘As Moffat asked me to enter into a treaty, which I refused, Moffat thereupon said that I must at all events answer that I refused it. He then read a letter to me, in which I acquainted the High Commissioner that I did not wish to enter into any treaty.’ These were Lobengula’s words.”

It will be seen from these quotations that Frederick Grobler had not a very sparkling literary style, but such has never been considered an essential amongst South African writers of fiction; on the other hand, he undoubtedly possessed the supreme gift of imagination, and, as a fellow-worker in the same field, Dr. Leyds, who received his depositions in Pretoria, should certainly have advised him to quit diplomacy for the writing of novels, in which case he would probably have left his mark on the literature of his country.

Lobengula’s own version of the matter was somewhat different, and was expressed in more concise language. It runs as follows :—

“I, Lobengula, Chief of the Amandebele, declare that

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the words of the treaty of 30th July 1887 [Pieter Grobler's treaty], of which a copy has been laid before me by the Assistant Commissioner of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, are not true—they are not my words. I was not alone when the treaty of that date was made at Emganweni. There were others with me. The talk we had was not as the paper says.

“What we talked of that day was the old treaty of general friendship which was made between my father Umzilakazi and Enteleka (Hendrik Potgeiter).”

This declaration was signed on the 25th of October 1888, and there is little doubt that it represented the exact truth. To put the matter on the lowest ground, the king had nothing to gain under the Grobler treaty, whilst he stood to lose a good deal of prestige. In conversation with Moffat, he said: “Would I have given myself to any white nation in this way? Have I not refused Grobler to come and live here? Have I not refused his brother Frederick to give him an *impi* against the Bamangwatu? How, then, could I have made such a treaty?”

With that, the matter practically ended, so far as the Matabele were concerned. The Imperial Government accepted the king's explanation, and the question was narrowed down to the merely sordid issue of compensation from Khama, which, as already stated, ended in the native, who was technically in the right, paying compensation to the widow of the white man who was admittedly in the wrong.

Meanwhile, the king had more important matters to decide, or, as it turned out in the end, to have decided for

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him. He had made a treaty with the British, putting himself, as he thought, under the direct protection of the Queen of England. Had any one told him at that time that his treaty was really with the High Commissioner, who, in his dual capacity as Governor of the Cape, was merely the mouthpiece of the Cape politicians, probably the king would not have understood the significance of the fact; for, though he was a great man, he was also a savage, with the limitations of his kind; moreover, he had a kind of pathetic faith in the efficacy of the Queen's protection; he, himself, was a sovereign and a man of honour; and he thought he would be dealt with in accordance with his own standards. In the end, he did realise his mistake, realised it too late to save either his kingdom or his life; but that day was still distant, and in 1888 he was perfectly ready to accept the advice of his new British allies.

All through the year, the concession-hunters had been haunting the king's kraal, and Lobengula had grown unutterably weary of their importunities and of their continual quarrels amongst themselves. There were British subjects and Germans, Boers and Americans, men who claimed to represent their country, and men who had left their country for their country's good; men who worked hand in hand with the missionaries, and men who frankly took the other side; men who drank and men who professed to abhor drink,—a motly crew, with only two common characteristics, their selfishness and their readiness to turn on Lobengula once their concessions were secured. Some approached the king with an assumption of authority, others grovelled before him on the ground as humbly as did his Makalanga slaves, whilst each hated the other,

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and intrigued against Lobengula's old friends, the three or four white traders who had been with him for years.

In these circumstances, it was but natural that Lobengula should turn to the British Government, or, as he thought, to the Queen, for advice. The High Commissioner was perfectly ready to meet his wishes, and, in October 1888, Sir Sidney Shippard, the Deputy Commissioner, was sent to Bulawayo. By one of those curious chances, which occur more often in fiction than in history, the visit of this official coincided with that of Rudd and Maguire, who were seeking a concession on behalf of a powerful Cape Town syndicate, the moving spirit in which was Cecil Rhodes.

Sir Sidney seems to have started on his journey fully convinced of the iniquity of the Matabele rule, and, consequently, of the necessity of ending it. He admired the Bamangwatu, who wore European clothes and sang hymns with great fervour; he sympathised greatly with the Mashona, who had been described to him as "ingenious" or "gentle," and on whose woes was founded one of the main pleas for the occupation of Lobengula's country; but the naked and insolent Matabele filled him with horror, to which he gave full expression in his dispatches. Certainly, his initial experiences of the warrior tribe were not encouraging. Some delay arose over the arrival of the king's permission to enter his territory, and the Commissioner was stopped on the road, the regiment which had held him up spending its time in dancing most disquieting war-dances round his wagon, a proceeding quite out of keeping with his official dignity. The Matabele took particular objection to the Commissioner's wagons travelling by night, when "only wolves and ghosts

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should be abroad," an assertion which seems to have annoyed Sir Sydney considerably, as perhaps it was intended to do. Still, despite the attitude of the natives *en route*, he knew that "they dare not disobey Lobengula's positive orders not to kill a white man."

The news which met the Commissioner at Bulawayo was alarming, as regarded the body of the nation, but reassuring in so far as the king's own sentiments were concerned. Only that morning the Umbezweni regiment had left Bulawayo after spending the greater part of the previous day in trying to obtain permission to massacre all the Europeans in the country, arguing that, whilst those who were up there already would "be a mere breakfast for them," thousands would come afterwards, unless frightened off by the slaying of these few. They also clamoured to be sent against the white men's towns in the south. Lobengula's answer was an unqualified refusal. Then, as always, he showed himself not only a wise ruler, but also that rarest of things, a great native gentleman.

"The white men are my guests," he answered. "If you are really so anxious to fight the white men, I will send you down to Kimberley in charge of the *indunas*. From Kimberley the *indunas* shall return to me, and you shall remain there and try and fight the white men, and you shall see what the white men can do to you." To others in his council who urged him to kill the British, he replied, "You want to drive me into the lion's mouth."

The king's reception of his visitor was most friendly, Sir Sidney being treated with the greatest honour, a striking contrast to the manner in which Mr. Consul Grobler had been received. The Commissioner was accorded two private interviews, the results of these being embodied in a

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confidential report, which still remains unpublished, buried away amongst the archives of the Colonial Office. In the light of subsequent events, however—the Rudd Concession was signed some eight days later—it is not difficult to hazard a guess at the nature of the advice given by His Majesty's representative; for, had he endeavoured to bring the Matabele territories under Imperial control, and to prevent their being exploited by the private speculator, it is not likely that his immediate chief, the High Commissioner, would have been so ready to support Rhodes and Rudd. One or two remarks in Sir Sidney's published dispatch show the trend of his sympathies. He says: "From what I can gather, a great deal of mischief has been made by two or three Europeans who have lived long in Matabeleland, and are anxious to prevent the granting of mining concessions to others." Again, he speaks in severe terms of several would-be concessionaires, though the names of the successful ones are not mentioned; whilst a reference to some Zambesi natives who "are painfully humble and submissive in manner, as might be expected from beings whose prospects in life, *unless they can escape to Kimberley, that paradise of the oppressed, fluctuate between slavery and death at the hands of the Matabele,*" gives a clue to his feelings on the subject of the Rhodes' companies.

The Commissioner left the king's kraal immediately his business was completed, and trekked southwards. On the road between Tati and Shoshong he was overtaken by Rudd, who showed him the newly signed concession, of the existence of which Her Majesty's Ministers learned, from an unofficial source, six weeks later.

CHAPTER XIV.

IT was not until the 26th of December 1888 that Lord Knutsford received full information regarding the Rudd Concession, at least from official sources ; although, as has been seen, the news was known in the City at least ten days before, and the Colonial Secretary himself had learnt it from a private source the day after he authorised the increase of the Bechuanaland Police at the expense of the British taxpayer.

Sir Hercules Robinson's dispatch, enclosing a copy of the concession, furnishes interesting reading. He wrote :—

“GOVERNMENT HOUSE, CAPE TOWN,
5th December 1888.”

“MY LORD,—I have the honour to enclose, for your Lordship's information, a copy of a letter which I have received from Mr. C. D. Rudd, covering a copy of a mining concession which he has obtained from Lobengula, King of the Matabeles.

“The rush of concession-hunters to Matabeleland has, as your Lordship will have learnt from previous correspondence, produced a state of affairs dangerous to the peace of the country. I trust, therefore, that the effect of this concession to a gentleman of character and financial standing will be to check the inroad of adventurers as well as to secure the cautious development of the country,

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with a proper consideration for the feelings and prejudices of the natives.

“ I have, etc.

(Signed) HERCULES ROBINSON,
Governor and High Commissioner.

The Rt. Hon. LORD KNUTSFORD, G.C.M.G., etc. etc.”

Possibly, the last phrase may have seemed to the Colonial Secretary to be rather in the nature of an unctuous platitude ; but, at least, he must have felt that, after all, the High Commissioner was a man of great discernment, able to detect the difference between “ gentlemen of character and financial standing,” and “ concession-hunters and adventurers.”

Enclosed with Sir Hercules Robinson’s letter was a copy of one addressed by Mr. Rudd to Capt. Bower, which is also of considerable interest, as showing the degree of official protection the concessionaires expected to receive. It ran as follows :—

“ CAPE TOWN,
23rd November 1888.

“ SIR,—I have the honour to hand you herewith copy of a concession obtained from Lobengula, chief of the Matabele nation, on the 30th ultimo.

“ I would specially call your attention to the clause authorising the exclusion of all other white speculators from the country, and I would venture to solicit such co-operation as Her Majesty’s Government may see fit to extend in accomplishing this object, it being very evident that one of the great sources of trouble among native chiefs has been the system of petty concessions over land insufficiently beaconed and of doubtful title.

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“I would also call your attention to the endorsement on the back by the Rev. C. D. Helm, the senior missionary in Matabeleland of the London Missionary Society, and I may further inform you that the concession was signed by the king, after being fully discussed for two consecutive days by an *indaba*, or Council, of most of the *indunas* or Headmen of the Matabele.

“Besides what appears on the face of the agreement, certain verbal undertakings were given to the king by me, as for instance, that any white miners engaged in the country by me should be bound to fight in defence of the country if called upon; also, that I should not introduce any white employé or machinery until the first instalment of rifles had been delivered, and also that I should insert advertisements or notices in most of the South African and some English papers cautioning speculators against entering the country.

“The lower classes of the Matabele population have been much excited of late by the influx of whites and other causes, and I do not consider the time propitious for starting mining, but I am quite prepared to delay operations until I have won the confidence of the Matabele people sufficiently to enable the quiet development of the country to proceed. This I consider the only alternative to a war leading to the disintegration or extinction of the Matabele nation, to be followed by years of anarchy and a scramble for the land and minerals, a disaster which I trust the present concession may be the means of averting.

“I have, etc.

(Signed) C. D. RUDD.

CAPTAIN GRAHAM BOWER,
Imperial Secretary, Cape Town.”

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The letter did great credit to the writer, and when the Colonial Secretary came to read the copy he could not fail to be struck by the fact that the concessionaires put the welfare of the natives before their own material gain. They were willing to defer mining operations until the Matabele had learned to love and esteem them. Doubtless, too, Lord Knutsford was impressed by the fact that no less a person than a Senior Missionary had endorsed the concession. Possibly, it was a pity that the other clause relating to the white miners fighting in defence of the country was not included in the original document; but, at the same time, the promise was probably just as valuable made verbally as the written word would have been. There was a spirit of philanthropy abroad which raised the Rudd Concession far above the plane of mere business.

One point there was, however, which seems a little curious. Mr. Rudd's letter is dated 23rd November and contains what amounts to a request for police aid in keeping "concession-hunters and adventurers" out of Matabeleland. It was written in Cape Town to the Imperial Secretary, whose office was certainly within a few minutes' walk, yet twelve days elapsed before its contents, and the copy of the concession which accompanied it, were sent Home to the Colonial Secretary, who did not receive it until thirty-three days after it was penned. Meanwhile, the Imperial Government had authorised the increase in the Police force on the Matabele border.

Since that far distant day when Esau sold his birth-right for a mess of pottage, there have been many instances of men ready, eager even, to do the same, either through folly or ignorance, or because circumstances allowed them no alternative. It is difficult, impossible almost now, to

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say which was the determining cause in the case of Lobengula. He was a savage, who could neither read or write, his councillors were equally ignorant, his handful of white friends, the old traders and hunters who had been with him for years, were not present at the discussions ; and the only witnesses were those who were wholly on the side of the concessionaries. As far as what is called "evidence" is concerned, oaths and declarations and solemn depositions, backed by pseudo-sanctity, the Rudd Concession and its friends have scored an unqualified victory. Their case is good beyond doubt, at least from a practical point of view ; and yet there remain doubters, who base their arguments on the fact that Lobengula was a man of unusual ability, whilst none but a fool would have agreed to the terms of that most amazing concession.

The Rudd Concession runs as follows :—

"Know all men by these presents, that whereas Charles Dunell Rudd of Kimberley, Rochfort Maguire of London, and Francis Robert Thompson of Kimberley, hereinafter called the grantees, have covenanted and agreed, and do hereby covenant and agree to pay to me, my heirs and successors, the sum of one hundred pounds sterling British currency on the first day of every lunar month ; and further, to deliver at my Royal Kraal one thousand Martini-Henry breech-loading rifles, together with an hundred thousand rounds of suitable ball cartridge, five hundred of the said rifles and fifty thousand of the said cartridges to be ordered from England forthwith and delivered with reasonable despatch, and the remainder of the said rifles and cartridges to be delivered as soon as the said grantees have commenced to work mining machinery within my territory ; and further, to deliver on the Zambesi River a steamboat,

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with guns suitable for defensive purposes on the said river, or in lieu of the said steamboat, should I so elect, to pay to me the sum of five hundred pounds sterling British currency on the execution of these presents, I, Lo Bengula, King of Matabeleland, Mashonaland, and adjoining territories, in the exercise of my sovereign powers, and in the presence and with the consent of my Council of Indunas, do hereby grant and assign unto the said grantees, their heirs, representatives, and assigns, jointly and severally, the complete and exclusive charge over all metals and minerals situated and contained in my kingdoms, principalities, and dominions, together with full power to do all things that they may deem necessary to win and procure the same, and to hold, collect, and enjoy the profits and revenues, if any, derivable from the said metals and minerals, subject to the aforesaid payment: and whereas I have been much molested of late by divers persons seeking and desiring to obtain grants and concessions of land and mining rights in my territories, I do hereby authorise the said grantees, their heirs, representatives, and assigns, to take all necessary and lawful steps to exclude from my kingdoms, principalities, and dominions, all persons seeking land, metals, minerals, or mining rights therein; and I do hereby undertake to render them such needful assistance as they may from time to time require for the exclusion of such persons, and to grant no concessions of land or mining rights from and after this date without their consent or concurrence, provided that if at any time the said monthly payment of one hundred pounds shall be in arrear for a period of three months, then this grant shall cease and determine from the date of the last made payment; and further,

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provided that nothing contained in these presents shall extend to or affect a grant made by me of certain mining rights in a position of my territory south of the Ramakoban River, which grant is commonly known as the Tati Concession. This, given under my hand this thirtieth day of October in the year of our Lord eighteen hundred and eighty-eight, at my Royal Kraal.

(Signed) LO BENGULA (X, his mark).

C. D. RUDD.

ROCHFORD MAGUIRE.

F. R. THOMPSON.

Witnesses.

(Signed) CHAS. D. HELM.

J. S. DREYER.”

Copy of Endorsement on the Original Agreement.

“I hereby certify that the accompanying document has been fully interpreted and explained by me to the chief Lo Bengula and his full Council of Indunas, and that all the constitutional usages of the Matabele nation had been complied with prior to his executing the same.

“Dated at Umgusa River this thirtieth day of October 1888.

(Signed) CHAS. D. HELM.”

Looking at the concession from the white man's point of view, it is difficult, if not impossible, to believe that Lobengula understood what he was granting. He gave so much, the mineral rights over the whole of his vast territory, rights which were then believed to be worth, not merely millions, but scores of millions of pounds; he gave up the power, which so far he had guarded most jealously, the

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power to refuse permission to enter any special part of his territory, or even to cross his borders ; he placed himself entirely at the mercy of the concessionaries as regarded the number of men they might introduce into his country ; he undertook to exclude their rivals and uphold their monopoly ; he risked his kingdom, imperilled the very existence of his nation, sold the birthright of his nation, in fact ; and in return he was to receive twelve hundred pounds a year and a thousand rifles, which need not even be new, or of British make. Moreover, it must be remembered that Lobengula was no mere petty chief, to whom a hundred pounds was a vast fortune. Potentially, at least, he was enormously wealthy, being amongst the world's greatest cattle-owners ; whilst on the East Coast there were always plenty of Germans and Portuguese ready to supply him with rifles. Possibly, he was too indolent or too greatly devoid of civilised business instinct, too much of a savage, in fact, to realise his own wealth, and the ready-money payment appealed to him ; but still the explanation seems hopelessly inadequate.

No one will doubt that the interpreter did his duty faithfully, translating the document as nearly as possible into the Matabele tongue, and endeavouring to make the king grasp its purport. That much may safely be accepted as historical ; but it is extremely questionable if, even then, Lobengula understood, not because he was lacking in intelligence, far from that, but because the written agreement is a product of civilisation, and it needs a civilised intellect to grasp its meaning and its binding effect. Moreover, the native African tongues are the languages of people delighting in vagueness and unused to legal subtleties. At least to a white man, a Kafir never states anything



THE SAVANA BIDI ROCK (SQUARE TOP HILL).

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exactly, nor, at the outset, does he look for definite statements in return. True, when he has been demoralised by contact with civilisation, he does acquire a certain cunning in his dealings, but, even then, he allows himself, and expects to have allowed to him, a considerable degree of latitude.

Civilised men had been round Lobengula for years, but he, himself, had never touched civilisation or been touched by it. He had always been supreme, a barbarian upholding his state of barbarism, and the white men had been mere visitors who came and went again, leaving things unchanged. He had adopted neither their customs nor their ways of thought. He still held to the vagueness of a wholly unlettered people. Consequently, when he was told, as was undoubtedly the case, that the gold mining concession applied to the entire country, he probably failed utterly to grasp the meaning of the phrase. Some months later, he told one of the small circle of his genuine white friends, a man of unblemished honour, who was neither a "concession-hunter," nor "an adventurer," nor a "gentleman of character and financial standing," that he had "given Rudd permission to come and dig some holes for gold," and there is little question that he was voicing accurately his own interpretation of what he had signed. He was too true a patriot, or too great a man—which is much the same thing—to sell his people's birth-right for that miserable mess of pottage.

Lord Knutsford's misgivings as to the propriety of supplying the Matabele king with Martini-Henry rifles and cartridges on a large scale were shared by a good many people, ranging from old pioneers who had been through the horror and madness of a native massacre to rival

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chiefs like Khama, to whom the name of the Matabele was synonymous with terror and desolation. Of the morality of the Rudd concession there can be little question. Did it not receive official sanction, and was it not, in the end, crowned by complete success? Moreover, after the Matabele War, the majority of those same Martini-Henry rifles were recovered by the victorious troops and once more turned to the uses of civilisation. Yet there was, and still is, something to be said in favour of the views of the opposition.

The gun-runner, the man who supplies savage tribes with rifles and ammunition, is universally detested. He is a pariah amongst white men, an outlaw liable to a heavy penalty if caught by the Law, likely to be lynched if captured in one of those districts where a sense of decency takes the place of a more regular criminal code. In Africa, the British-born gun-runner is, happily, almost unknown, although there have been one or two notorious exceptions, especially in Durban. As a rule, this abominable traffic is carried on by the lower types of white men, German and Portuguese, the guns and cartridges being smuggled in through the little malaria-haunted, mangrove circled inlets of the East Coast. The rifles, gas-pipe and pewter productions from the factories of the Fatherland, used to come in, and still come in, by dribblets, two or three at a time, never more than a score in one consignment, entered under a false bill of lading, unloaded in fear and trembling after dark. But the concessionaires who supplied Lobengula with arms came into a wholly different category. They were able to do things openly, under the protection of the British, or at any rate of the Colonial, Law, and there was no question of their indictment, much less of lynching them. They were in the right—they must have been, or

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they would have been stopped—just as the little German or Portuguese trader who landed, not a thousand, but a dozen rifles, was emphatically in the wrong. To the lay mind, the difference between the cases may seem to be merely one of degree ; but anyone who knows South Africa will understand the reasons which led the Governor and the Ministry of Cape Colony to approve of the transaction.

Lord Knutsford was, however, far from satisfied about the bargain, and his views were supported by the Bishop of Bloemfontein, who, true to the great traditions of his Church, and, as a result, anxious for the honour of his country, strongly opposed the introduction of the rifles ; although the majority of the Nonconformist missionaries appear to have joined the opposite side. The correspondence with Sir Hercules Robinson is exceedingly interesting as showing the official attitude of the Cape Town authorities, who appear to have regarded the Rudd Concession as a boon both to Lobengula and to his subject tribes, as an advantage both to the hunter and to the hunted, the concessionaires being in the position of general benefactors, supplying the rifles and ammunition which would introduce a new element of pleasurable excitement into the dreary lives of the heathen north of the Crocodile River.

Sir Hercules Robinson wrote on 26th December 1888 :—

“ MY LORD,—With reference to your telegram of the 17th inst. [see above] I have the honour to enclose for your information a copy of a Minute which I have received from Sir Sidney Shippard regarding the supply of arms, which forms one of the considerations on which Mr. Rudd

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has obtained concessions of mineral rights from the Matabele King, Lo Bengula.

“Sir Sidney Shippard considers that the actual loss of life and bloodshed in a Native War is diminished by the substitution of the rifle for the stabbing assegai; and although I have no statistics on the subject, I can understand that there are reasons which would make this probable, more especially as regards the useless and wanton slaughter of women and children which is committed by men maddened with the excitement of a charge with the stabbing assegai. But whatever opinion may be formed on this subject—and it is one on which I must acknowledge my information to be defective—I do not think that anything would be gained by vetoing the passage of arms for Lo Bengula through the Protectorate, which is all we could do. If Mr. Rudd desired, he could in such case send the arms through the Transvaal, whilst if he abstained from fulfilling that part of his agreement Lo Bengula would assuredly take offence and turn to the Transvaal Government, who would in all probability be glad to supply him with an equal or larger number of arms if he desired it.

I have, etc.

(Signed) HERCULES ROBINSON,

Governor and High Commissioner.

The Right Hon. LORD KNUTSFORD, G.C.M.G., etc. etc.

Colonial Office.”

It is a little difficult to follow out the High Commissioner's argument that he could do no more than veto the passage of the arms through the Protectorate. Apparently, he had forgotten the treaty with Lobengula which Mr. Moffat had negotiated only eleven months before, a treaty

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which expressly forbade the Matabele chieftain from entering into an agreement with any other State, and, by implication, brought the Rudd Concession into the domain of Her Majesty's Government ; moreover, Mr. Rudd, though described as "of Kimberley," was a British subject, and, as such, amenable to the laws relating to the supply of arms to natives.

Sir Sidney Shippard's Minute, which accompanied the High Commissioner's letter, must have impressed Lord Knutsford greatly. The Commissioner for Bechuanaland wrote so plainly, that one can almost assume the nature of the advice which he gave to Lobengula on the occasion of their conference. His Minute ran as follows :—

SIR SIDNEY SHIPPARD'S MINUTE.

"(1) The *Indaba* or Council of Matabele *Indunas* at which Mr. Rudd's Concession was discussed at Umvootja, and the actual signing of the Concession by the Chief Lo Bengula, took place, as I understand, three days after the departure of Mr. J. S. Moffat, the Assistant Commissioner, and more than a week after I had left Umgusa River on my return from Matabeleland. I had carefully impressed upon Lo Bengula's mind that Her Majesty's Government was not in any way concerned with either mining schemes or trading ventures, and that he might be quite certain that any private concession-seeker who professed to represent the British Government was trying to deceive him by false representations.

"No Government officer or representative had anything to do with the concession in question, and my knowledge of what took place is limited to hearsay and to the contents of the document itself, which was shown to me by

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Mr. C. D. Rudd, when his mule cart overtook my ox wagons near Palochwe (Palapwe) on the road between the Tati and Shoshong.”

It was, to say the least, unfortunate that Her Majesty's representative should have felt it necessary to make this disclaimer of connection with the Rudd Concession at so early a stage, anticipating, as it were, public criticism. It shows how heavily the atmosphere was charged with suspicion ; and the fact that the Deputy Commissioner's visit coincided with that of Rudd and his associates, who were popularly regarded as being merely the delegates of Rhodes, must have appeared greatly to strengthen the case of Sir Sidney Shippard's critics. No official of the Imperial Government should ever be placed, or be allowed to place himself, in such a false position ; though the blame lies, not with the Deputy Commissioner, but with those short-sighted politicians at Home who were unwilling, or incapable, of seeing the force of John Mackenzie's argument, that no man could hold the two offices of Governor of Cape Colony and High Commissioner for South Africa, and do his duty to the Empire.

Sir Sidney Shippard's Minute :—continued.

“(2) The Rev. C. D. Helm of the London Missionary Society attested the document, and, as Mr. Rudd informed me, interpreted throughout for him, and was strongly in favour of the Concession on two grounds—(a) because the substitution of long range rifles for the stabbing assegai would tend to diminish the loss of life in the Matabele raids and thus prove a distinct gain to the cause of humanity ; and (b) because the great increase of trade would tend to introduce civilisation among the Matabele.

“(3) On the other hand, the Right Rev. the Bishop of

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Bloemfontein and the Rev. J. D. Hepburn, London Missionary at Shoshong, are strongly opposed to the supply of firearms and ammunition to the Matabele, on account of the increased facilities likely to be thus afforded for their cruel raids, the atrocity of which appears to be above question.

“(4) I felt it my duty to explain fully to Khama the conditions of Mr. Rudd’s Concession especially as related to the promised supply of arms and ammunition to the Matabele. Khama appeared very apprehensive that such a supply of arms and ammunition to the Matabele might be followed by a raid on the Bamangwatu, though I did not gather that he would attempt to prevent the conveyance of such arms and ammunition through his territory. Mr. Rudd would, I understand, be prepared to give arms and ammunition to Khama, also for defensive purposes, and the relative position of the Chiefs would thus remain unchanged.”

It is extremely interesting to find that the concessionaires were in such a generous mood, and Sir Sidney Shippard was evidently gratified, and expected Her Majesty’s Government to share in his gratification, at the fact, that if Lobengula was to receive Martinis and cartridges wherewith to slay his enemies, Mr. Rudd was also ready to give the Bechuana chief an equal number of firearms and an equal quantity of ammunition, in order that, in the Deputy Commissioner’s delightful phrase, “the relative positions of the Chiefs would remain unchanged.” Civilisation was coming to South Central Africa, and, as a result, Matabele and Bamangwatu would now be able to slay one another at long range.

The Minute went on:—

“(5) As regards the arguments based solely on the

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humanitarian point of view, I am inclined to agree with the Rev. C. D. Helm in thinking that the gradual substitution of the rifle for the stabbing assegai will directly tend to diminish instead of increasing the bloodshed and loss of life. A Matabele Matjaka unaccustomed to the use of firearms, with only a rifle in his hands, would in my opinion be far less formidable than when, assegai in hand, he stalks his victims as at present. The experience of all those who have fought in Native wars in South Africa proves that bloodshed is decreased in proportion as the Native discards the stabbing assegai and takes to missiles or firearms; and experience everywhere, to say nothing of the teachings of history, appears to confirm this view. Mr. Hepburn contends that in this case it will be the stabbing assegai plus the rifle, and that the combination will render the Matabele invincible by any other Native race; but this may, I think, fairly be doubted. At any rate, I have noticed that other natives who have once acquired familiarity with the use of firearms discard all other weapons in favour of the rifle. The use of firearms in modern warfare has notoriously diminished the loss of life in action."

Sir Sidney Shippard's arguments are not very easy to follow. For one thing, no native, save perhaps a Basuto accustomed to the open country, ever dreamed of using a rifle at long range. His idea is always to get to close quarters and so make quite sure. Moreover, whatever may be said to the contrary, a native invariably carries some other weapon, an assegai or a battle axe, in addition to his firearm. Then, too, as even Sir Sidney must have admitted, the Matabele would not have wanted the rifles unless the possession of these would make them

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more powerful in war, that is, would place the weaker tribes more than ever at their mercy.

The Deputy Commissioner's other arguments are equally feeble. He says :—

“(6) In a political point of view, it would in my opinion be inexpedient to place any restriction on the supply of firearms and ammunition to Lo Bengula while, as he is quite aware, we allow an unlimited supply to be furnished to the Bechuana and other chiefs in and beyond our Protectorate. Any such attempted restriction on our part as regards Lo Bengula would be wholly inoperative, as he can always obtain large supplies through the Transvaal, and our refusal would merely have the effect of throwing him, so to speak, into the hands of the Transvaal Boers.”

Had the Transvaal Government been anxious to obtain mining concessions, there might have been a good deal in what Sir Sidney said ; but, as matters stood, it was a matter of common knowledge that the Boers coveted the land itself, or at least the high central plateau, and their first step would be to destroy utterly the Matabele power ; consequently, the last thing they would have consented to do would have been to supply Lobengula with the means of defence against themselves. Added to this was the fact that, whatever their other sins may have been, the Boers never descended to gun-running. They knew by bitter experience what a Native war meant, and, as a result, they were always true to their own colour.

Sir Sidney's Minute went on :—

“Lo Bengula is desirous of defending himself against filibusters from the Transvaal, against marauders claiming to act under Portuguese authority, and against certain

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regiments of unruly, virtually mutinous, Matjaka, consisting mainly of Magholi or captives who have grown up to be a source of perpetual danger to him. Bad as Lo Bengula's Government may be from our point of view, it is the only means of maintaining order and preserving any vestige of respect for life and property among his ferocious subjects ; and until, in the fullness of time, some salutary changes can be introduced, it will, in my opinion, be sound policy for us to furnish Lo Bengula with the means of maintaining his authority.

(Signed) SIDNEY SHIPPARD.

December 28th, 1888."

This Minute may be said to have made history. Lord Knutsford was in the hands of his advisers in South Africa, and it was practically impossible for him to judge for himself on such a question. Moreover, it is probable that he did not realise the full gravity of the step which was being taken, and that he had not the least idea of how soon those "salutary changes" foreshadowed in the Minute were to become established facts.

In many ways, the Rudd Concession may not be a legitimate source of pride to the nation—it began as the private concern of an individual, but it quickly became a matter of Imperial importance—and yet when one comes to balance up the good and evil accomplished through it, its existence is probably justified. Now that the bitterness aroused over the transaction has died a natural death, and the Concession itself has passed out of politics into history, it is possible to take a far broader view than could the men who opposed Rudd and his associates at the time. Not unnaturally, the opposition

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saw in the document merely a device for making money rapidly at the expense of a savage chief. Not even John Mackenzie, who towered above everyone else in the country, could have foreseen the extraordinary succession of events, the result of genius, luck, folly, hard work, and actual crime, which combined to make that insignificant scrap of paper the beginning of a great Colony, one might almost say of an Empire.

But the great territory of Rhodesia in itself represents only a part of the direct results of the Rudd Concession. The Transvaal was determined to have Lobengula's territory, and, had the British delayed any longer, they would have been too late. Boers and Germans are slow-moving people, but both had realised the enormous value of the Matabele territory. The Transvaal coveted the lands and the cattle of Lobengula's people; the Germans were scheming to extend their sphere of influence right across the continent, and to cut the British off from the magnificent highlands of Central Africa. Moreover, with each succeeding month, the German hold on the Transvaal was growing stronger; and though, had the British continued to negotiate and procrastinate, the actual work of invasion would probably have been done by the Boers, the fruits of victory would in the end have gone to the Teuton, who, in this case, as in the case of the Bechuanaland Freebooters, was ready to use the Transvaal as a catspaw. Had the British failed to secure the gate of Central Africa when they did, it is safe to say that they would have lost the whole of South Africa within the next decade. Their prestige with the natives would have dwindled down to the vanishing point; the hands of the very large disloyal element in Cape Colony

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would have been strengthened enormously ; the great influx of Home-born men which took place during the next seven years would never have occurred ; and when the inevitable rupture with the Afrikanders came, the British would have found that President Kruger's dream of driving them into the sea had been accomplished almost before they could strike a blow in their own defence. Afterwards, the practical absorption of South Africa by Germany would only have been a matter of time, as a huge Afrikaner republic would soon have been honeycombed with corruption and racked by internal dissensions, leaving it an easy prey to a Fatherland whose influence had been growing steadily for years past.

The Rudd Concession proved to be the starting point of the salvation of South Africa from an Imperial aspect, or rather it was a re-starting, on somewhat different lines, of the work which John Mackenzie had begun so brilliantly. The end of the Boer War crowned it all. The British Empire was triumphant from Cape Agulhas to the Great Lakes ; and though political folly at Home, which comes perilously nigh to treason, has once more weakened the Imperial position, and may even end in absolute disaster to the Empire, the fact remains that, for nearly two decades, the cause of humanity and civilisation, the British Ideal, made almost unbroken progress in Africa.

CHAPTER XV.

THE Rudd Concession was in a secure position from the outset, at least so far as official protection was concerned. In fact, it seems impossible to doubt that it was negotiated with the full knowledge and approval of a good many of those officials whose interests should, by virtue of their position, have been wholly Imperial, whose sense of duty should have made them absolutely impartial and disinterested where private speculators were concerned. Lord Knutsford seems to have been badly served by his subordinates. No one can doubt that he, himself, was entirely in the dark as to what was really occurring, and he can in no sense be held responsible for any betrayal of the Imperial interests ; yet, at the same time, he does not seem to have been very sure as to what attitude the Colonial Office should adopt ; for on May 18th, 1888, in answer to Mr. Cawston, who informed him that he was about to proceed to Matabeleland to negotiate a concession, he replied :—

“ Her Majesty’s Government could give no countenance to any concession or agreement unless it were concluded with the knowledge of, and approved by, the High Commissioner.”

Yet, on 20th December of the same year, when Sir J. Colomb asked in the House of Commons “ whether it was true that a person named Rudd had recently been with

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the Chief Lobengula, whose territory had been declared to be within the British sphere of influence, negotiating for the transfer of the whole of the mining rights in that Chief's territory ; whether, as any such transfer if carried out would deprive that country of the chief source of revenue for its future Government, the High Commissioner would be directed to issue a proclamation declaring that no such concessions would be recognised by Her Majesty's Government, unless previously sanctioned by the officer of the Imperial Government administering the territory ; and whether it was the intention to appoint an Imperial officer to reside in that territory, and when."

Sir John Gorst, answering on behalf of the Government, replied : "The answer to the first is 'Yes.' Inquiry has been made, and the High Commissioner has reported that a full account is on its way Home. *As we have at present no protectorate in Matabeleland*, we have no right to interfere in any grant or concession which Lobengula may choose to make, nor have we any right to issue such a proclamation as that suggested in the third paragraph of the question. In reply to the last part of the question, there is no such present intention, nor has Lobengula desired such an officer."

The inconsistency is obvious. Both Portugal and the Transvaal had already received notice of the British rights over Matabeleland. Mr. Moffat and Sir Sidney Shippard had both visited Lobengula as official advisers, with the avowed object of stopping the rush of concession-hunters. Certainly, Sir Sidney had declared his total ignorance of the Rudd mission, and had stated that the Concession came to him as a surprise ; but in that case he was distinctly to blame, in view of Lord Knutsford's answer

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to Mr. Cawston, of which both he and Sir Hercules Robinson must have known.

The South African Committee, commenting on the matter, expressed its views with crude directness in one of its circulars. It wrote :—

“In one case Her Majesty’s Government refuse to countenance any treaty with Lobengula without their sanction, and as a consequence the enterprise is put a stop to. In the other case the Government declare, through Sir John Gorst, that they have no right to interfere, and a single speculator buy for an old song the most valuable territory in South Africa.

“There is no apparent difference between the cases of the two applicants, except that the former is an Englishman without any influential support behind him, while the latter is a Cape Colonist, who is believed to have received very influential support in the commercial part of his undertaking from persons in authority at the Cape.”

In writing the above, the Committee expressed the views of a very large section both at Home and in South Africa. There was an uncomfortable atmosphere of suspicion regarding the action of the Imperial officials. Naturally, the other concession-hunters were furious. Amongst others, Mr. A. W. Haggard, the Managing Director of the Austral Africa Exploration Company, sent a strong letter to the High Commissioner, stating that when he attempted to enter Matabeleland he was turned back by Mr. Maguire, “who is apparently a partner of Mr. Cecil Rhodes” and a Matabele *impi*. He protested against the withdrawal of “the British Commissioner, Mr. Moffat, at this juncture, by which we are left at the mercy of

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commercial rivals." However, though the letter was dated 5th December 1888, the very day on which the copy of the Concession was sent Home, it was already too late to seek redress. The concessionaires and their friends were all-powerful in Cape Town, and Downing Street did little more than register the decrees of its South African advisers.

The fact that the Rudd Concession did, in the end, have distinctly beneficial results does not come into the question when discussing the conduct of the Government and its officials. The latter had no right to assume what was going to happen in the future, having no past experience of such things to guide them. Moreover, their first duty was towards the British nation, and, by aiding private individuals to obtain a monopoly of what was then supposed to be the most valuable asset in Lobengula's territory, they were working against the interests of the nation as a whole.

Lobengula had entered into a treaty with the British, and in effect, if not legally, his country was a British Protectorate; at any rate, it came definitely within the British sphere of influence. The whole history of South Africa, the whole history of the white man's dealings with savage races, went to show that the Matabele kingdom was doomed to early extinction. The great Northward Trek had now begun in real earnest; it had become a political movement instead of being merely a drifting of individuals in search of new lands, and within the space of a few years the white tide was bound to sweep over Lobengula's territory and destroy his sovereignty. That much was certain, inevitable, and the British nation was in a position which gave it the first claim to be Lobengula's heir. True, the nation did not realise that fact, and

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probably would not have rated its rights at a very high figure had it been brought to an understanding of the position ; but, none the less, Her Majesty's advisers should have known how matters stood, and their first duty should have been the safeguarding of the nation's interests. The reversion of Matabeleland belonged to the Empire. Possibly, there would have been a good deal of opposition at Home to any step in this direction ; but it should have been attempted, even if it had ended in failure. However, no such attempt was made ; instead, there seemed to be a general desire to get rid of the whole trouble by handing the country over to the Rudd concessionaires. Certainly, so far, only the mineral rights had been dealt with, but everyone knew that white man and Matabele could never live side by side, especially when the white men were virtually an armed force independent of Imperial control.

The appointment of an Imperial Commissioner to reside with Lobengula would have altered the whole state of affairs. It would at once have reduced the proposed mining company down to the position, its rightful position, of a purely commercial undertaking, whilst the presence of a British representative would effectually have checked any further attempts on the part of the Boers or the Germans. When the inevitable war came, probably on the death of Lobengula, the Imperial Government would have taken over the country for the British nation. It might have been argued that there would be little left worth having, the concessionaires having secured the entire mining rights ; but the obvious answer to that is that the authorities could have refused to sanction the agreement on the terms proposed.

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John Mackenzie, always the strongest and most clear-sighted upholder of Imperial rights, laid the whole matter plainly before the Home Government. He looked on the Concession as the triumph of the forces he had fought so long and so bravely, almost single-handed at times. He saw in the Rhodes-Rudd scheme, or rather in the Rhodes scheme, for Rudd was little more than the greater man's mouthpiece, but a continuation of the old plot to bring the whole of South Africa under Afrikaner sway, which would mean ignoring utterly the rights of both British and native. He did not regard the new move as aimed in any way at the Transvaal Boers, although it might be a check to the existing Transvaal Government; but he seemed to see in it a plan to make Cape Town, definitely and finally, the capital of an Afrikaner State, reducing Pretoria to a place of no political importance. On 15th February 1889, he wrote to Lord Salisbury "the question which is being decided by the persistent efforts of our opponents, and by our own action (and often by our want of action) is—Whether or not South Africa shall be English-speaking and owning the sway of England, or be a Dutch-speaking country, owning virtually the sway of a rival European power?"

Already the Charter was in the air, and was being advertised blatantly throughout the Press as a great Imperial scheme. Mackenzie, knowing the men behind the project, was not misled by their newly-conceived enthusiasm for the cause of the British Empire. Yet others were, and many of his own supporters, those whom he himself had brought round to the Imperial point of view, were led away by the display of patriotism. As the Rev. Douglas Mackenzie says in his fine biography of his father,

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“They were not in the least conscious of departing from the principles for which they had already worked for him ; rather it seemed to many of the best of them that this scheme would go far to realise his own dreams. For how could the proposed opening up of the unoccupied territories of Mashonaland and Matabeleland by means of the enormous capital which it was proposed to employ, do aught but good in establishing Imperial authority in South Africa ? Hard-headed, practical Englishmen, to whom the vastness of the commercial proposals appealed, seemed to consider Mackenzie’s objections merely academic and his fears groundless. In brief, as Mackenzie afterwards pointed out, his own years of hard labour in educating the British public regarding South Africa had prepared the way for the Chartered Company.”

No truer words were ever written than those in the last sentence. When, if ever, the nation comes to a sane appreciation of its Imperial statesmen, it will place John Mackenzie amongst the greatest. The fact that his fears were not realised, that in the end the new territories became wholly Imperial in their ideas and methods, does not in the least detract from the value of Mackenzie’s judgment. No man living then foresaw the enormous future of the Rand goldfield, which altered the focus of everything, and, by leading to the crowning mistake of the Jameson Raid, effectually severed Rhodes’ connection with the Afrikaner party. Just as Mackenzie forced Rhodes’ hand at the time of the Warren Expedition, so, by making the Transvaal rich and powerful, transferring the hegemony of Afrikanerdom definitely to Pretoria, the growth of the Rand mining industry forced it later. The Transvaal became the predominant partner,

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and in the Transvaal Rhodes had no chance, save with the Imperialistic party.

Lord Milner, then Mr. Alfred Milner, was inclined to think Mackenzie's views extreme. Quoting again from the Life of John Mackenzie,¹ he is found saying, "The Cape might be separatist, and South Africa by itself might be separatist, but a South Africa reaching up to the Zambesi, marching into foreign spheres of influence, and needing the protecting arm of Great Britain against Portuguese or German interference with its own development, will lean more and more on us. I think I see the development in Rhodes himself. As a purely Cape politician he was (is perhaps) Afrikander. As the author of enterprises which look far beyond the Cape and the Transvaal and reach to the Zambesi, and beyond the Zambesi, he must know (he is far too shrewd not to know) that, without Imperial backing, he is lost."

Events have shown certainly, or appear to have shown, that this judgment was correct; but still, had the new factors not entered into the situation, it might very easily have proved wrong. In any case, had Mackenzie's advice been taken, and South Central Africa been placed under a Lieutenant-Governor, "who should be in direct communication with Her Majesty's Government," there would have been no element of uncertainty in the matter; but the opposition, financial, political, and social, was too powerful to be overcome. The enthusiasm for the Charter seemed to have blinded the nation as to the true issue.

¹ John Mackenzie, South African Missionary and Statesman, by Douglas Mackenzie.

CHAPTER XVI

THE question of whether Lobengula really understood what he was granting when he put his mark to the Rudd Concession will never be settled now. On one side is the undoubted fact that it was translated to him, on the other side there are his consistent repudiations of the bargain. That he continued to accept the salary and the instalments of arms is hardly admissible as evidence, because it is not in the nature of a South African native to refuse anything of value. It seems, however, improbable that, having refused so many offers for minor concessions, he should have sold everything to a stranger for such a pitiful subsidy, had he really grasped what he was doing, and the binding nature of the contract.

It is certain that he, himself, was very uneasy in his mind about the whole matter, and soon after Rudd left his kraal he decided to send two of his *Indunas*, Umsheti and Babaan, to see with their own eyes whether there really was a Great White Queen, and, if they found she existed, to ask her advice as to how he should deal with the concession-hunters.

The two chiefs were sent in charge of Mr. E. A. Maund, whom the king knew well. Mr. Maund arrived on 28th February 1889, and a week later the mission called on Lord Knutsford at the Colonial Office, Mr. Colenbrander, who, under the name of "Johann," is known to every native

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in South Africa, acted as interpreter, Selous also being present. The Colonial Secretary took down the statement of the *Indunas*, and the following day presented them to the Queen herself, at the same time reading them the Royal answer to their message.

The king's words show clearly his troubled state of mind.

“Lobengula desires to know that there is a Queen. Some of the people who come to his land tell him there is a Queen, some tell him there is not.

“Lobengula can only find out the truth by sending eyes to see whether there is a Queen.

“The *Indunas* are his eyes.

“Lobengula desires, if there is a Queen, to ask her to advise and help him, as he is much troubled by white men who come to the country and ask to dig gold.

“There is no one with him upon whom he can trust, and he asks that the Queen will send someone from herself.”

The Royal answer was severely official in tone, and cannot have been of great help to the king, who was in hopes of some sort of personal assurance, as from one ruler to another. It ran :—

“The Queen has heard the words of Lobengula. She is glad to receive the messengers of Lobengula, and to hear the message he has sent.

“The Queen will send words in reply through her Secretary of State, for the messengers to take to Lobengula.

“A reply to the letter of Lobengula will be sent through the High Commissioner. Lobengula may trust in the advice and words of that officer, as he is specially appointed by the Queen to receive the words of all friendly Chiefs in South Africa, and to send them any reply which the Queen may be pleased to give.”

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In a sense, the appeal to the Throne had failed, as the reference to the High Commissioner showed. There had been considerable opposition to the visit of the *Indunas*, and Lobengula was practically told that in future he must go to Sir Hercules Robinson for advice. He was a matter of South African, rather than of Imperial, concern. On the other hand, Lord Knutsford's reply shows that the Government was by no means ready to accept the Rudd Concession hastily; and his letter caused considerable alarm both in the City and in Cape Town. He wrote:—

“The Queen has heard the words of Lobengula; she was glad to receive these messengers and to learn the message which they have brought.

“They say that Lobengula is much troubled by white men who come into his country and ask to dig gold, and that he begs for help and advice.

“Lobengula is the ruler of his country, and the Queen does not interfere in the government of that country, but as Lobengula desires her advice, Her Majesty is ready to give it, and having therefore consulted her Principal Secretary of State holding the seals of the Colonial Department, now replies as follows:—

““In the first place, the Queen wishes Lobengula to understand directly that Englishmen who have gone to Matabeleland to ask leave to dig for stones have not gone with the Queen's authority, and that he should not believe statements made by them or any of them to that effect.

““The Queen advises Lobengula not to grant hastily concessions of land or leave to dig, but to consider all applications very carefully.

““It is not wise to put too much power into the hands of the men who come first, and to exclude other deserving men.

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A king gives a stranger an ox, not his whole herd of cattle, otherwise what would other strangers arriving have to eat ?

“ ‘ Umsheti and Babaan say that Lobengula asks that the Queen will send him someone from herself. To this request the Queen is advised that Her Majesty may be pleased to accede. But they cannot say whether Lobengula wishes to have an Imperial officer to reside with him permanently, or only to have an officer sent out on a temporary mission, nor do Umsheti and Babaan state what provision Lobengula would be prepared to make for the expenses and maintenance of such an officer.

“ ‘ Upon this and any other matters he should write, and should send his letters to the High Commissioner, who will send them direct to the Queen. The High Commissioner is the Queen’s officer, and she places full trust in him, and Lobengula should trust him also. Those who advise Lobengula otherwise deceive him.

The Queen sends Lobengula a picture of herself. . . . ’ ”

The letter reflects accurately the attitude of the Government. It did not wish to be embroiled in the affair—that was the keynote of its policy. It could not fail to recognise that the Rudd Concession was a most amazing document, and it was not going to take the immediate responsibility of upholding it. On the other hand, by referring Lobengula back to Sir Hercules Robinson, whose views were already well known, it allowed itself ultimately to admit the validity of the Concession on the grounds that the man on the spot advised it so to do.

The pity was that Lord Knutsford had not thought of sending a similar message by Sir Sidney Shippard six months previously. At that time, the advice would have

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been of very real help to the king. As it was, however, if the Government intended to recognise the Concession in the end, the letter was a gross piece of hypocrisy, calculated to lead Lobengula into difficulties by encouraging him in his repudiation of the bargain with Rudd; if it did not intend to allow the Concession to stand, it is difficult to understand why it executed such a complete change of front a few weeks later.

The excuse for not sending a Resident reads like a mere quibble. A suitable man would have become permanent in the natural course of affairs; whilst the suggestion that the king must pay the expenses of any Imperial officer seems hardly serious when made by the richest nation in the world to a savage chieftain.

Meanwhile, the forward movement of the recently-increased Bechuanaland Police had begun, Lord Knutsford had given his consent to the step but two days after he received the *Indunas* in Downing Street. True, Lobengula was assured solemnly that the presence of these troops close to his border was merely intended to protect Khama against problematical Boer freebooters; but the king's mind did not seem greatly eased by the statement. His own regiments were so thoroughly alarmed and so difficult to control, that he was in hourly fear of one of them marching south, into Bechuanaland, and attacking the new post which was being established in the Chapong Hills, between Shoshong and the Crocodile River.

There was a most striking delay over the receipt of Lobengula's answer to the Queen's letter, a delay which may possibly have accounted for the Government's change of attitude. It is difficult to understand how a letter of such importance took so long over delivery, when it had been

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handed to the Deputy Commissioner for transmission to the High Commissioner, following the channel of communication which the king had been instructed to use in future.

On 7th August 1889, Mr. Maund wrote direct to Lord Knutsford, advising him of his return to the royal kraal, accompanied by the two *Indunas*. The king expressed his delight at the letter, and had it read to all the white men he could gather together. The messengers had received a most honourable welcome on their return, in order to show the importance the king attached to their mission. That letter was received at the Colonial Office on 23rd September, being only forty-seven days *en route*.

Lobengula's own reply was written three days after Mr. Maund's, but did not reach London until 18th November, having been *one hundred and ten days en route*, yet it contained the definite repudiation of the now-famous Concession. It ran:—

“I wish to tell you that Umsheti and Babyaan have arrived with Maund. I am thankful for the Queen's word. I have heard Her Majesty's message. The messengers have spoken as my mouth. They have been very well treated. The white people are troubling me much about gold. If the Queen hears I have given away the whole country, it is not so. I have no one in my country who knows how to write. I do not know where the dispute is, as I have no knowledge of writing.

“The Portuguese say that Mashonaland is theirs, but it is not so. It is all Umzilakazi's country. I hear now that it belongs to the Portuguese.

“With regard to Her Majesty's offer to send me an envoy or resident, I thank Her Majesty, but I do not

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need an officer to be sent. I will ask for one when I am pressed for want of one.

“I thank the Queen for the word which my messengers give me by mouth, that the Queen says I am not to let anyone dig for gold in my country, except to dig as my servants.”

This letter was witnessed by the Assistant Commissioner, Mr. Moffat; but before it was received by the Queen, to whom it was to be communicated, the Charter had received the Royal assent.

Prior to this letter, Lobengula had sent, through James Fairbairn, one of his old friends, another letter to the Queen, but, possibly because it arrived in informal fashion, instead of through the High Commissioner, little weight appears to have been attached to it. Rhodes, who was in London at the time, wrote of it as “an alleged communication,” whilst enclosing to the Colonial Office a statement on the subject by Maguire, himself one of the original concessionaires. Maguire’s contention was, of course, that even if the letter were genuine it was due to the jealousy of disappointed concession-seekers, and he went on to state that “Those acquainted with Matabeleland, as a rule, attach little importance to any document stated to be signed by Lobengula which is not witnessed by one of the missionaries, whom the Chief regards as his most independent advisers.”

Still, it must be admitted that the letter has every appearance of being genuine, especially as it reflects accurately Lobengula’s own attitude during those trying months which followed the signing of the Concession, when, knowing well that a large white expedition into his country was being planned as a consequence of his bargain

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with Rudd, he was casting around for an excuse to stop it, foreseeing that, sooner or later, a collision between his people and the invaders was inevitable.

The letter to Her Majesty ran :—

KING'S KRAAL,
April 23rd, 1889.

“GREETING,—Some time ago a party of men came into my country, the principal one appearing to be a man named Rudd. They asked me for a place to dig for gold, and said they would give me certain things for the right to do so. I told them to bring what they would give and I would then show them what I would give.

“A document was written and presented to me for signature. I asked what it contained, and was told that in it were my words and the words of these men.

“I put my hand to it.

“About three months afterwards I heard from other sources that I had given by that document the right to all the minerals in my country.

“I called a meeting of my *Indunas* and also of the white men, and demanded a copy of the document. It was proved to me that I *had* signed away the mineral rights of my country to Rudd and his friends.

“I have since had a meeting of my *Indunas*, and they will not recognise the paper as it contains neither my words nor the words of those who got it.

“After the meeting I demanded that the original document be returned to me. It has not come yet, although it is two months since, and they promised to bring it back soon.

“The men of the party who were in my country at the

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time were told to remain until the document was brought back. One of them, Maguire, has now left without my knowledge and against my orders.

“I write to you that you may know the truth about this thing, and may not be deceived.”

The letter was witnessed by Messrs. Fairbairn, Phillips, and Cohen, and countersigned by Usher, who had the reputation of being the best native linguist in the country.

In the autumn of 1889, Sir Henry Loch replaced Sir Hercules Robinson as High Commissioner. One of the first duties which the new official had to perform was that of sending to Lobengula a further message from the Queen, informing him that the Concession had been approved and the Charter granted.

CHAPTER XVII

ONCE the Imperial Government had passed the stage of cautious hesitation and had decided to accept the Rudd Concession as valid, the granting of the Charter followed almost as a natural sequence. Certainly, there was a long series of moves and countermoves amongst those financially interested, and a considerable readjustment of shares in the enterprise. Men who had done little or nothing found themselves in powerful positions and had to be treated on much the same basis as those who had done the real work ; but with these negotiations History has no concern. They are merely the uninteresting details of private lives. From the moment the Concession became a recognised fact, Rhodes took the foremost place, entirely dwarfing the smaller men, both in the public eye and in the privacy of the Board Room.

Cecil Rhodes had the enormous advantage of being able to look on the financial side of the question as a secondary consideration. The generally accepted view of him which holds that he was then, as he certainly became afterwards, a sincere and far-sighted Imperialist, may be right, or he may have been, as John Mackenzie saw him, a Briton obsessed with the Afrikander ideal ; but, in either case, his ambition was to acquire a new territory for a white race, rather than to make money for himself ; and, as the years went on, and the Imperialistic side of his

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nature developed, so this idea of "new Homes" steadily grew stronger. He became the idealist in earnest, and possibly some of the ill-success which attended the Chartered Company, and at one time threatened to bring its career to an untimely close, was due to the fact that its moving spirit was himself unconcerned about the question of dividends. He was always looking so far ahead, so intensely absorbed in the great future he foresaw for his country—for it became his country in fact, and rightly bears his name—that he was apt to overlook the immediate necessities of the present. His successors, more practical if less famous, have had a long, uphill fight to retrieve past failures; but, possibly, had there not been the great schemes of the bygone years, there would not have been the certain successes of the years yet to come.

The Chartered Company, too, has been fortunate in its shareholders. Many, a very large proportion of these, invested in the first case because the enterprise seemed to them one which a patriotic Briton should support, and, as year after year went by, and they received no return, instead of complaining, they continued to hold their shares, feeling that, after all, they were getting a reward in the expansion of the Empire. This is not the least of the reasons why the Chartered Company has managed to survive through an almost unparalleled series of disasters.

The first official step towards the formation of the Chartered Company was taken on 3rd January, 1889, when the Bechuanaland Exploration Company, writing on behalf of itself and the Exploring Company, wished to know whether, in the event of the latter concern

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obtaining a concession in Matabeleland, the Imperial Government would be prepared to grant a Charter to an amalgamation of the two companies. Thus the rivals of the Rudd Concessionaires scored the first point; though in its reply the Colonial Office was not very encouraging, for it declared that the approval of Sir Hercules Robinson must first be obtained.

However, a few weeks later, Lobengula's two envoys arrived in charge of Mr. Maund, himself one of the principal men in the Exploring Company, and the fate of the Rudd Concession trembled in the balance. The Queen's message not only ignored it, but also condemned it by implication, whilst in reply to a question in the House of Commons, the Under Secretary for the Colonies stated that the Government would advise Lobengula to grant no one a monopoly, a declaration which seems greatly to have annoyed the High Commissioner, who wrote very strongly on the matter to Lord Knutsford.

In the circumstances, with the Concession under a cloud, and with a powerful syndicate already in the field against them, it is not surprising that the Rhodes party was ready to compromise with their rivals.

The result was apparent on 3rd April 1889, when the Exploring Company once more wrote to the Colonial Office, laying before it a definite scheme for a Chartered Company, whose objects were to be fourfold:—

(1) To extend northwards the railway and telegraph systems in the direction of the Zambesi.

(2) To encourage emigration and colonisation.

(3) To promote trade and commerce.

(4) To develop and work mineral and other concessions under the management of one powerful organisation,



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“thereby obviating conflicts and complications between the various interests that have been acquired within those regions, and securing to the native chiefs and their subjects the right reserved to them under the several concessions.”

Accompanying this letter was one from Rhodes, Rudd, and Beit, as representing the “Matabele Concession” stating their readiness to co-operate with the Exploring Company.

In reply, the Colonial Office requested to be supplied with a draft Charter for the consideration of the Ministry. This document was forwarded by the Exploring Company a month later.

Rhodes, impatient of official delays and anxious to return to Cape Town, where his presence was needed for political reasons, tried to expedite matters. On 1st June, he made the Government a definite offer to pay immediately £30,000 for the construction of a telegraph line from Mafeking, through the Protectorate, via Palachwe to Tati, on the border of Matabeleland, and further to guarantee £4000 a year towards the expenses of maintaining a Resident with Lobengula, though this official was not to be in direct communication with Her Majesty’s Government, but was to be merely a subordinate of the High Commissioner.

Lord Salisbury accepted the proposal, though almost a month later the subsidy was still unpaid, as the Colonial Office seemed quite unable to decide who was the proper official to receive it, having no precedent. However, this minor difficulty did not retard the settlement of the main question, for on July 5th, 1889, Rhodes was advised that the Government had definitely decided to grant the Charter. On October 25th, the cheque for £30,000 was accepted by the Crown Agents, and the order for the five

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hundred miles of telegraph wire and the necessary poles was given.

The extension of the railway northwards from Kimberley, at least as far as Mafeking, was a matter of vital importance to the concessionaires. The first proposal of the Exploring Company was that it should be bound to construct such a line in return for various fiscal privileges, land grants, and mining rights; but in the course of renewed negotiations, after the Exploring Company had developed into the British South Africa Company and so come into the more able hands of Rhodes, the proposed terms were altered, the Company agreeing to take a grant of six thousand square miles of vacant Crown lands with the mineral rights thereon in return for constructing the railroad as far as Vryburg, and a similar grant in return for the further extension to Kimberley.

Later in the year, at the end of October, Rhodes entered into a provisional agreement with the Cape Government, by which the latter undertook to work the whole line at the rates in force in the Colony; Rhodes on his part undertaking to continue the railway at least as far as Vryburg, with the condition that the Cape Government should have the right to acquire the whole, or part, of the extension on certain stated terms.

This was ratified in December 1889, with the alteration that the option to purchase became an obligation to purchase; and as this would eventually set free a large amount of capital, Rhodes was able to arrange for the second section also, that from Vryburg to Mafeking, in return for six thousand square miles of Crown land from the Government of British Bechuanaland.

This basis of the Charter was the Rudd Concession,

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that scrap of paper which, in Lobengula's phrase, "gave Rudd leave to dig holes for gold" in return for a regal income of twelve hundred pounds per annum and one thousand rifles wherewith he might kill his enemies in a civilised manner. Yet if the king could have seen, and understood, that document which received Her Majesty's sanction on the 29th of October, 1889, it is extremely doubtful whether he would have been able to connect it in any way with the Concession he, himself, had granted. Even a civilised man might have found it assumed considerably more than the right "to dig holes for gold."

True, the petition did credit to the philanthropic motives of those who signed it. They expressly stated that they wished "to promote trade, commerce, civilisation and good government (including the regulation of liquor traffic with the natives) in the territories which are or may be comprised," and in the next paragraph they went on to say "that the petitioners believe that if the said concessions, agreements, grants and treaties can be carried into effect, the condition of the natives inhabiting the said territories will be materially improved and their civilisation advanced, and an organisation established which will tend to the suppression of the slave trade in the said territories," all of which sounded most admirable, and was calculated to make an irresistible appeal to the more fanatical elements, though, none the less, it seemed to go far beyond the terms of the Concession, whilst there was nothing in the whole document to safeguard the rights of Lobengula, who, even if he were an unmitigated savage, was under the protection of the British by virtue of the treaty of 11th February 1888. On the other hand, of course,

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he had Rudd's verbal assurance that the white miners who were coming up "would fight in defence of the country if called upon."

The first clause in the Charter defines the area of operations of the Company as being "in the region of South Africa lying immediately to the north of British Bechuanaland, and to the north and west of the South African Republic, and to the west of the Portuguese dominions."

The description certainly erred a little on the side of vagueness, for even the limits of the term "South Africa" have never been laid down officially. Practically speaking, the company was given the right to the whole of the enormous stretch of un-annexed territory lying between the Crocodile River and the Great Lakes, regardless of the fact that the gate to that territory, the Bechuanaland Protectorate, had been opened, and kept open, at the expense of the British taxpayer, whose rights, so far, had only been recognised to the extent of permitting him to pay for the additional police now necessary on the Matabele border. On the other hand, the last few words of the definition "and to the west of the Portuguese dominions" became of historic importance a few months later, when the Company attempted to claim the whole of the centre part of the Mozambique territory by virtue of its concessions from Umtassa and Gungunhana.

It will be seen, however, on reference to the Charter, that though it did not supersede or affect the British Protectorate in Bechuanaland, the Company was empowered to acquire from the lawful rulers, either within or beyond the Protectorate, certain powers of administration, a clause which left the door open for many abuses, and should never have been passed in view of the British

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obligations towards Khama. It is very interesting to note how, at that time, though so much was talked about Imperialism, there was such a readiness to hand everything Imperial over to the Company.

The Company was authorised to have the benefit of, and to carry out, such valid concessions as it had already acquired, or might acquire, though a special clause was inserted safeguarding the interests of the owners of the Tati Concession, and of any persons lawfully and peacefully carrying on business in the Tati District.

Clauses 3 and 4 empowered the Company, subject to the approval of the Colonial Secretary, to acquire further powers, including those of government and administration, either within or beyond the territories affected by the concessions or agreements recognised by the Charter.

Clause 6 provided that the Company should be British in character, and that its directors and principal representatives should be natural-born British subjects; but an exception was made in favour of any director nominated in the Charter, this being done to meet the case of Alfred Beit, who was an unnaturalised alien.

Clauses 8, 9, and 15 secured to the Imperial Government the right of vetoing and restraining the acts of the Company should they appear to be contrary to the public interests.

Clause 10 allowed the Company to enact ordinances, and to maintain a force of Police of its own.

Clauses 11 and 12 related to the discouragement and abolition, if possible, of the slave trade, and the prohibition of the sale of liquor to natives; whilst under clauses 13 and 14 the Company was bound not to interfere with native religions and to have regard to native customs and

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laws. Clause 33 provided that at the end of the first twenty-five years (1914), and at the end of every subsequent period of ten years, the Crown should have the right to alter or repeal any of those provisions of the Charter which related to public matter or administration.

Clause 34 retained the rights of the Crown to declare a protectorate over or annex any territory it should see fit to include within Her Majesty's dominions.

Clause 35 gave the Crown power to revoke the Charter at any time, if the Company should exceed its rights, or go beyond the objects the promoters had in view.

The original capital of the Company was fixed at £1,000,000 sterling, divided into one million shares of one pound each, and, of course, the liability of the shareholders was limited to the nominal value of their shares.

It is interesting to contrast even this relatively small original capital—small, that is, by comparison with what it subsequently became—with the sum paid to Lobengula for the Concession. Undoubtedly, the concessionaires were men of keen business instincts.

In granting the Charter, the Imperial Government took a middle course. No thinking man will accuse that Administration of knowingly betraying Imperial interests; and whatever suspicions of unclean dealing may have been felt regarding either Imperial or Colonial officials in Cape Town, no such thought was ever entertained regarding any of Her Majesty's Ministers at Home. If they erred—and History will possibly hold that they were ill-advised—they did so either from lack of sufficient information, or because, knowing the British public well, they felt convinced that it would never consent to take the sane course.

South African history is little more than a catalogue

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of blunders and lost opportunities, and amongst these the mistake made by Lord Salisbury's Administration in granting the Charter is by no means the greatest. By comparison with the pitiful surrender after Majuba, or the handing back of the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony to the Boers, it seems very small, possibly because, owing to the steady influx of men of British birth, the results of the mistake have been largely neutralised.

In justice to the Imperial Government, it must be admitted that the proper course, the declaration of a protectorate over Lobengula's territory, would have been difficult, and, from a party point of view, almost dangerous to follow. The Cabinet would have found itself attacked both by Rhodes and his powerful following and by the Little Englander faction. Moreover, the step would have involved a heavy annual expenditure for some years, with the probability, almost with the certainty, of a little native war on the death or downfall of Lobengula.

The other extreme course, that of doing nothing in Matabeleland and refusing to sanction the Charter, would simply have meant leaving South Central Africa a prey to the Boers and their pseudo-friends, the Germans.

The Charter represented the middle way. It seemed to involve no risk or expenditure, whilst appearing to secure the Matabele territories, if not to the Empire, at least to men of British blood. True, an enormous Imperial asset was surrendered—for no sophistry can alter the fact that the reversion of Lobengula's kingdom already belonged to the British Empire—yet it was infinitely better to grant the Charter than to have the gate of Central Africa permanently closed to the British race. The danger that

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Rhodes and his associates were still obsessed with, the Afrikaner ideal of "Africa for the Afrikaner," may have seemed a small one, possibly it really was a small one ; and, even assuming that the Cape was still as much opposed to Imperial control and British ways as it had been before the Warren Expedition, the personnel of the Board of the new Company might reasonably be regarded as a guarantee against disloyalty and treason ; whilst the right to evoke the Charter placed the Crown in the position of a suzerain power.

The weakest point in the Charter, from an ethical, as distinct from an Imperial, point of view, was that, whilst it recognised that most amazing Rudd Concession, it did not safeguard Lobengula, despite the fact that he had entered into a treaty with the British Government. Moreover, by recognising the rights of the Rudd Concessionaires, the Government closed the door against all the other white men who had been up to Lobengula's kraal, placing them practically in the position of trespassers, despite the fact that the majority of them had done far more hard work and incurred far greater risks, than had the two or three whose fortune was made when the Royal assent was given to the Charter. True, the men of this type were working primarily for themselves ; but they must have known all the time that they had but a life interest in their work, that the capital must inevitably go to the Empire, and it was something nearly akin to gross injustice to hand the whole of the spoils over to a handful of new-comers, whose way had been made easy by the men who had gone before them.

Still, with these smaller issues the Imperial Government could not be expected to deal. The Cabinet was

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in the hands of its South African advisers as regarded details, and those advisers had shown, perhaps too plainly for Imperial servants, which way their sympathies lay. So the Charter passed into law, and though it was quite indefensible on a number of grounds, it was certainly preferable to the third course, that of doing nothing ; and succeeding generations may not only condone it, but may actually applaud it, because, more by good fortune, than by good management, it has led to the formation of a barrier against the spread of the Afrikander ideal. So long as Rhodesia remains wholly British, Central Africa is safe.

CHAPTER XVIII

WHATEVER its final verdict on the character of Cecil Rhodes may be, posterity will certainly have to admit that he fell short of greatness, almost fell short of mediocrity, in one respect—he was no judge of men. It is only necessary to give a cursory glance at the careers of many of those whom he selected for the higher positions in the Rhodesian Civil Service to realise that fact. The Afrikanders, or Britons who had married Afrikander wives, seemed, as a class, to do their best to prove that their patron had been wrong. When the supreme test of the Boer War came, the disloyalty of some, the doubtful probity of others, the inefficiency of almost all, roused the scornful wrath of the British-born community, and embittered many Rhodesians against Rhodes himself during those last dark days which preceded his untimely death.

On the other hand, he was right in his choice on two vital occasions; firstly, when he sent Dr. Jameson to interview Lobengula; secondly, when he gave the contract for the Pioneer Expedition to Frank Johnson. It is too early yet to attempt to sum up Jameson's claims to a place in history; possibly, he is so completely overshadowed by the figure of his chief, Cecil Rhodes, that, in the end, he will simply be included in the verdict on that same chief, as a fellow-hero or a fellow-sinner; but as regards the two qualities which Rhodes required of him

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in 1889 and 1890, courage and energy, there can be no question but that he possessed both in abundance. He may have made mistakes, he may have gone nigh to ruining both Rhodes and the Chartered Company, but he never spared himself, and he never shrank from either danger or fatigue. He was perfectly loyal and perfectly fearless, and, for that reason, he stands out almost as an heroic figure beside those other heads of the Company, who ran no risk more terrible than that of losing their money.

The time of Jameson's first visit to Lobengula was a critical one for the Chartered Company. The king had already repented bitterly of his Esau's bargain. He realised now what he had granted to the Rudd concessionaires, and his people realised it too. A savage of the Tjaka type would have solved the difficulty by a slaughter of all the white men within reach, not so much because they were accomplices of those whom he considered had defrauded him, but because, by wiping them out, he would have brought the question of black versus white to a clear issue. A man of Khama's type, a black statesman, would have temporised whilst he tried to bring his tribe into line with the new state of affairs, realising that resistance was impossible, yet recognising the duty he owed to his people, and endeavouring to make the most favourable terms possible to them.

Lobengula, however, was neither a Tjaka nor a Khama. He had no opportunity to follow the example of either of them. Khama was the wise and benevolent despot of a wholly pitiful race of effete psalm-singers, a people whom any strong chieftain could cow into submission; Tjaka was the savage head of a savage confederation, holding his position because he was, in effect, a super-savage.

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Lobengula, on the other hand, was never sufficiently civilised to break his word, and never savage enough to awe his tribe into submission. He was a native gentleman, and because he tried to live up to the faith which was in him, trusting other men, white men, who appeared to be gentlemen too, his career ended in disaster, both to himself and to his tribe. He made one of the greatest, and one of the most magnificent, failures in the history of the British Empire. And yet he has been judged, and condemned, by men to whom, by comparison with himself, a London County Councillor seemed an important, and almost a noble, personage.

Once Lobengula found that he really had granted Rudd and his associates the entire mineral rights of the country, and that the High Commissioner—or, as he understood it, the Queen—was determined to regard the concession as valid, he made no further attempts at resistance. He seems to have recognised that, whether he, himself, had been either a fool or a dupe, the white man was technically in the right and would enforce the terms of his concession. The Pioneers of the Chartered Company were coming up to his country—that much was certain. Lobengula knew now that he could not stop them from starting, and his main object from that time forward was to prevent a collision between them and his own followers. It has been said, with perfect truth, that he was shifty and unreliable during those months which followed the Imperial recognition of the Charter, but the end of his policy was to gain time, to bring his tribe round to his own views, and not to try and evade the obligations into which he had entered. His people were thoroughly alarmed at the prospect of a white invasion ; more than half his troops were in a dangerously

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disaffected condition ; his own authority, his own life even, was trembling in the balance ; and yet when he had turned to the great white Queen for advice she had ultimately answered him by consolidating the forces of those who, he knew well, would in the end destroy the national existence of the Matabele.

Immediately after the signing of the Charter, Lord Knutsford sent, nominally on behalf of the Queen, an official notice, informing Lobengula of what had been arranged, and advising him to allow the Chartered Company to start operations. This notice was carried to the king by two officers of the Royal Horse Guards, who appeared before him in full uniform, with the idea of impressing the Matabele. The mission did not, however, produce any great effect, at least so far as the warriors were concerned, for they argued from the steel cuirasses that the white man was afraid to fight unless encased in armour.

The granting of the Charter by no means marked the end of Rhodes' initial difficulties. True, he had obtained official sanction for his plans, but the latter were not supposed to include anything in the way of a native war. When asked to "give the white men a road" into his country, Lobengula replied that the road lay through his kraal at Bulawayo ; and, as every one knew well, no white force would ever pass up that road, save over the bodies of the Matabele warriors.

At that time, Rhodes' own plans seem to have been vague. He, himself, had never been in Matabeleland, whilst his partners and associates knew little more of the country than what they had seen in travelling up from Tati to Bulawayo ; consequently, no one was quite sure

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as to what route should be taken, or what the proposed expedition should do when it had actually entered the Matabele territory. Undoubtedly, a large section of those interested in the Company was in favour of a forcible entry by way of the old wagon road, trusting that the wave of enthusiasm which the granting of the Charter had caused would practically force the Imperial Government to aid in the destruction of the Matabele power. On the other hand, the same element argued that such a course would inevitably arouse great opposition at Home, and probably end in the revocation of the Charter. The war would continue, certainly, and Lobengula would be defeated in the end ; but the spoils would go, not to the concessionaires or to the Company, but to the Empire. Matabeleland and Mashonaland would become Crown Colonies, and both those who dreamed of sudden wealth, and those who were scheming for a greater Cape Colony extending up to the Great Lakes, would find their plans frustrated permanently.

The best authority on the subject of Lobengula's territories was Frederick Courtenay Selous, who had traversed them in every direction during the past ten years. In a sense, Selous' books had prepared the way for the Pioneer Column, and his oft-repeated declaration, since proved to be absolutely correct, that the high veld of Mashonaland, the country itself, was the real prize, rather than the reputed gold reefs, probably had a great deal to do in shaping Rhodes' plans. But for Selous' work, it is very possible that the career of the Company would have come to a disastrous end within a few months of its formation. At the outset, it was entirely amateur so far as pioneering was concerned, and it was

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largely due to the advice he got subsequent to the flotation of the Company, from the men who actually knew the ground, that Rhodes changed his original scheme of a gradual opening-up by means of prospecting parties, for the more daring plan of actual occupation of the high veld of Mashonaland.

Rudd had done his work efficiently in securing the Concession ; but subsequent agents were not so successful. The Matabele troops were daily growing more and more unruly, and there was a distinct element of risk attaching to the post of unofficial white Resident in Bulawayo. Boers and Germans were still intriguing against the British influence, endeavouring to stir up Lobengula's suspicions and, at the same time, to weaken his position amongst his own people.

Lobengula, himself, emerged splendidly from the ordeal. He had given his word, and he kept it, sternly refusing to listen to the falsehoods told him, and once more repeating his declaration that the white men were his guests, and, therefore, sacred. But there were limits to his power over his troops, and the day came when, as a matter of policy, he had to refuse an audience to the Chartered agent, who had been vainly endeavouring to obtain permission to cut the new road for the expedition to Mashonaland. Naturally alarmed, the agent left Bulawayo, and hurried south to Mafeking, whence he telegraphed to Rhodes.

No news could have been more unwelcome. Already the Pioneer Force was being organised, and if the Matabele were to show an uncompromising hostility at this early stage, there was more than a chance that the Imperial Government would put its veto on the whole expedition.

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It was one of those cases where the personal element is everything. The wrong man would inevitably have ruined the whole scheme. However, fortunately for Rhodes, he had the right man at hand, and, for once, he chose wisely. Dr. Jameson was a successful Kimberley practitioner when he threw up his professional career at a moment's notice to go north as agent for the Chartered Company. He knew little of the veld, less of Lobengula, whom he had only met once when he had gone up to Matabeleland on a holiday, with the idea of doing some big game shooting. On that occasion, though the king had refused him permission to hunt, he had been favourably impressed by his visitor, and when the latter returned as Rhodes' representative, the Matabele Chief readily agreed to see him. As matters turned out, his visit was well-timed; for the king was suffering severely from gout, which the doctor was able to cure. Still, though Lobengula was inclined to listen to his requests for permission to cut a road, he would not, or dare not, give a definite answer. At the end of three months the only definite progress Jameson could report was that, as a mark of high favour, the king had made him an *Induna* of his favourite regiment, the M'Beza.

However, a month later, at a secret audience, the king gave a qualified assent to his requests. He dare not run counter to the wishes of his people to the extent of granting a formal permit for the expedition to enter his territory; but he told Jameson that if the party kept well to the East, in the Makalanga country, it would probably get through without being attacked. He did not profess to answer for its safe passage through the bush and the kopje country, into the high veld, but he



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let it be understood that he would do his best to keep the regiments in hand.

Jameson returned at once to Kimberley with the good news, on the strength of which Rhodes hastened on the preparation of his column of Pioneers. However, the doctor had scarcely left Bulawayo before the King changed his mind again. Word came down that the qualified permission had been rescinded, and once more Rhodes induced Jameson to undertake the long, wearisome journey to the North. The emissary found that matters had grown decidedly worse during his absence. The news that an armed white force was being assembled on the borders of Matabeleland had roused the warriors to fury, and, though the king had sent the more unruly regiments on a raiding expedition to the Zambesi, those who remained were a danger, not only to the little white community, but to Lobengula himself. Rumours of an impending massacre were rife, and, though these did not deter Jameson from going up to the royal kraal, he quickly saw the utter uselessness of staying there. The king would commit himself to nothing, and when, after a couple of days of waiting in vain, the doctor gave up the task and went to say good-bye, the utmost he could get out of the king was, "I never refused the road to you and to your impi," and with that very doubtful assurance the Chartered Company had to be content.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE route ultimately taken by the Pioneer Column was very different from that which Rhodes proposed to follow in the first instance. The original intention to trek up through Bechuanaland to Tati and from thence strike out north-east, right through the very heart of the Matabele country, was little short of madness. The first fight would probably have taken place on the border, and even if the expedition had been victorious there, its chance of getting so far as Bulawayo would have been small. The Matabele knew every inch of that part of the veld, which was well adapted to their style of warfare.

This plan, which, if persisted in, would have wrecked the whole enterprise, was probably the cause of a good deal of Lobengula's unwillingness to grant a road-making permit, for, even when the alternative scheme had been adopted, he may have retained a lingering suspicion that the change was merely a blind.

It is certain that Rhodes himself was at first in favour of the Tati route. The plan was published in the Press, and it was not until early in 1890, a few months before the Column actually started, that he decided to take what was afterwards known as the "Selous Road." The advantages of the latter were so obvious that hesitation was impossible, once Selous himself had volunteered to act as guide.

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Practically speaking, the "Selous Road," or the "Pioneer's Road"—it is known by both names—skirts right round what was formerly the Matabele territory. True, Lobengula claimed jurisdiction over that part of the country, but so did also Gungunhana, the chief of the M'Tchangana. Neither tribe had ever occupied it in any way, both regarding it as little more than a raiding ground. The inhabitants, mainly Makalanga with a sprinkling of M'Hlengwe amongst them, were a timid, harmless people, poor, uncleanly in their habits and much given to lying. There was hardly the possibility of their giving the column any trouble during its passage, whilst once the Pioneers got out of the low country on to the open high plateau, they would be able to hold their own against a very large force of Matabele. The danger was, of course, that they might be attacked whilst in the bush or kopje country; but, as Selous pointed out, such an attack was only a contingency on the eastern route, though it would be an absolute certainty if the column attempted to force its way in through Matabeleland. Moreover, had the expedition been attacked whilst skirting round Lobengula's country, sympathy at Home would certainly have been with the Chartered Company, and Rhodes would have found it easy to obtain both military assistance and, if necessary, further capital.

John Mackenzie had fought against the granting of the Charter so long as resistance was of any avail; but the moment the Royal assent was given, he was ready to place his great knowledge and experience freely at the service of the Company. The proposal to force an entry through Tati troubled him considerably, as he foresaw what the end of the attempt must be. He had not met

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Selous for years, and they had held no communication since the days at Shoshong; yet at the same time that the great hunter was settling the route with Rhodes in Kimberley, the veteran Imperialist was giving exactly similar advice to the Board of the Chartered Company at Home.

Had Rhodes continued to wait for Lobengula's definite permission to cut the road, it is quite possible that the expedition would never have started, for the Boers would have been first in the field. President Kruger had never abandoned his contention that the Grobler treaty was an authentic document, and, as a result, he had never acknowledged the Moffat treaty. He affected to ignore the British rights in Matabeleland, an attitude which he could easily adopt in view of the wavering policy of the Imperial Government. Matabeleland had never been actually proclaimed as being within the British sphere of influence, or, if such a proclamation had been made by implication, as for instance when the Moffat treaty was published, it had been virtually annulled by subsequent official answers given in Parliament. In these circumstances, President Kruger felt tolerably certain of a good deal of support if he could point to the fact that his burghers were actually in possession of part of Lobengula's territory, especially if that part were to consist of the high veld of Mashonaland, to which Lobengula had no title, save that his warriors used it as a raiding ground.

In view of the perfect intelligence department subsequently organised by the Transvaal, it seems curious that the President should have known so little of Rhodes' plans; and it is almost as strange that Rhodes himself was not aware of what was going on in the Transvaal.

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It is certain that the Boers did not expect the Pioneers to be ready so quickly. Possibly, they were misled by the smallness of the force which was being assembled, and looked on it as something in the nature of a frontier guard, never realising that that little band was actually the expedition which was to brave and destroy the power of the dreaded Matabele.

Had Kruger known, he would doubtless have hurried his own scheme forward, as he could easily have done, being untroubled by formalities such as charters, and having no tender public conscience which he must first satisfy as to the integrity of his motives. Moreover, he had by far the more favourable position geographically, for Lobengula's territory bordered on the Transvaal.

Under these conditions, it is difficult now to understand the long delay between the death of Grobler and the raising of the Boer force for the invasion of Mashonaland. It may have been due to the fact that there was no company with a huge capital to finance the venture, and that it was a long task to enroll the number of men required, two thousand in all, each of whom must agree to find his own horse, rifle, and ammunition. Rhodes may have heard vague rumours that the Boers were thinking of making a move; but it does not seem as though he took them very seriously, believing that he had now got ahead of everyone else; but the whole situation was changed when Selous, having gone into the Zoutpansberg District to obtain some information regarding a portion of the country through which the Pioneers would have to pass, returned with the news that fifteen hundred of the two thousand men were actually on the roll—which he, himself, had seen—men from the Zoutpansberg, Marico, and

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Waterberg districts, and that five hundred more recruits were even then being raised in Cape Colony itself.

Sir Sidney Shippard was in Kimberley when Selous returned, and he was at once summoned to hear the news, which in turn was communicated to Sir Henry Loch. The information, coming as it did from a man whose popularity with the Boers, and perfect mastery of their language, made mistake almost impossible, troubled Rhodes greatly. The Pioneer Column was not ready to start, and if the Boers were to awake to the situation, they might easily be first in the field with their much larger force.

Rhodes wasted no time over further inquiries. There was only one way to save the situation, a compromise; and, fortunately for the Chartered Company, Sir Henry Loch took the same view. Consequently, a meeting was quickly arranged with President Kruger, who agreed to discuss the question with the High Commissioner and Rhodes at Blignaut's Pont.

The hurried nature of the summons had shown the wily old President the strength of his own case, and he made the most of it. Afterwards, when the terms of the compromise became known at Home, there was considerable popular outcry at what was considered a surrender; but in the circumstances it is doubtful whether the High Commissioner could have made a better bargain.

The President proposed an exchange of "rights." On behalf of the Transvaal, he offered that it should "withdraw its claims to the northern territories on condition that Her Majesty's Government withdrew itself to the east of the Republic in Swaziland, from the territory of Zambaan and Umbegeza and Amatongaland, including Kosi Bay." This request was backed up by the solemn production of

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the old and hopelessly-discredited treaty with Lobengula. Naturally the whole of these demands, which would have amounted to tearing up the Convention of 1884, were not granted; but in the end the Transvaal succeeded in getting what practically amounted to a free hand in Swaziland, Kruger on his part agreeing to "damp down" the Boer expedition to Mashonaland, an undertaking which he carried out loyally, recalling Hans Bezuidenhout and the other leaders who were raising the force. Had the public known at the time the true reason for what was called the "surrender of Swaziland," and how nearly the Pioneer Expedition was forestalled at the last moment, it might have taken a more favourable view of Sir Henry Loch's diplomacy. The new High Commissioner was not a man to surrender tamely to a political antagonist, and only the imperative necessity of avoiding complications in the North would have induced him to concede so much.

With the settlement of the Transvaal claims, Rhodes' position became much stronger. So far as the white races were concerned, he now had a free hand, and though Jameson's reports from Bulawayo were not encouraging, there was a hope that the Pioneers would get through to the high veld without being attacked. In view of the unruly temper being displayed by the Matabele warriors, it might have seemed wiser either to wait until the excitement subsided, or greatly to increase the strength of the Pioneer column. On the other hand, however, the preliminary expenses had already been enormous, and either delay, or augmentation of the force, would have strained the Company's finances too severely, so the preparations for the start were hurried on, despite the prophecies of disaster which flowed in from all parts.

BOOK IV.

THE MARCH TO MASHONALAND

CHAPTER XX

WHEN Cecil Rhodes decided to conquer Mashonaland by contract, the main consideration present in his mind doubtless was that he was taking the surest and cheapest way to the accomplishment of his schemes. He made an exceedingly good bargain for the Chartered Company, and he knew that, if the task could be accomplished by so small a force, the men with whom he was dealing would succeed. On the other hand, he may never have reflected that, by following the course he did, he was investing the whole enterprise with an interest which it might otherwise have lacked. Conquest by contract was so novel an idea, that, to a very great extent, the public overlooked the fact that the Rudd Concession did not grant any rights of conquest at all.

Perhaps the most curious part about the Pioneer Expedition is that, though it accomplished so much and ran such great risks, its story is absolutely uneventful. The credit for this is due partly to Lobengula, who managed to keep his men in hand whilst the long line of wagons was making its way slowly and laboriously through the bush and kopje country, partly to the contractors, whose arrangements had been made with a thoroughness which reduced

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the chances of breakdown to a minimum, and partly to Selous, who, acting as intelligence officer and guide, conducted the expedition straight into the high plateau in what must be regarded as record time for work of the kind. The mistake subsequently made, the planting of the future capital, Fort Salisbury, in the middle of a muddy vlei, far from any good water, a wholly abominable spot, was in no sense the fault of Selous, who had left the main body near Fort Victoria in order to guide Colquhoun, the future administrator, to M'Tassa's kraal, in the neighbourhood of Macequece.

In Africa, an expedition through several hundred miles of unknown country is not a thing to be undertaken lightly, even when there is no possibility of being attacked by natives. The man who has never been on the veld can have no conception of what it means ; it has to be experienced to be understood ; and even many who have travelled through the continent in later years may have but the vaguest idea of what conditions were when Railhead was still in Cape Colony, and the outposts of civilisation consisted of mud walled forts held by a handful of the Bechuanaland Police.

Since those days, South Central Africa has changed entirely. The Boer War brought about some alterations, of course ; it cleared the air for a time, and made progress easier ; but as regards the Interior itself, the Rinderpest was a far more important factor, for, by sweeping away the vast majority of the transport cattle, it hastened on the construction of the railway, and it is the railway which has killed all the Romance of Africa, robbed it of most of its charm, brought the Northern Territories down to the level of the Prosaic, almost of the Sordid. There is no

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opening for a pioneer within sound of the whistle of a locomotive, and to-day you can hear the rattle of the trains right up to 14° South.

It used to be said in the old days that South Africa was tied together with reims, strips of raw hide ; and the saying was more true than the majority of such proverbs. The bullock wagon was almost the first necessity of frontier work. Just as no other transport animal can compare with the bullock for work in rough country, so no other vehicle comes into the same class as the great eighteen-foot-long Natal and Cape wagons. Like the animals which draw them, they may be clumsy and ungainly, but they have the merit of usually arriving at their journey's end, which cannot be said of horses and mules, at least in Rhodesia. South African roads are bad—probably they are, on the whole, the worst in the world—and a transport-rider's life is never an easy one ; but so long as there is a track of some sort, with drifts across the rivers and spruits, and with the bush cleared sufficiently for the cattle to get a clear pull, it is merely a question of time and patience to reach the destination. But it is a very different matter to go forward into unknown country with no road of any sort ahead, without even a cart spoor to follow, to have to wait whilst the trees are felled, the banks of the dongas dug away, the larger boulders rolled out of the track, or blasted with dynamite ; and when, added to this, there is the constant danger of attack from an overwhelming force of natives, necessitating the formation of a laager every night, then the task becomes one requiring infinite patience and courage. Yet such was exactly the position of the little Pioneer Column which marched northwards in 1890 to conquer a great kingdom. More-

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over, only those who have been along that old Pioneers' Road—now deserted, disused, and well-nigh overgrown—can understand to the full what the difficulties were. It is bad country, as bad as any to be found in South Africa, at least from the transport-rider's point of view. Wherever you find granite kopjes, you find almost bottomless swamps of clinging black mud; wherever you get mopani scrub, you get an infinity of ugly, steep little dongas, into which your wagon drops with a rattle and crash, needing two, or even three, spans to pull it out the other side; above all, once you have got down on the low country, east of the high veld, the rivers, which appeared mere spruits up on the plateau, have become deep and wide, capable of delaying your progress for a month or six weeks should you reach them after a heavy rain has brought them down in flood.

Then, too, in that low country—and the first part, the critical part, of the Pioneers' Trek lay entirely in low country—the advantages are all on the side of the natives, who can approach within a few hundred yards of the wagons before their presence is known, whilst the bush and trees rob the machine guns and rifles of half their utility. On the high veld, the horse gives the white man an enormous superiority to the savage on foot, especially as, even if that savage does possess a rifle, he can seldom shoot either accurately or rapidly, the assegai being his principal weapon; but, on the other hand, it is little use being mounted in the low veld, where, the moment you attempt to charge, a bough will probably sweep you out of your saddle.

The risks run by the Pioneer Column were really tremendous, so great that men who were merely working

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for a money consideration would never have encountered them. It was sheer love of adventure which really carried the expedition through to Mashonaland. Had the Matabele attacked it anywhere between the Shashi River and the head of Providential Pass, it is most unlikely that any white man would have survived to tell the tale. The Matabele were the finest warriors north of Basutoland; they were thoroughly alarmed and exasperated at the idea of anything in the nature of a white occupation of Mashonaland; and, though their king might know differently, the body of the nation believed that one massacre of Europeans would have the effect of deterring others from coming north of the Crocodile River. Under these conditions it seems almost incredible that the column should have got through in perfect safety.

In one sense, the Pioneers formed a military expedition. They went up, in the first case, to invade and occupy what was, for all practical purposes, a hostile country; but, having taken possession of the land, they were to become civilians again, and form permanent settlements. For that reason, they were bound to carry far more material with them than would have been necessary had their object been purely military. The country to which they were going certainly supported a large native population; but the white man cannot exist long on native food; consequently, large supplies had to be carried, in addition to the tools and other appliances necessary for the use of the settler and the miner. As Selous, who knew Matabeleland and Mashonaland better than did anyone else, warned them, the beginning of the wet season would see their new road rendered almost impassable, and they could not safely reckon on getting any fresh supplies

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through for four or five months from that date ; for any of the larger rivers they had to cross, the Shashi, the Bubi, the Nuanetsi, the Lundi or the Tokwe, might hold the wagons up for weeks, or even months. There was, of course, the old road into the country—the only road, according to Lobengula—that which entered Matabeleland at Tati, and passed through Bulawayo. Selous himself had made a track from there right on to Mount Hampden as far back as 1872, and other hunters, following him, had cut the spoor up anew every season. This road, leading as it did across the high veld, where the rivers were small, was passable at all times of the year so far as physical conditions were concerned ; on the other hand, its course lay through the very heart of the Matabele country, and, for that reason, it was useless to the Pioneers. Even the king's direct permission would not have sufficed to ensure the safe passage of a wagon load of provisions bound for Mashonaland.

Probably, in the whole course of his career, Cecil Rhodes never had a more difficult question to decide than that of the size of the force which should be sent into Mashonaland.

He had practically no data to guide him. Moreover he, himself, had no experience of work of that kind, and when he turned for advice to the men who should have known, he found that their notions were almost as vague as his own. No one had the slightest idea what the Matabele would ultimately do—therein lay the chief difficulty. It was felt that Lobengula would hold his men back if possible, but it was not safe to assume that he would succeed in so doing ; yet to send up anything in the nature of a small army would render attack a matter

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of certainty, arouse a storm of criticism at Home, and, incidentally, use up the whole working capital of the Chartered Company.

The Boers, who should have been good judges of the situation, considered that 2000 men represented the irreducible minimum; a well-known British officer who was consulted asked for 1000 men and a quarter of a million sterling for their pay, equipment, and transport; yet in the end, Frank Johnson carried out the work for the sum of £89,285, 10s. His force of Pioneers consisted of 179 men; a troop of the Chartered Company's police and 150 natives making up the remainder of the expedition.

It was in the Kimberley Club that Rhodes first offered Major Johnson the chance of raising the Pioneer Force. For the moment, Rhodes' schemes were held up. He had obtained his Concession and his Charter, he had a considerable amount of capital available for the purpose of the expedition; and yet he was still uncertain as to how to carry out the occupation. He did not want to fight the Matabele, at least not for a year or two. He could not afford to delay, for even if the Boers did not slip into the promised land ahead of his men, his shareholders and backers would begin to grow impatient, not understanding his difficulties.

It is easy to understand Rhodes' hesitation and anxiety at this time. He did not want the responsibility of sending a small force to be cut up by the Matabele, yet he could not send a large body; and still he knew he must act, and act quickly. In these circumstances, it was but natural that he should have welcomed Frank Johnson's offer, made whilst the two men were breakfasting together

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in the Club, to take the whole responsibility, and carry out the work, for a fixed sum, with about 200 men. The offer was made on the spur of the moment, half jocularly, without consideration, and without the slightest anticipation that it would be accepted, yet Rhodes clutched eagerly at this chance of a solution of his difficulty, gave the younger man till mid-day to fix a definite price, and before he, himself, left for Cape Town that night the matter was practically decided, being fixed finally two days later.

Major Johnson's contract is an interesting document. It is entirely in his own handwriting, Rhodes having declined to allow any lawyer to aid in drawing it up. For the sum of £85,000, subsequently increased by £3285 10s., it having been found necessary to include in the expedition one or two additional men whom it would have been unwise to leave out, Frank Johnson agreed to organise an expedition to Mount Hampden in Mashonaland, in a manner satisfactory to both Sir Henry Loch, the High Commissioner, and to the Directors of the Chartered Company. He was to recruit, arm, and equip a force of 200 men, who were to be trained on the same lines as the Chartered Company's own police; he was to construct a good wagon road from the base camp to Mount Hampden, and to erect certain forts for the protection of settlers and others.

Out of his £89,000, Major Johnson had to pay his men, to buy bullocks, wagons, stores, arms and ammunition; consequently, the figure cannot be considered an extravagant one, especially in view of the unbroken success which attended the venture, and the important results obtained. It would be interesting to know how

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much the War Office would have spent on the same expedition.

The Pioneers were armed with the ordinary Service pattern Martini-Henry rifle, a more useful weapon against savages than the modern small-bore rifle, the stopping-power of its heavy bullet outweighing the advantage of rapid fire which the newer type of firearm possesses. In addition to his Martini, each man had a .450 bore Webley revolver. In this connection, it might be mentioned that, with all its stormy history, the mixed nature of its white population and the ever-present dangers from both natives and wild beasts, Rhodesia has never been a "revolver country." During the first ten years, at any rate, every man carried a rifle or shot-gun as a matter of course ; but a pistol was rarely if ever seen. Sentiment was strongly against the carrying of revolvers, which were regarded as savouring rather of theatrical American ways, and to this feeling the extraordinarily short record of murder by whites is largely due. The population of Rhodesia has always been essentially sane in matters such as these.

The uniform of the Pioneers consisted of a heavy waterproof overcoat, a brown corduroy tunic, breeches of the same material, leather gaiters, regulation Army boots, and a broad-brimmed felt hat, with the brim pinned up at one side. The pay of the rank and file was seven-and-sixpence a day, no great sum in the circumstances ; although, in addition to this, the Chartered Company guaranteed to allow each man to peg out fifteen gold claims, and to select a block of land, three thousand acres in extent, for a farm. These terms were afterwards the cause of considerable bitterness ; in



OFFICERS' QUARTERS, CAMP NEAR MAPELING.

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fact, many of the surviving members of the Column still cherish a grievance against the Company, especially with regard to the farms. The terms on which the grants were made were certainly misunderstood by the recipients, the majority of whom had neither the capital to stock and work their land, nor the least inclination to live on it themselves. As for the fifteen gold claims, this did not mean that a claim could be pegged out in each of fifteen separate places should the holder of the licence so desire ; but merely that he might peg out one and a half blocks in one place, a block being really the unit, although, for some inexplicable reason, it is divided on paper into ten claims. A claim has no separate existence apart from its nine companions.

The Pioneer Force was organised at Mafeking, and, as will be seen by the Nominal Roll, it started finally a hundred and seventy-nine strong. It was divided into three troops, A, B, and C. Major Johnson was, of course, in command of the whole. A troop was under Maurice Heany, a Virginian by birth, a West Point graduate and once a lieutenant in the Regular Army of the United States. Probably, no man in Rhodesia was ever more universally popular than was Major Heany, to give him the title by which he was afterwards known. The captain of B troop was H. F. Hoste, once commander of a Union Line Mail boat. He was at Madeira on his way home when he received a cable from Frank Johnson, dispatched a few minutes after Rhodes had decided on the Pioneer contract, offering him a command in the projected force. Captain Hoste did not hesitate ; he resigned from the Union Company, and hurried out in time to join the column at Mafeking. Afterwards, he settled in Salisbury, where

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he was as popular as his brother officer, Maurice Heany, was in Bulawayo.

The captain of C Troop, which consisted of artillery, was Jack Roach, one of those men who are always called by their Christian names. Very big, very handsome, very well liked, Jack Roach was a typical soldier of fortune. After a varied career, in charge of the Trans-Continental telegraph line, as officer in command of Fort Victoria, he died as one would have expected him to die, as he probably hoped to die, standing up, facing the enemy in the daylight. He was shot, it is said in eight places, when with Lord Methuen's column in the Western Transvaal.

Major Johnson, the commander of the Pioneer Column, returned to England in the end, and settled down to a prosaic, though successful, life in the City, surely a curious change after the exciting days on the frontier. At the time of writing (August 1909) he still looks so young and vigorous, that it seems almost impossible that he can have been the principal figure in an expedition which, nineteen years ago, resulted in the finest country in South Africa being brought under the British Flag.

Cecil Rhodes has, of course, received the greater part of the credit for the occupation of Mashonaland in 1890, and yet this is hardly just. True, Rhodes had been the moving spirit in procuring the Charter, and had he not taken the part he did, the lesser men might possibly have disputed amongst themselves for so long that the Boers would have got ahead of them; but as regards the expedition itself, the honour should go to the men who composed it, and to no one else. Had they been made of poor stuff, they would never have got through to the high veld, and Cecil Rhodes, a thousand miles

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away in Cape Colony, would have been powerless to help them on.

If Rhodes himself had gone with the column, it would seem quite natural that the glory should be his, for, knowing his masterful character, it would be safe to assume that he had infused his own spirit into the entire expedition. However, he had chosen the less-exciting and, as it turned out, less important, post of Cape Premier, and, consequently, he had to remain in the Colony, worried by petty local concerns, instead of helping to secure the land which was afterwards to bear his name.

This being so, the men who actually carried out the work, Lieut. - Colonel Pennefather of the 6th Royal Dragoons, the Imperial Officer in command of the whole expedition, Frank Johnson who raised the Pioneers, and Frederick Courteney Selous who showed the way, should be given a far greater share of credit than has been accorded to them hitherto. Only those who are either hopelessly ignorant of the facts, or totally lacking in any sense of proportion, will talk of Cecil Rhodes and ignore the Pioneers.

CHAPTER XXI.

ON May 18th, 1890, the Pioneers left Mafeking for the North. The horses had arrived the previous day, and, as time was a matter of the greatest importance, a start was made as early as possible. As was inevitable, the first day's trek resulted in a certain amount of muddle. It is no easy matter to manage a long train of wagons. If one team happens to stick fast in a drift or mudhole, it delays all those behind it, whilst those ahead are plodding along steadily. It is impossible to catch up again, unless a similar misfortune befalls one of the leading wagons. The trek bullock has his regular gait, and no amount of urging will induce him to hurry; in fact, a driver who endeavours to make his cattle move faster than usual should be discharged on the spot, for his team will quickly get thin.

That first night out of Mafeking some of the wagons went on too far, others stuck in the sand behind. No rations were issued all day, and the Force, not having become accustomed to discipline, there was a good deal of rather unmilitary murmuring. However, after the one experience, things went more smoothly, and, from that time onwards, both men and officers pulled together in admirable style.

Twenty days after leaving Mafeking, the Pioneers reached the Crocodile River near its junction with the

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Notwani. This part of the journey was unexciting. The country was essentially a friendly one. Its inhabitants both dreaded and hated the Matabele, and any expedition which appeared to be directed against Lobengula's people was certain of securing their goodwill. Nowadays, it would be different. The downfall of the last great native chief, though ardently desired before it actually occurred, produced an extraordinary revulsion of feeling. When Lobengula had gone, and the fear of his warriors was no longer on the other races, the latter began to realise that, though the white man might appear to be their saviour at the moment, his ultimate aim was to bring all the black peoples down to one common level. The bond of colour, hitherto ignored, suddenly became of paramount importance; rival tribes, which had been feared in their day of strength, grew to be objects of sympathy in their day of misfortune. Insensibly, the idea of a black nation began to take root, and races which had formerly never met, save in battle, grew to regard one another as relatives, almost as brothers. But in 1890 that feeling was absolutely non-existent, and the Pioneer Force had a good reception throughout the Protectorate.

On the other hand, the natives attached to the expedition began to grow more uneasy with every trek. They had heard so much of the ways of the Matabele warriors, and were so convinced that the little expedition would be doomed the moment it crossed the border, that they deserted in batches whenever the chance occurred. So serious did the matter become, that at one time it seemed as if the whole enterprise would be crippled for lack of drivers, horse boys, and voerloupers. However, at this point Khama, always the faithful ally of the white man,

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came to the aid of the column, sending two hundred of his own men, under the command of his brother Radi-Kladi, to take the places of the deserters. Thirty-seven of these Bamangwatu were mounted, and Selous, as Intelligence Officer, was given them to use as scouts.

Later on, however, Khama's men fell into disfavour. The Bamangwatu are chiefly noted for their piety and their general inefficiency at any sort of manual labour, whilst they are by no means amenable to discipline. William Harvey Brown, one of the Pioneers, an American by birth and author of an excellent book, *On the South African Frontier*, draws an amusing, and very characteristic, picture of some of Khama's men who had been out scouting with himself. They had taken offence at something which had been said, and "when we stopped to make coffee and let our horses graze, they again held religious services, with Bible-reading, singing, and prayers, and then spent the rest of the time in searching for vermin in one another's woolly heads and in their dirty, greasy clothing. The Bamangwatu were finally altogether dispensed with as scouts, presumably on account of their laziness and cowardice."

At Macloutsie the Pioneers found the British South Africa Company's police, who were to accompany them on their long journey; whilst a few miles away was the camp of Bechuanaland Border Police, that same force the strengthening of which had seemed so important to Sir Hercules Robinson. There is not much doubt now that the increase of the Border Police did serve a useful purpose, though that purpose was not the one which the High Commissioner had indicated to Lord Knutsford. The force at Macloutsie was never called upon to turn back

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a Boer trek, in fact it was much too small to have done anything against the force which President Kruger would have sent up ; but, by threatening Lobengula's southern border, it undoubtedly did have the effect of drawing away some of the Matabele regiments, which otherwise might have attacked the Pioneer Column.

Whilst at Macloutsie, the Pioneers were put through a rapid course of drill, in view of the coming inspection by Lord Methuen, then Adjutant-General in South Africa. The ordeal passed off satisfactorily, the sham fight being especially realistic, although probably but few of those who took part in it would have believed that it was the only battle of any sort in which the column was destined to take part.

On June 27th, the expedition, Pioneers, Police, and the small handful of unattached civilians, left Macloutsie and entered on the dangerous part of its journey. Amongst those accompanying it in unofficial or semi-official positions, were Dr. Jameson, who held Rhodes' power of attorney, and Archibald Colquhoun, who was to organise a form of civil government when, if ever, Mount Hampden was reached.

Shortly after leaving Macloutsie a small party of Matabele appeared, bearing a letter addressed to the chief of the white men. This purported to be from Lobengula, and repeated the declaration which he had made to Jameson, that the only road in his country lay through Bulawayo, that he would have no new road made, and that, if the white men dared to cross the Tuli River, they would meet with trouble. It was hardly an auspicious start, though, as a matter of fact, it was merely what every one had anticipated. Colonel Pennefather sent the

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only possible reply, but the most effective answer was given in another way, by Selous being despatched across the Tuli to start cutting his road.

The first section of the new road was made by B troop, under Captain Hoste, and such good progress was made that by 9th July the track was clear as far as the Umsingwane River. Meanwhile, the main body had reached the Tuli River on July 1st, and both Police and Pioneers set to work to build a fort which was to serve as a base camp. Originally called Fort Selous, the name of this station was subsequently changed to Fort Tuli. In later years the place acquired, unjustly perhaps, an evil name. It was the grave of good reputations, people said. Practically every man who remained there any length of time lost the major part of what virtues he may once have possessed ; but then, as a matter of fact, much the same can be said of all those lonely little outposts, where there is no society, save the score of fever-stricken men who foregather nightly in the one sweltering, tin-roofed canteen, no recreation save the drinking of alleged whisky, no topic of conversation save the good fortune of those who have got away and the ill-luck of those who have died.

The expedition which crossed the Tuli River consisted of about four hundred white men all told. There was a proper medical staff, organised by the Jesuit Fathers ; two chaplains, an Anglican and a Roman Catholic ; and a Veterinary Surgeon. The wagons numbered ninety, in addition to which there were four water-carts. One wagon carried a seachlight, another the electric plant for working it ; whilst amongst the miscellaneous stores was a complete steam saw-mill. The armament of the artillery troop comprised four Maxim guns taking the Martini-Henry

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cartridge, two 7-pounder Field guns, and twenty war rockets with two war rocket-tubes.

From the time the Column left Macloutsie, laagers were formed every night. The wagons were drawn up in the form of a hollow square, with one of the guns, a Maxim or a 7-pounder, at each corner. A certain number of men was appointed to each wagon, to sleep under it, or near it, at night, and to form its escort by day; whilst, by assigning to every wagon a fixed position in the laager, it became a comparatively easy task to form up, provided the ground was sufficiently open, or had been cleared previously. On the other hand, a sudden attack during a trek would probably have resulted in a victory for one side or the other long before half the wagons had got into position; there would have been but little warning, and a convoy of that size cannot be laagered up in a few minutes. However, though the arrangements were never actually put to the test of war, they were certainly the best which could have been made under the conditions, and had disaster come, it would not have been the fault of the leaders.

At night the horses were tethered inside the laager, secured to ropes stretched right across it; the oxen, on the other hand, were outside the barrier of wagons, tied as usual to the trek-chains, forming not the least of the defences against an enemy whose object always is to get to close quarters and use the stabbing assegai.

Whilst the Column was on the march, scouts were thrown out in all directions, a vanguard riding a few hundred yards in advance of the leading wagon, a rear-guard keeping about the same distance behind the tail of the long line, whilst on either side were flanking parties, pairs of horsemen, each pair keeping in touch with the

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next. Every precaution was taken, and yet there was not a man in the party who did not know that if Lobengula had given the order for a general attack by all his troops, the fate of the expedition would have been sealed. It would have been overborne and utterly destroyed by the sheer weight of numbers.

Captain Hoste's troop went on across the Umsingwane River as far as the Umshabetsi, where it halted and waited for the main body, which had left one unfortunate troop of police behind to act as garrison for Fort Tuli. On July 18th the rest of the expedition reached the Umshabetsi, and on the following day Selous went ahead again, this time with Captain Heany's troop. So it was during the whole march through the low country. The famous hunter was always in advance with a troop of the Pioneers, and undoubtedly his was one of the hardest and most responsible tasks of all. He had never been across that actual stretch of veld before, but so thorough was his knowledge of the country generally, that he was able to pick out at a glance the best way through any difficult stretch, whilst a less experienced man might have wasted hours riding round, and then have taken the wrong course.

From the Umshabetsi onwards, a double road, or rather two parallel tracks, was cut, in order to shorten the line of wagons, and make concentration easier in the event of attack. This plan, though it increased greatly the work of the road-makers, answered admirably, resulting in a considerable increase in the distance covered during the day's trek.

The work of the road party was both laborious and dangerous. In a country where the white man seldom

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handles either an axe or a shovel, the Pioneers had to use both, toiling all day in the blazing sun ; moreover, when that part of the daily round was over, they had to make a scherm of thorn scrub to sleep in, and fetch their own water and fuel. They were only allowed one wagon and a water-cart, so that anything in the nature of a laager was out of the question. The fact that the road was always open well ahead of the main body, even when the system of double tracks had been started, bears the most eloquent testimony to the loyalty, grit, and endurance of those who were trusted with the making of it, men who received in return for their services, and for the hourly risk of being massacred, seven and sixpence a day and some grants of problematical value in a country they might never reach.

There were several reports of Matabele having been seen whilst the column was on its way through the wooded stretch between the Nuanetsi and Tokwi Rivers. In the majority of cases, these were brought in by Makalanga natives from the miserable little villages which can be found on the top of nearly every large kopje in that district. As a rule, a stray party of scouts quickly disposed of the report, but in one case the news appeared to be well founded. Khama's party of Bamangwatu, who had been dismissed the previous day and started on their long journey back to Palapye, returned in a state of abject fear, and declared that they had actually seen an army of at least two thousand Matabele. The column was camped on the south bank of the Tokwi River, in a spot where attack with the stabbing assegais would have been easy, and defence correspondingly difficult. There was no panic of any kind, but every man set to work as perhaps he had never worked before. Mines were laid round

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the laager ; scrub was cut and placed amongst the bullocks, and the searchlight was kept playing on the bush all night. Yet when daylight came there had been no sign of an enemy ; and it was tolerably certain that the Bama-ngwatu had merely been acting up to their reputation, which charges them with being the most unblushing liars between Cape Agulhas and the Line.

The following day, August 11th, the expedition crossed the Tokwi River. It was now near the end of the first and most dangerous stage of its venture. A few miles ahead could be seen the edge of the high veld, the promised land, and already Selous had sent back word that he had succeeded in overcoming the greatest physical difficulty of the whole journey. He had found an easy pass from the low to the high country. A trek or two more, and the Pioneer column would be on the open plains.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE news that an easy way on to the high veld had been discovered was received with delight by every member of the expedition. All along, the occupation of the great plateau had been the main object of the Chartered Company, the low country then, as now, being considered of secondary importance. On the other hand, it was one thing to be at the edge of the high veld with a train of loaded wagons, and quite another matter to get those wagons up the two or three thousand feet which represented the difference in level. In most parts of Mashonaland, the high veld breaks away into what is really a series of rugged terraces, granite kopjes alternating with boulder-strewn valleys and green, marshy vleis, utterly hopeless country from the transport-riders' point of view. The number of passes known even now is extremely small, and of these by far the best is still that discovered by Selous, and well named Providential Pass.

The discovery of the pass came at the most critical moment in the history of the Column. Lobengula's messengers, who had met the expedition between Macloutsie and Tuli, had taken about ten days on the return journey to the royal kraal, and even then they had not been able to report definitely that the white men had entered the Matabele territory. Lobengula himself seems to have believed that the Pioneers were still at Tuli; at any rate,

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he assumed they were, possibly with the idea of gaining time and allowing them to reach a place of safety before his own people forced him to act ; consequently, his second and more peremptory command to keep out of his territory was sent, not to the Lundi, where the main party had already arrived, but to Tuli. The bearer of the letter was Johann Colenbrander, now Colonel Colenbrander, a man whose name is known to every native between the Cape and the Zambesi. Colenbrander was accompanied by four *indunas*, who, when they found that the column had actually gone on, asked the white man to ride after it, deliver the king's letter, and return to Tuli with Colonel Pennefather's answer. In this way, several days more were lost, and Lobengula did not actually receive the reply until the Pioneers had reached the comparative safety of the open plains.

Had Selous, however, failed to find a pass, matters would have been very different. The column might easily have been held up in difficult, unhealthy country whilst a road was being constructed, and this would have given the Matabele ample time to act. There is little doubt that Lobengula did not want to fight ; but his authority was already strained almost to breaking point, and he could not have held in his men many days longer. Opinions are divided as to whether he thought the expedition would really dare to cross his borders, and the point can never be settled now ; but the fact remains that the king risked his throne, and even his life, in order to keep faith with the white men.

Selous had left the main body on the 2nd of August, and ridden on ahead, accompanied by Lieutenant Nicholson, a Transvaaler named Borius, and two natives. On

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the second morning out, he climbed one of the largest of the granite kopjes, a hill called Zamamba, and from there he could see the country spread out before him like a map, a few miles of comparatively level bush, with the course of the Tokwi and Tokwana rivers clearly marked out by the greener vegetation along their banks ; beyond the Tokwi, eight or ten miles more of forest, gradually rising now ; beyond that again, hills, rugged granite kopjes of the most hopeless kind, apparently stopping all access to the promised land which was clearly visible as an almost unbroken ridge, forming the horizon. There appeared to be one opening, and one only, leading into the hills, and though it was more than probable that, as is usually the case in Africa, this would end abruptly in some wholly impassable barrier, Selous decided to explore it. He crossed the Tokwi, left two of his party there, and went on with Nicholson and a native. It was late in the afternoon when he entered the valley he had seen from the top of the kopje, and sunset found him still in the pass which led up, gently and regularly, always in the exact direction in which he wished to go. Telling his companions to camp down, Selous himself went on to try and take advantage of the few minutes of light which yet remained.

It is easy to understand his anxiety. So much depended on whether that pass would continue on as it had begun. If it did, the safety and success of the expedition were practically assured ; if it did not, the Matabele might have time to sweep down and destroy the whole column.


¶ Climbing a small kopje, about a mile ahead of his camp, Selous at last got a clear view, and, as he himself

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says, "a weight of responsibility that had at times become almost unbearable, fell from my shoulders," for, stretching away in front of him, as far as his eye could reach, was the great level stretch of open country on which Victoria now stands, the south-eastern extremity of the high veld of Mashonaland.

In his book, *Travel and Adventure in South-East Africa*, Selous, stung by some superficial comments which had been made by men who had come later, who had taken no risks, and to whom the Pioneer's road was but a dreary track, along which the wagons jolted with maddening slowness, wasting the valuable time of their passengers, says sadly, that doubtless in course of time the very name of Providential Pass will be forgotten. But in that he is wrong. Just as the old Pioneer's road has become disused, well-nigh obliterated in places by the encroaching bush, the drifts washed into great ravines by the rains, the corduroy bridges across the swamps long since rotted away, so, for the moment, the memory of what happened on that road seems to have grown dim. The new population of the country came up by rail, in safety, and it does not like to think of the risks which were run, possibly because the thought would remind it of the debt it owes to the men who went before it, few of whom secured any adequate reward in the end, being mainly of a class which seems foredoomed to failure in any enterprise which does not entail danger.

On the other hand, however, as time goes on, and instead of being practically a contemporary event, the Pioneer Expedition becomes a fact in the history of the Empire, so a sense of proportion will return to the nation, which will realise that anything that has happened



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since in Rhodesia has been of local and passing interest compared to that first great Trek. The latter was an Imperial event, whilst even the two native wars were only Rhodesian, or, at most, South African; and, in the story of that Trek, the discovery of Providential Pass forms the most striking and dramatic incident.

No time was lost in taking advantage of Selous' welcome news, and by August 13th the Column was on the high veld at the head of the Pass, with the greater part of its difficulties and dangers behind it. From this point onwards, road-making became a comparatively easy task, whilst the open nature of the country rendered anything in the way of a successful Matabele attack almost impossible.

Whilst the expedition was in the low veld, the greatest excitement had prevailed amongst the Matabele themselves. Lobengula had never told his people definitely that he intended to let the white men through to Mashonaland, in fact one or two of his orders seem to indicate that he himself was not quite certain what he would do ultimately. For instance, he ordered a large number of new shields to be made, in itself a sign that he was expecting war; and then he set the whole tribe to work, men as well as women, manufacturing sandals for themselves, which seemed to indicate that he was contemplating a general movement northwards, an idea which was confirmed by his sending his cattle up to the Zambesi valley. Possibly he looked on the road to Mashonaland as being merely a blind, and was anticipating that the Pioneers would suddenly change their course and attack him from the east, whilst the Bechuanaland Border Police invaded his country from the south.

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Every day, whilst the Column was still between the Tuli and the Tokwi, large bodies of warriors came in to see the king, begging to be sent against the white men, and, as Colenbrander subsequently reported, these did not return home, but went into camp somewhere in the eastern districts. It may have been that they had orders to wait and repulse any attack, should the Column turn towards Matabeleland after all, or it may have been that they were simply too late, and turned back when they found out that their prey had escaped on to the high veld. One thing is certain, the Matabele were ready and anxious to fight, and were not, as has been said, well disposed towards the expedition provided it kept out of their especial preserves.

On August 14th the column halted, well in the open country, and founded its first post in Mashonaland, Fort Victoria. A little later, this was shifted a few miles to a spot selected by Selous between the Umshagashi and Umchegi Rivers, where the township of Victoria now stands. Latterly, Victoria has fallen out of the race. Bulawayo, Gwelo, and Salisbury, being on the main road to the North, have grown steadily, whilst the tiny settlement away to the east has attracted little attention. It is much the same to-day as it was ten years ago, despite the important fact that it is the centre of what may be called the granary of Rhodesia; that the finest native cattle between the Crocodile and the Zambesi are raised in its neighbourhood; that there is pasture to be found in the valleys a few miles to the east of it when the grass in every other part of the country is parched and useless; and that, moreover, its gold belt is amongst the best discovered so far. Yet Victoria remains stagnant, forming almost

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the only spot in Rhodesia where the spirit of the Pioneer days yet survives, the careless, sanguine, unpractical good fellowship, the open-handed generosity, and the utter disregard of danger. It is off the main track. The men of the new type, in a hurry to get rich, keep close to the railway, where there are still more than enough openings to occupy them. By and by, however, the line will reach the sleepy little township on the eastern edge of the high veld, and everything will be changed. A large town will grow up, a new town with new ideas, for the men of the pioneer type have little chance beside the speculator, the Teuton, and the Greek.

At Victoria, Sir John Willoughby overtook the Column, bringing with him C troop of Police, which was left behind as garrison for the new post. The column then went on again, heading now practically due north for Mount Hampden, where, acting on the advice of Selous, who knew that district thoroughly, the Chartered Company had decided to make its principal station. However, Selous himself did not go on with the main body of Pioneers, for though he was anxious to see his task as guide through to the end, he was overborne by Jameson, who persuaded him to lead a small party, consisting of the Doctor himself, Archibald Colquhoun, and fifteen men from A troop of the Police, across to the kraal of a chief called Umtasa, with whom they wanted to make a treaty. Consequently, on August 26th, Selous resigned his position as Intelligence Officer, Edward Burnett taking his place.

The danger of a Matabele attack was now practically over, but a new and very serious trouble arose. Whilst the wagons were in the low country, there had never been any difficulty about finding good feed for the oxen. True,

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it would be impossible to breed cattle on a large scale in the lowlands, but, for transport-bullocks merely passing through, any amount of really nourishing grass can always be found, especially up the little valleys between the granite kopjes. But on the high veld it was different. The Column arrived there in the latter part of the winter, when the grass was at its very worst, long, dry, and almost devoid of nutriment, good enough perhaps for cattle which were accustomed to it, but not for bullocks which, like those belonging to the Column, had just come off the richer feed of the low country. The result was that the oxen began to grow thin, and a thin trek-bullock is the most hopeless animal imaginable. With his weight, he seems to lose also all heart in his work, and when he comes to a heavy place he simply lies down, not because he will not try, but because he is physically incapable of doing so. Using the whip on him merely has the effect of making him still thinner.

Had the Pioneer Column consisted merely of ordinary transport, with just a driver and a leader to each wagon, it would have had to stop whilst the cattle picked up their strength; as it was, however, there were plenty of men, and in the heavy places, the drifts and the sandy river beds, the men had to supply the draught power the bullocks lacked. In many cases, the Pioneers actually placed the yokes across their chests, and pulled like oxen.

The Umfuli River was crossed on 6th September, and the expedition found itself in country of a nature different from any it had been through so far, heavily timbered, and extremely unpromising so far as farming work was concerned. It was then that the long and bitter quarrel between the Pioneers and the Chartered Company began,

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a quarrel which was not greatly to the credit of the latter. The Pioneers had each been promised a farm of three thousand acres in extent, and, as the whole country was unoccupied and was of vast extent, the men naturally expected to be allowed to stake out their land wherever they liked, especially as they knew that Rhodes himself had made a long fight to secure this same right for Van Niekerk's Freebooters in Stellaland, men whose claims to any land at all had been of the most shadowy description. In these circumstances it was but natural that, when two parties of engineers were sent ahead from the Umfuli to survey Pioneer farms in the miserable stretch of country between that river and the Hanyani, there should have been general dissatisfaction, especially as the grants were not to include any mineral rights. Men had time to grumble now, the dangers and difficulties seemed to be over, though it seemed, too, that the gratitude of the Company was going to take the form of depriving them of even the small reward they had been promised. Towards their own leaders, however, the feelings of the Pioneers were always cordial, and there was never any hint that the contract made in Cape Colony had been broken in Mashonaland. The bitterness was all directed against the Chartered officials, who, having acquired the country so cheaply, seemed determined to retain the whole of the spoils. A little more generosity at this juncture, a little of that spirit of concession which had been shown to the Stellalanders, would have been of great future benefit to the Company. As it was, however, it started on bad terms with its first settlers, and though since the Boer War a far more reasonable and broad-minded policy has been adopted by the London Board,

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the quarrels of the past drove many of the best men out of the country, and prevented many others from coming in. Later on, the scheme of settling the Pioneers in the Hanyani-Umfuli stretch was abandoned with rather an ill grace, and the men were allowed to peg out where they chose, though only in blocks of six farms. But, as a set-off to this, it was declared that occupation was necessary, a most unreasonable condition at such an early stage.

On September 11th, the column emerged from the wooded country and came once more on to the open plain. It was the last trek. The oxen were absolutely exhausted, and though Selous' projected site,¹ beyond Mount Hampden, was only twelve miles away, the leaders would go no further. Where the expedition outspanned that night the town of Salisbury now stands. Some day, perhaps, the capital of Rhodesia may develop into a pleasant place, the muddy vlei may be drained, and the unsightly gaps due to it be filled up; but that seems a dream, rather than a possibility. At present, it is a miserable little town in a miserable situation, a miscellaneous collection of buildings scattered over a dreary stretch of veld, resembling an ill-advised speculation on the part of an insolvent land company, rather than the official centre of a flourishing colony.

On September 12th, 1890, the whole expedition was paraded, and, in the name of the Queen, all the land in South Central Africa not claimed by any civilised power was annexed to the Empire. Lieutenant Biscoe hoisted the Union Jack, whilst prayer was offered by Canon Balfour. A salute of twenty-one guns was fired; three cheers were

¹ Near the source of the Gurumapudzi river.

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given for the Queen ; and the occupation of Mashonaland was complete.

In honour of the Premier, the place was named Fort Salisbury ; though, in common with Victoria and Charter, a post which had been established on September 4th, a troop of the police being left there, the word "Fort" was dropped as soon as the civilian character of the place overshadowed its military importance. As has been said, from its physical characteristics, Salisbury is bad, and geographically it is even worse, being far from the centre of the country, and nearly three hundred miles away from the nearest point on the great Cape-to-Cairo railway. But, none the less, it seems likely to remain the capital, as the growing business of the country has made anything in the nature of an alteration almost impossible.

The remainder of September was taken up in fort-building, practically the last work the Pioneers were called upon to do for the Company, and on the 30th of September they were finally disbanded, just three months after they had crossed the Tuli River and entered Lobengula's territory. Not a single life had been lost, and yet the whole of the work for which the Force had been raised had been accomplished ; a road four hundred miles long had been cut ; forts had been erected at Tuli, Victoria, Charter, and Salisbury ; Mashonaland had been annexed, and a sufficient number of white men brought up to render that annexation no mere formality. It was a fine record, and if the story may seem uneventful to-day as compared with that of other Empire-building expeditions, it is not because the element of risk was lacking, but rather that the risks during the early stages were so great that every man, from Colonel

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Pennefather down to the youngest trooper, spared no effort to hasten the progress of the Column through the low country ; and, perhaps, the finest part of the whole achievement was the fact that not a shot was fired in anger.

It is practically impossible, and certainly invidious, to pick out any man as specially deserving of credit. The fact that there was no fighting, and that the actual pioneering work proved to be the most important part of the task, tended to place the purely military and police elements at a disadvantage so far as the public was concerned ; yet, on the other hand, the excellence of the military arrangements proved throughout that efficient men had been selected. Colonel Pennefather was, of course, in supreme command, and the Empire certainly owes him a debt of gratitude. Major Johnson contracted to do certain definite work, and carried out his contract splendidly, having chosen the right men to assist him. Selous was an exceptional man in an exceptional position, and he acquitted himself as every one knew he would do ; as in the case of Major Johnson, his part in the success was a definite one, and the work he accomplished can never be forgotten.

There were a dozen others equally deserving of remembrance. Forbes, who occupied Manicaland, Borrow who fell with Wilson's party ; Heyman, the victor at Macequece ; and Roach who was shot in the Boer War ; Willoughby of the Raid, and Nicholson who helped Selous find the pass to the high veld ; Fiennes, Mundell—to name but a few.

The Pioneers are scattered now ; some have succeeded brilliantly : one, a trooper in 1890, is now one of the General Managers of that same Chartered Com-

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pany ; others have gone under completely ; and many, the majority perhaps, are dead. Of the hundred and eighty-seven men who crossed the Tuli River on June 28th, 1890, sixty-five are, at the time of writing (August 1909) known to be dead ; of sixty-six more no details are available, though, unfortunately, it is only too probable that most of these have made their last trek ; and but fifty-six are known to be alive. Yet nineteen years ago they were all young men, chosen for their fitness out of thousands of volunteers. The price of Empire is not only the tale of the lives lost in the field of battle.

BOOK V.

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE EASTERN GATE.

CHAPTER XXIII.

COMPARED with the history of Matabeleland, the history of the neighbouring strip, now known as the Mozambique territory, is very vague. The reason for this is, however, simple. Whilst Umzilakazi's country lay on the direct route to the North, in what may be called the natural line of expansion, the eastern territory, or Gazaland as it was then called, was right off the track. Moreover, it was so notoriously unhealthy that the missionary societies, which played so important a part in the development of South Central Africa, rightly decided not to ask any of their men to go to what seemed certain death, at least so long as the more healthy fields in the heart of the Continent remained practically untouched.

For the trader, also, Gazaland had few attractions. In his case, also, the fever acted as a deterring influence, whilst the fact that wagon transport was impossible, by reason both of the tsetse fly and of the dense jungle, rendered it difficult for him to take up more than a few hundred pounds weight of trading goods. Hunters avoided Gazaland on very similar grounds. There were plenty of elephant—there are plenty still in the Sabi valley—but they are very difficult to approach on account of the under-

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growth ; whilst, even when they are shot, it is not easy to find carriers to take the ivory back to civilisation.

Under these conditions it is not surprising that Gazaland attracted little attention from either British or Boer, and that, when the Portuguese marked it on the map as one of their possessions, no one troubled to protest very vigorously. In South Africa, at least during the last hundred years, Portuguese claims have never been regarded too seriously, and if any one did chance to reflect that Gazaland was the maritime gate to South Central Africa, he probably consoled himself with the thought that, when the time came, Portugal would merely receive notice to quit.

In the days of her greatness, Portugal undoubtedly did exercise a certain degree of sovereignty over Gazaland. She held the coast, and she sent expeditions inland as far as the Zimbabwe Ruins, establishing two or three posts on the border of the high veld ; but her possession of the interior, if possession it can be called, did not last long. Her ally and convert, the "Emperor of Monomatapa," after the manner of his kind, murdered the missionaries and repudiated the treaty. The expedition sent against him ended in absolute disaster, and, from that time onwards, the farthest Portuguese post was not beyond the limits of the jungles of the coast. This state of affairs continued until the early part of the nineteenth century ; there was a little trading for gold and ivory, more than a little slave-dealing, but of effective occupation there was no sign.

About 1827, however, even the small degree of sovereignty His Most Faithful Majesty did exercise over the interior was swept away. There is only native tradition as to many of the details, and a native is a prince amongst

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liars ; but the main facts belong to history. About the time Umzilakazi fled from Zululand, another Zulu chief broke away in similar fashion. Amongst white men it has been the fashion to speak of this leader as Manikos ; but his real name was unquestionably N'Yamandi. He quarrelled with Tjaka over some point, and, fearing to be killed, took his personal followers and fled due north. Little or nothing definite is known concerning his wanderings. The natives declare that he met with practically no resistance anywhere, that he made a straight course for the Portuguese territory, drove the white men right back to the coast, reduced the local natives, who were chiefly M'Hlengwi, to a condition of vassalage, and settled down somewhere in the neighbourhood of the Sabi River.

Whatever else is vague, one fact is certain—N'Yamandi conquered the country from the Portuguese, who, for the greater part of a century, merely held a few posts on the coast. The Zulu chief appears to have treated the M'Hlengwi well, possibly because they offered so few attractions from the point of view of the raider ; but he regarded the unfortunate Mashona differently, and his men from the east harried them as regularly as did Umzilakazi's warriors from the west.

When M'Yamandi died, his kingdom passed to his son M'Zila, who was certainly recognised by the British as an independent chief. In 1870 he sent a mission to Natal begging to be accepted as "ally, friend, and tributary." His message ran : "Umzila has plenty of ivory and other things which the subjects of the Government of Natal value, and he has heard that Natal possesses many things which he and his people require ; he also finds that some tribes benefit largely by their people going to the Colony to work

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for what they may desire to possess, and he wishes his people to have the same advantage; "but," he went on to say, "this latter cannot be had without peace, and he sends to ask for peace." He then asks the Government of Natal to send "an officer with a ship to enter the mouth of the Imiti (Crocodile River)," and promises to send back a load of ivory "which the ship alone could carry." The final paragraph in the message was both quaint and true. "He is anxious for peace. It is hard to be always at war or ready for war; death from the assegai is invariably followed by worse death from fever, for these two kinds of death are the constant companions one of the other."

In an additional statement the messengers said: "Umzila is a King; the Portuguese are women." Umzila says, "I am a girl wishing to become a bride, and to be married, like the Zulu and Amaswazi brides have been [to the British Government], to a strong and vigorous husband, who is able by his word only to protect me. I hereby present myself for acceptance, and if I am accepted I and my people will be happy, and live in our old country in peace."

In his reply, Sir Theophilus Shepstone promised to send Mr. St. Vincent Erskine to see the chief, though he expressed his doubts as to whether the Portuguese might not prevent him from entering the mouth of the Crocodile River. This actually occurred, as Erskine reported on July 3rd, 1871. In view of later developments, and as showing what the Portuguese had done for civilisation prior to British occupation of the interior, Erskine's description of Delagoa Bay is full of interest. He wrote:—

"The town of Lourenço Marques consists of about twenty-four houses of other than native construction,

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though scarcely to be described as built upon European models, and about a hundred native huts.”

“There is a so-called fort, garrisoned by about a hundred men, two-thirds of whom are Kafirs, and the remainder half-breeds or convicts. It is constructed of the ordinary sandstone of the district, with no pretensions to principles of fortification. The walls are quite straight and upright, and of no comparative thickness as a fortification. It is quite unprotected seawards except by a five feet high sea-wall of about a hundred yards long, already undermined by the sea, and evidently with insufficient foundation to give it solidity. The walls are pierced with large windows near the ground, protected by wooden bars.”

Of the houses he wrote: “The roofs are flat, constructed with beams of mangrove poles, on top of which are placed laths and grass, upon which again clay is stamped down. . . . The outsides are whitewashed, and ornamented with a broad band of vivid brown round the doorways and windows, as well as along the outside edges of the building. Within, the rooms are large and mean, . . . with a singular dearth of furniture and upholstery. This applies equally to the house of the Indian trader and the Governor.”

The population was in keeping with the town. “The inhabitants are mostly natives of Goa or half-breeds. . . . *There is not a single woman in the town with any claim to European origin.* Their place is supplied among the so-called whites by the ordinary Kafir women of the Amatonga tribe.”

It must be remembered that Erskine was writing, not of an outlying post, but of the principal Portuguese settlement on that coast. In these circumstances, it is not unnatural that the British should have been in-

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clined to treat the claims of Portugal with scant ceremony. She had been weighed and found wanting. She was not only standing in the path of civilisation, but, wherever she was strong enough, her methods with the natives a disgrace to the colour of her rulers, and an insult to the women of her race. The total destruction of Portuguese power in Africa might have been an outrage according to international law, but it would have been a service of incalculable value to the cause of humanity.

Erskine, turned away at Delagoa Bay, landed at Inhambane, where he found that the extreme limit of the Portuguese claims was a little island in the river, and they had even been driven out of this a few months previously by M'Zila's men. The journey to M'Zila's kraal, on foot all the way, was a long and wearisome one, and the king's own behaviour, in refusing to send either carriers or food, made it even more difficult than it need have been.

M'Zila at a distance, asking through his messengers for an alliance, and M'Zila at close quarters, turned out to be two very different persons. After insulting Erskine vicariously in every way he could, the chief at last allowed him to come on to the kraal; but, even then, he was kept waiting a week. At last, he was invited up to see a marauding party which was just going out, but he was not impressed. He reported to Sir Theophilus Shepstone:—

“ I saw the most ragged and dirty collection of natives it has ever been my luck to witness. They were badly armed with worn-out assegais, and furnished with small shields, composed of all materials, from that of a poor goat's skin to that of a buffalo. . . . Whilst I was standing near the cattle kraal a rather stout man came sauntering up by himself, and approached. He was joined by one

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of the head *indunas*, and came up. This was Umzila. He said, "Which is he?" I was pointed out. He remarked, "So you have come at last?" and then passed on. Soon afterwards he broke into a violent passion with his sons, and kept hunting them with a stick, and calling to the people to kill the *induna* that attends to their affairs. Both these men were so intoxicated they could hardly stand, and Umzila, was in little better plight. . . . After our departure, Umzila, in a fit of rage, set fire to his son's huts and burnt them and all the property therein to ashes."

Yet this drunken king and his ragged, ill-armed warriors had experienced no difficulty in keeping the Portuguese out of the country, reducing them practically to the position of mere trespassers on the coast.

As might have been expected, the mission ended in nothing being arranged. M'Zila was usually unfit to attend to business, and at last, in sheer weariness, Erskine decided to depart. This had the result of drawing from the *indunas* the statement that, though he acknowledged the power of the British and their Natal Kafirs, M'Zila was by no means afraid of them. The Zulu formed a good shield between him and them, and, moreover, he had "General Bush," and "General Fever," and many more useful "Generals" in the form of various diseases, with which, by means of his witchcraft, he could infect invading armies. And with that statement, Erskine had to be content.

Seven years passed before anything more was heard officially from M'Zila; then he sent to Shepstone to complain that "Vinnie," St. Vincent Erskine, had not given him the presents which the Natal Government had



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promised, and to ask that another consignment might be dispatched, by sea, in charge of a different white man. The latter part of the request was refused; though his messengers were handed a few pounds' worth of trading goods, which, apparently satisfied him.

In 1887, after another long silence, messengers came again, this time to announce that M'Zila was dead, and had been succeeded by his son, Undungazwe (N'Gungunhana M'Dangazi, commonly called Gungunhana). The significant point about the mission was that the *Indunas* composing it were supposed to have presented the Natal Government with an elephant's tusk—they explained it had proved too heavy, and that they had left it behind—but the mere intention of bringing such a gift when they announced the king's death, was an acknowledgment of British suzerainty. The long period, two years, which had elapsed between M'Zila's death and the formal announcement was nothing to a native, the actual death and "official death" of a chief being usually separated by a considerable period.

When the Pioneer column went up to Mashonaland, Gungunhana certainly considered himself independent of Portugal. True, the Charter had recognised that the Portuguese held the coast, or a strip along the coast, but the limits of this had never been defined in any way, and, whilst the Portuguese had already claimed the whole of Mashonaland, the Chartered Company was quite prepared to claim the whole of Gazaland, if it could only get a concession from Gungunhana.

North of Gazaland—the latter word has unfortunately rather a vague significance, and is probably only a corruption of something totally different, but there is no alterna-

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tive term—was Manicaland, a district of indefinite extent, comprising both the splendid high veld round Umtali, and the richly mineralised low country round Macequece. The chief of Manicaland was Umtasa, a wily old native politician who claimed to be wholly independent, and repudiated the idea that he owed allegiance either to Gungunhana or to the Portuguese. The latter had, however, pushed their way inland again, up the Pungwe River, and thence across country to the Revue River, where there was a fortified post, Macequece. A chartered company, the *Comphania da Moçambique*, had been formed, its local representative being Baron de Rezende, the Managing Director; whilst aiding him was Gouveia, the *Capitao Mor* of Gorongaza, a Goanese adventurer, otherwise known as Manoel Antonio de Souza, a name which concealed the most rapacious half-bred slave trader in South East Africa.

As soon as the success of the Pioneer Expedition had become assured, that is, immediately after the founding of Victoria, Jameson, who though he was nominally only an unattached civilian, was really one of the moving spirits of the whole venture, realised that the journey from Kimberley to Salisbury by bullock wagon was far too long and expensive for practical purposes. Consequently, he began to think of an outlet, or a way in, from the East Coast. It was with this object in view that Archibald Colquhoun and Selous hurried across the veld to Umtasa's kraal; and it was to prevent anything of the kind that Baron de Rezende called to his aid Colonel Paiva d'Andrada and Gouveia. Such was the condition of affairs in the early part of September 1890. The *Comphania da Moçambique* claimed Umtasa's country; the Chartered Company intended to have it, and,

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if possible, a strip down to the sea as well. The Portuguese had a small army on the way up; the Pioneers had not yet reached Salisbury, and were getting further from Umtasa's every day; yet the little party of British rode into Manicaland in the same spirit of calm assurance which had characterised the whole of the Pioneer venture.

CHAPTER XXIV.

IT was on September 13th that Colquhoun and Selous arrived at the principal kraal of Umtasa, or, as he also called himself, "Mafambo Busuko" ("He who walks by night"). The village itself, at an altitude of about 4300 feet above sea level, was in an almost impregnable position amongst the granite kopjes. The chief, perhaps speaking the truth for once, announced that he was delighted to hear that the mission had arrived, and that he was prepared to discuss matters with the white man on the following day.

This readiness, which was so greatly at variance with the native character, was in itself suspicious, and shows the value he placed on his engagements. As it turned out afterwards, he was ready to enter into agreements with any one, provided there was the chance of profit to himself, and to repudiate those agreements in the same light spirit in which they had been made.

His position was very different from that of Lobengula. The Matabele king had a great deal to grant, and a great deal to preserve. His territory was of international importance, and he realised the fact. Moreover, in all his negotiations he felt he was fighting for the very existence of his people, who, if they did not actually distrust him, were ready to turn on him the moment he made a mistake.

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Umtasa, on the other hand, was the absolute ruler of a rather feeble people, who would trouble little about what he did. Then, too, he knew that the occupation of Mashonaland was already an accomplished fact; that, whatever happened, he must in future be between two fires, the British and the Portuguese, and that resistance to both would be fatal. Unfortunately, he adopted what was practically a policy of submission to both, in the hope of obtaining subsidies from both. Even whilst he was entering into an agreement with the British, he was, as it subsequently transpired, sending messages secretly to the Portuguese at Macequece. There was something heroic about Lobengula's behaviour, but that of Umtasa was wholly sordid. The two chiefs typified perfectly their respective nations, the lordly Matabele, and the wholly mean and detestable Mashona.

The first question put to Umtasa on the occasion of the meeting between himself and the Chartered Company's representative was as to whether he had entered into an agreement with any other white men, and he was told plainly that, in the event of his having done so, further negotiations would be useless. The old man protested vehemently against the idea. He was not under the Portuguese; he was not under Gungunhana; he was not under any one. He was Umtasa, the independent chief of Manicaland.

Questioned as to the position of the Portuguese at Macequece, he replied that he allowed them to live there. As for Baron de Rezende, he added, "He occasionally gives me presents, but I have not given him my territory, nor have I concluded any treaty with him"; but, at the same time, he admitted that he lived in fear of Gouveia,

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and the dread of the slave raider being sent up to his country had induced him to make certain concessions to the *Compania da Moçambique*. Probably, at the moment, Umtasa was sincere in his expressed desire for British protection. He knew, only too well, the power of the Matabele, and the fact that the Pioneer column had braved Lobengula's warriors, and cut a road through to the high veld, could not fail to impress him. He knew also that the Portuguese could never do such things. Moreover—and this is an argument which is constantly heard along the Anglo-Portuguese border—the Englishman is a man and a warrior; he rides a horse or walks, as a warrior should; whilst the Portuguese is, after all, but a woman, and has to be carried in a hammock slung on a pole.

The same day on which Umtasa received the Chartered envoys, he put his mark to the agreement with them. As this document led shortly afterwards to the most exciting events in the story of the occupation of Mashonaland, it is worth reproducing. It runs:—

“ Know all men to whom it may concern, that a full meeting of the Council of the Manica nation was held at Mafambo Busuko's on the fourteenth day of September, and it was then agreed that I, Umtasa, Mafambo Busuko, paramount king or chief of the said nation, should enter into this solemn agreement, and for the considerations hereinafter mentioned should, for myself and my heirs and my successors, and on behalf of my said nation, give and grant unto Archibald Ross Colquhoun, in his capacity of representative of the British South Africa Company, hereinafter called the Company, the sole, absolute, and entire perpetual right and power to do the following acts over the whole or any portion of the territory of the said nation, or

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any future extension thereof, including all subject and dependent territories :

“(a) To search, prospect, dig for, and keep all metals and minerals.

“(b) To construct, improve, equip, work, manage, and control public works and conveniences of all kinds, including railways, tramways, docks, harbours, roads, bridges, piers, wharves, canals, reservoirs, waterworks, embankments, viaducts, irrigations, reclamation, improvement, sewage, drainage, sanitary, water, gas, electric, or any other mode of light, telephonic, telegraphic power supply, and all other works and conveniences of general or public utility.

“(c) To carry on the business of miners, quarry owners, metallurgists, mechanical engineers, iron founders, builders and contractors, ship owners, ship builders, brick-makers, warehousemen, merchants, importers, exporters, and to buy, sell, deal in goods and property of all kinds.

“(d) To carry on the business of banking in all its branches.

“(e) To buy, sell, refine, manipulate, mint, and deal in bullion, specie, coin, and precious metals.

“(f) To manufacture and import arms and ammunition of all kinds.

“(g) To do all such things as are incidental and conducive to the exercise, attainment, and protection of all or any of the rights, powers, and concessions hereby granted.

“And I further agree to bind myself and my successors and nation not to enter into any treaty or alliance with any other person, company, or State, or to grant any concessions of land without the consent of the Company in writing, it being understood that this covenant shall be considered in the light of a Treaty or alliance made between the said

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nation and the Government of Her Britannic Majesty Queen Victoria : and in consideration thereof, I, Archibald Ross Colquhoun, on behalf of the Company, hereby undertake and agree to protect the said king and nation from all outside interference or attacks, and to support and maintain the said Chief and his lawful successors in the constitutional maintenance and exercise over his subjects of his powers and authority : And the Company hereby undertakes, in token of the amicable and friendly relations subsisting between the king and the Company, to appoint and maintain in the said territory a British Resident, with a suitable retinue and a suite of British subjects, and an escort of British police, for the due maintenance of law and order within the said territory.

“The Company hereby further agrees that it will, under the king’s supervision and authority, aid and assist in the establishment and propagation of Christian religion and the education and civilisation of the native subjects of the king by the establishment, maintenance, and endowment of such churches, schools, and trading stations as may be from time to time mutually agreed upon by the king and the Resident hereinbefore mentioned, and by the extension and equipment of telegraphs and of regular services of postal and transport communications.

“And the Company lastly undertakes and agrees to pay to said chief or king and his successor in perpetuity an annual sum of £100, or the equivalent thereof in trading goods as on overleaf at the option of the king.”

The document was signed by Umtasa, Mafambo Busuko, King or Chief of Manica, Archibald Ross Colquhoun, Representative of the British South Africa Company, F. C. Selous, C. F. Harrison, Adair Campbell ;

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whilst the witnesses who set their marks were Sebangi and Musaibi.

With regard to this concession, there was never any hint that Umtasa did not understand what he was granting. The fact that Selous signed it was in itself sufficient proof that the purport of the document had been explained carefully, and that no form of compulsion was employed ; it is only a matter for regret that the same, or similar, signatures were not available for the Rudd Concession. In that case, there would have been no possible grounds for suspicion, and Lobengula's repudiation of his bargain would not have been taken seriously by any one.

Umtasa, having made his bargain with the British, immediately set to work to pacify the Portuguese by sending two messengers to Baron de Rezende, informing the latter that the Manica nation was being compelled to sign a treaty with the Chartered Company. The result was that when Selous rode down to Macequece a couple of days later, the reception which awaited him was not cordial ; the Baron declined to sell him any of the provisions which were urgently needed, and showed him plainly that the Portuguese policy was to regard the Chartered envoys as trespassers. On his way back to Umtasa's, Selous overtook and passed Captain Bettencourt, a Portuguese officer, who was charged to deliver to Colquhoun a formal letter of protest. The letter, however, received the treatment usually meted out to Portuguese protests ; it was acknowledged and then practically forgotten. Colquhoun left for Salisbury shortly after, leaving Trooper Trevor, one of his escort, in charge of British interests until the promised Resident and police force should arrive.

It is well to point out here that, when Colquhoun and

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Selous arrived, the only claim which Portugal had to any part of the high veld was based on the fact that Umtasa was afraid of being raided by Gouveia ; there was no form of occupation, no treaty. The argument that Umtasa was a vassal of Gungunhana, and therefore subject to Portugal, was hardly to be taken seriously ; for, in the first case, there was no evidence that the chief of Gazaland had ever exercised any sort of authority in the Manica country, and, secondly, the Portuguese claim to be suzerains of Gungunhana was, at that time, very similar to Don Carlos' claim to the throne of Spain. They were not in a position to enforce it.

Towards the latter end of October, reports reached Salisbury to the effect that Colonel Paiva d'Andrada and Gouveia were marching on Umtasa's. A sergeant-major and ten police troopers were despatched hurriedly from Salisbury and were followed a few days later by a couple of officers. At the same time, Lieutenant Fiennes was ordered to take a portion of a troop of police, then garrisoning Fort Charter, across to Manicaland ; though, owing to the fact that there was, as yet, no road from Charter to Umtasa's, this party did not reach the chief's kraal until 16th November.

Meanwhile Major Forbes—or, as he was then, Captain Forbes, one of the most able men in the Company's service—had been placed in command of Manicaland, where he arrived on 3rd November. He was only just in time. The Portuguese force was already at Macequece, a few miles away, actually in the territory claimed by Umtasa. Forbes' first act was to send Lieutenant Graham and two troopers down to D'Andrada, warning the latter that he was practically invading what was now a British Pro-

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tectorate, and telling him frankly that the British troops would resist force with force. Colonel D'Andrada does not appear to have regarded the threat seriously, though he treated the messengers very well. This was on the 6th of November. On the 8th, two days later, Gouveia himself arrived at Umtasa's with seventy well-armed men, greatly to the consternation of the old chief, who knew that Forbes' total force, available at the moment, consisted of only ten troopers.

Forbes, however, immediately sent a strong letter of protest, greatly to the disgust of Gouveia, who was especially annoyed by an intimation that if he did not leave quickly he would be ejected by force. Meanwhile, messengers were sent to hurry on Fiennes, who was on his way from Charter, ordering him to leave his wagons, and ride in with as many men as possible. Fortunately, the party was not far off, and on November 15th, the lieutenant arrived with twenty police.

On the day after his arrival, Gouveia had hoisted the Portuguese flag over Umtasa's, ignoring the British threats, and feeling secure in the knowledge that D'Andrada was following him up with a strong force. By the 14th, D'Andrada and De Rezende, with the whole of their followers, the majority of whom were armed with rifles and sword bayonets, were within Umtasa's kraal. D'Andrada had given orders that, if the British were seen approaching, the entrances to the village were to be barricaded; and the Portuguese success seemed assured. Numerically, they were enormously superior to their opponents, whilst they held what was, under the circumstances an almost impregnable position, the British having no artillery of any sort.

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D'Andrada's first act was to issue a notice to all white settlers in Manicaland, calling on them to assemble at the kraal, and hear from Umtasa's own lips to whom the country really belonged; there was also to be a public meeting between Umtasa and D'Andrada. Late in the forenoon of the 15th, Forbes was informed that Umtasa was being pressed to set his mark to a document which declared that the country had been ceded to Gouveia many years previously. Umtasa afterwards alleged that at this stage he was told plainly that any refusal on his part would lead to Gouveia and his band being turned loose on his country, a threat quite in keeping with the Portuguese system of negotiating with natives, and, as every man in Manicaland knew the way in which Gouveia had recently dealt with a chief named Matoko, the menace was one not to be treated lightly.

The British chances of success seemed to be dwindling away to the vanishing point, when at 2 p.m. Fiennes and his twenty troopers appeared. Forbes lost no time. He decided to risk everything in an attempt to stop the Portuguese from forcing a public declaration of vassalage out of Umtasa. Possibly, the fact that he was so hopelessly outnumbered disarmed the others' suspicions; at any rate, he took them completely by surprise. Jonas, the native interpreter who had been left with Trevor when Colquhoun went to Salisbury, led Forbes and Hoste, who had recently arrived from Salisbury, into the kraal itself, by a back entrance. Eight men accompanied them, whilst Fiennes with twenty-five more was sent to disarm Gouveia's followers, who were outside the kraal. The surprise was so complete that no resistance was attempted. D'Andrada, De Rezende, and Gouveia were

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arrested, whilst their escort scampered away in all directions. A good number of rifles and bayonets was secured, but the smallness of the British force made anything in the nature of a pursuit impossible.

The *coup* had been effected without bloodshed, but the moral results were even greater than if there had been a hard fight. Within a few hours, every native in the country had heard that Gouveia, who had held them in terror for so many years, whose name had seemed synonymous with victory, had been arrested by a handful of British police, taken when surrounded by his own invincible band, and sent a prisoner to Salisbury.

Colonel D'Andrada subsequently endeavoured to minimise the effects of the British success by declaring that he was at Umtasa's merely in his capacity of managing Director of the *Compania da Moçambique*, that Baron de Rezende was the Company's local representative, whilst Gouveia was the labour agent, and that the large party of followers were armed, not as soldiers, but for protection against wild beasts. He declared further that, had he wanted an army, Gouveia could have raised two thousand men in eight days, and have increased these to ten thousand a fortnight later. It is quite easy to understand the Colonel's mortification, and his wish to make his expedition appear to have been a mere commercial venture. He was an able man, who did good work for his country; but, on the other hand, it is quite impossible for a white man to feel the slightest sympathy with those who employ such tools as Gouveia, and even go the length of appointing them to commands in the national service. This employment of Goanese has been one of the principal causes leading to the decline of Portuguese Colonial power. The

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white man, too indolent or too timid to undertake the administration of outlying districts, has handed them over, farmed them out in many cases, to rapacious half-breeds, who have merely used their official positions to gratify their own cupidity and lust.

D'Andrada and Gouveia were sent under escort to Salisbury ; De Rezende was released on parole ; whilst Forbes himself proceeded down country to Macequece, which he immediately occupied, finding it to consist merely of a trading station and a stockaded compound, all of which belonged to the mining company managed by De Rezende. The only Portuguese in the district were the Baron himself and two traders ; the other white men, mainly British and Americans, were delighted at the prospect of British rule.

The arrest of the officials at Umtasa's caused great excitement at Lisbon, as well as in Lourenço Marques. The governor of the latter town held a public meeting to call for volunteers, and the walls were placarded with a notice, running: " Against England, who wants to rob us of our African Colonies. Courage ! " The Portuguese Government, knowing well that threats would only make its position worse, by introducing an element of the ridiculous, preserved a dignified attitude, and protested through the usual diplomatic channels ; but the Portuguese Press seethed with indignation, which resulted later in an expedition being despatched to the East Coast, though, as was perhaps intended, this did not start until the first phase of the trouble was over and a temporary compromise with Great Britain had been effected.

CHAPTER XXV.

IT was fortunate for Great Britain that, when the Portuguese trouble arose, she had as Foreign Minister a statesman with a strong sense of Imperial responsibility. Lord Salisbury may have hesitated about acquiring Mashonaland directly for the Empire, considering that the granting of the Charter was the simplest solution of the difficulty, but he took a firm stand regarding the Portuguese claims to Manicaland. The occupation of Rhodesia had strengthened his position greatly. It had aroused the greatest enthusiasm at Home, and started one of those waves of Imperialism which occasionally sweep through the country, a wave which reached its greatest dimensions during the dark days of the Boer War, and then subsided so rapidly once the strain was over, that a Cabinet was allowed to hand the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony back to the Boers, almost without protest, at least from the mass of the nation.

The Portuguese quickly showed the weakness of their claim to Manicaland. The documents they produced were of a nature hardly to be taken seriously; whilst the endless repetitions in their despatches shows how difficult they found it to obtain facts in support of their case. The Blue-books of that year furnish dreary reading; the same statements appear time after time, with only a slight alteration in their wording, and when they are


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all summed up they amount to this—the Portuguese wanted the country, but were never strong enough to go beyond Macequece.

The Foreign Office in Lisbon produced two most curious treaties, if treaties they can be called. The first had been made at Lourenço Marques on 2nd December 1861; it was signed by four Portuguese officers, and not by any one on behalf of M'Zila, who was supposed to be the other party to it. Really it was nothing more than a draft of the agreement Portugal would have liked to make, had she been able so to do. Some of the conditions are interesting as showing the Portuguese ideas of colonisation. For instance, Clause 4 provides that "The chieftain Muzila will permit . . . all small and large plantations that the said Government, or any private person of Portuguese nationality, may think proper to lay or have laid in territories most to the latter's convenience; and not only the said Muzila will not oppose them, but will even direct their choice to the most productive soil if so asked."

Clause 7 provides that "All controversy between white and negro inhabitants of the Crown's dominions and Muzila's subordinates will be judged at this fortress in the Governor's presence, or by any person by him appointed."

Clause 8 is the one which, perhaps, was considered the most important from the point of view of the slave-trading community, and its insertion in a document of that kind so late as 1861 is little short of amazing. It runs: "The Chieftain Muzila, as soon as he enters into possession of his dominions, will return to this fortress all refugee negro slaves, and will so continue to do every time any



THE COLONEL'S TENT (LUNDI RIVER).

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slave belonging to the said fortress seeks a shelter in his territory.”

It is not surprising that the treaty remained little more than a pious expression of hope ; on the other hand, it furnishes an excuse for those who were striving to sweep the Portuguese out of the Mozambique Territory, and, in this connection, it should be remembered that, though the main object of the British undoubtedly was to get an outlet to the sea, the feeling that the Portuguese were standing in the path of humanity and civilisation was a very strong factor in the case.

The second treaty propounded by the Government in Lisbon purported to be a deed of vassalage entered into by Gungunhana. It was drawn up on “the twelfth day of October, 1885, in the Reception Room of the Naval and Ultramarine Office in Lisbon,” in the presence of “the Colonel Counsellor Agostinho Coelho, Chief of the Fourth Department of the Colonial General Direction ; José Caseleiro de Alegria Rodrigues, Director of the suppressed Angoche Custom-house ; Caetano Xavier Diniz, lieutenant in the Ultramarine infantry regiment—and two of Gungunhana’s natives.” The latter had, apparently, no authority from their chief—at least none was ever produced for the inspection of the British Foreign Office ; whilst it is quite easy to understand that two raw savages from the East Coast jungles would have little chance in Lisbon against a Colonel Counsellor, whilst the additional majesty of a Director of a suppressed custom-house would lead to their being reduced to a state of trembling awe, under the influence of which they would sign anything.

The treaty was little more than an absolute submission

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to Portugal. Gungunhana was to give up the whole of his independence, in return for which he was to be "promoted by Royal decree to the honours of Colonel of the Second Line." It is doubtful whether the chief himself ever heard of this agreement, certainly he never acknowledged it; and it was not produced for Lord Salisbury's inspection until 4th February 1891, when other arguments seemed to be proving useless.

Lord Salisbury's comments are interesting. He wrote: "As regards the first of these papers (the 'treaty' of 1861) I have to observe that it is clear, from its being thought necessary to endeavour to obtain a deed binding Gungunhana, that it was not considered to be in force in 1885; it is not therefore necessary to subject it to a searching criticism. I am bound, nevertheless, to observe that, though it professes to have been shown to Muzila, it does not bear that Chief's signature, nor that of any of his *Indunas*; it is signed only by three Portuguese officers. Under these circumstances, it could not have been expected that it would be recognised by Gungunhana. The second paper has still less force, inasmuch as it does not even profess to have been seen by Gungunhana. It recites that two Portuguese officers, two subjects of Gungunhana, and a Portuguese Secretary, met in the Reception Room of the Naval and Ultramarine Office in Lisbon. One of the officers, ex-Director of the suppressed Angoche Custom-house, described himself as Special Envoy of the Chief, on whose behalf he signed an act of vassalage, the two natives affixing their marks. Nothing is said to show what powers the officer had received, nor is any mention made of the ratification by the chief of an act so affecting his interests. It is therefore

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not surprising that he and his *Indunas* should have repeatedly and emphatically denied that they had signed any deed placing themselves under the Crown of Portugal.

“On all points the Portuguese case fails. The Independence of Mutassa is not disproved. There is no evidence of his having disqualified himself from granting a concession by previous arrangement with Portugal. Lastly, supposing that his alleged dependence on Gungunhana were substantiated, proof is altogether wanting of the submission of the latter Chief to the Portuguese Crown.”

The despatch from which this comes was dated 6th February 1891, and was addressed to Sir George Petre, the British Minister in Lisbon. It is wholly admirable in every way, and, reading it, one inevitably regrets that the writer of it was not in power during those years of shame and disaster, from 1880 to 1884. In that case, there would have been no Warren Expedition and no Boer War. The Boers in those days were even less important than the Portuguese, and there would have been no risk of international complications arising through Great Britain dealing with them in the way she should have dealt—on the basis of unconditional surrender.

Lord Salisbury effectually disposed of the arguments advanced by the Portuguese themselves, and the dispute might easily have terminated in the British obtaining access to the sea, but for one unfortunate sentence in the Charter. By its own act the British Government had, in 1889, recognised expressly that the Portuguese owned the strip of East Coast between the Zambesi and the Crocodile Rivers. No argument would alter that fact, and, in the end, that sentence practically ruined the British case, so far as obtaining a seaport was concerned.

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Meanwhile, though the Governments might be negotiating in leisurely fashion, a crowd of pioneers was hastening to Manicaland. The majority of these, however, never reached the interior. At the new port of Beira, the Portuguese put every difficulty in their way, holding up ships on trivial protests, arguing, delaying, endeavouring to keep out every one until the reinforcements should arrive from Portugal. There was no road to Manicaland, only a track through one of the most unhealthy stretches of country in the world. Beira itself, which, unheard of before, suddenly sprang into importance, ranks high in the list of places to be avoided. Later on, it became, and remains, the Sink of the Indian Ocean, into which everything which was detestable in the way of humanity, black, white, and Dago, was poured; but in those days it consisted merely of a few tin shanties stuck on a sand spit, shimmering and glowing under the pitiless tropical sun. When the tide went out, it left vast, reeking expanses of black mud to add their smell to the other discomforts; whilst all around the bay were dense, fever-haunted mangrove swamps. Men hurried to Beira, mad with the gold fever, fired with exaggerated descriptions of the fortunes the Pioneers were making. Some managed to slip away inland; some wisely returned to Durban; but many, having neither the means nor the chance to go on or go back, remained in Beira, where the climate soon claimed them as its victims. They were the Pioneers who did not get through to the promised land.

The British remained in possession of Macequece until they received an order from Rhodes, dated 24th April, ordering them to evacuate the town. Captain Heyman, who was in command, withdrew to Chua Hill, a few miles

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distant, allowing the Portuguese to reoccupy De Rezende's old settlement. Meanwhile, the Chartered agents had been busy further to the south. Selous had made a treaty on behalf of the Company with Motoko ; but Jameson went further, and decided to try and obtain a concession from Gungunhana himself. With this end in view, he left Umtali at the end of January, taking with him two white men named Doyle and Moodie. The party was unfortunate from the start. It was bound for one of the worst fever districts in Africa, at the worst season of the year, when all the rivers would be in flood, and every yard of the path which was not through jungle would be through a swamp. It was a plucky, almost a foolhardy, undertaking ; but it was known that the Portuguese were straining every nerve to get a valid concession out of the Chief, and if the Chartered Company had delayed, it would certainly have been forestalled. Then, if it could be proved that Umtasa was Gungunhana's vassal, Manicaland would be lost.

The second day out from Umtali, Jameson's pack-mules were swept away whilst crossing a flooded stream, and practically all the stores were lost. Most men would have turned back, but such was never Jameson's way, and he went on. It was a miserable journey through an appallingly dreary country. Native villages were few and scattered, game was very scarce, whilst the constant rain kept their clothes perpetually wet. Moreover, the close, stifling heat of those East Coast jungles is a thing which must be experienced to be understood. All three of the white men had fever, as was inevitable ; but still they stuck to their task so well that they arrived at Gungunhana's kraal in twenty-five days, ragged, exhausted, ill—only to

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find that the Portuguese had arrived before them, and were camped on the hill opposite Gungunhana's kraal, with a well-equipped expedition, a striking contrast to the travel-stained British envoys.

However, the Portuguese had been too late, after all ; for, as far back as October 4th, 1890, Dr. Schulz, an agent of the Chartered Company, had obtained a concession from the Chief, under which the Company received all the mineral rights of his territory, as well as commercial rights identical with those granted by Umtasa. One clause in the agreement was, however, the subject of severe comment from Sir Henry Loch. It ran : " And I further agree and bind myself, and my successor and nation, not to enter into any Treaty or Alliance with any Chief, Person, Company, or State, or to grant any concession of land without the consent of the Company in writing, it being understood that this covenant shall be considered in the light of a Treaty or Alliance made between the said nation and the Government of Her Britannic Majesty Queen Victoria."

The High Commissioner in referring to this said : " His Excellency considers that Her Majesty's name should not be employed so freely in connection with concessions of a commercial character, whilst, when the concessions are sought for political objects, it is desirable the opinion of the High Commissioner should be obtained before engaging in negotiations where Her Majesty's name has to be used and that involve political responsibilities."

It will be remembered that the Umtasa treaty contained a similar clause ; but the circumstances had been different. Not only was it negotiated by the Administrator himself, whilst Dr. Schulz was merely in the position of an employé of the Company ; but it was an actual acknowledgment of

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vassalage, which brought Umtasa's territory under the British flag.

Gungunhana fixed his boundaries as follows :—

North. The Zambesi River to its mouth.

South. Below the Komati River, immediately north of Delagoa Bay.

East. The sea coast, leaving out Inhambane and the country immediately surrounding it.

West. Roughly the line of the Sabi River from North to South.

The latter definition would, of course, have included Umtasa's kraal ; but, on the other hand, the description as a whole included far more territory than the Chief had ever ruled, more probably than either his father or grandfather would have thought of claiming. Still, in the end, it did not make any vital difference to the situation.

The consideration to be given in return for what had been granted is put down in the concession as "five hundred pounds a year, in perpetuity, or the equivalent thereof in trading goods, at the option of the king." Gungunhana exercised his option, asking for rifles and cartridges, and the last consignment out of a thousand Martinis and twenty thousand cartridges arrived the day before Jameson left the royal kraal. Possibly, the outcry raised over the rifles given to Lobengula was the reason for no firearms being mentioned in the later concession. This part of the contract would, probably, never have been known to the general public but for the action of the Portuguese, who were, not unnaturally, both alarmed and infuriated at the idea of their hereditary foe receiving such a number of modern weapons, which would, sooner or later, be used against themselves.

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The rifles and ammunition had been brought round from Durban on a small steamer, the *Countess of Carnavon*. The vessel entered the mouth of the Crocodile River and was certainly boarded by three Portuguese officials. As to what happened then accounts vary widely. The story of those in charge of the guns was that they were never asked for any Customs duties, that there was no Custom house for vessels going up the river, which, in any case, was claimed by Gungunhana as part of his territory. The rifles and other stores were landed at Umshwebe's kraal, and handed over to one of the Head *Indunas*. The following morning, however, a Portuguese official named Repoza appeared, accompanied by a hundred and fifty armed natives and several white officers, and demanded two thousand pounds as Customs duties. On being asked how he arrived at the figure, he declined to explain, but persisted in his demand. Finally, seeing there was no way out of it, Pawley, the Company's agent, gave a written guarantee for the amount, and was then allowed to proceed.

The Portuguese story was to the effect that the *Countess of Carnavon* was caught smuggling guns, that the nature of her cargo was only discovered by accident, and that the sum of two thousand pounds was not duty, but a fine.

Probably the truth is somewhere between the two accounts. The British were not likely to recognise the river as Portuguese territory, unless forced to do so; consequently, if their view prevailed, they were not smuggling, but merely carrying property belonging to the king of the country. The Portuguese, on the other hand, were anxious to be as unpleasant as possible, and were only prevented from confiscating the whole consignment by the

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reflection that two thousand pounds in cash were more desirable than a number of presumably second-hand rifles.

The *Countess* having discharged her cargo, went back to Durban for provisions and coal, then returned in ballast to the Crocodile River, to pick up Jameson and his party. She had been anchored there six days, when a Portuguese gunboat, the *Marshal MacMahon*, came up the stream and dropped anchor about twenty yards astern of her. The newcomer at once lowered a boat, and sent aboard the British ship, demanding answers to a long string of questions, which were given, and ordering the skipper, Captain Buckingham, to lower his flag. This command was ignored until a second, and more peremptory, order was sent. Seeing the futility of resistance, for, by comparison with an unarmed merchant steamer, even a Portuguese gunboat is dangerous, the skipper then complied.

The following day, all the passengers and crew, with the exception of Jameson, and Doyle, who was too ill to be moved, were ordered aboard the *Marshal MacMahon*, whilst fourteen armed sailors took charge of the *Countess*. The prisoners on the gunboat were treated very badly, being confined the first night in the hold with a number of natives. The *Marshal MacMahon* was true to the traditions of her service, for she took three days to steam the eighty miles to Lourenço Marques. On arrival at the latter port, the prisoners were allowed to depart ; but the vessel herself was detained, to become the subject of much diplomatic correspondence. In the end, the Chartered Company agreed to pay any fine which might be fixed after a conference between the two Foreign Offices ; and so the matter came down to the level of a mere question

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of money, as is so often the case with those disputes which create a great stir at the outset.

With the arrival of additional troops and gunboats in Beira, the attitude of the Portuguese grew more and more aggressive. The soldiers, an uncleanly rabble, had no idea of the real power of Great Britain, and their officers seemed little better informed. The only level-headed man was the Governor, who tried his best to keep the others in hand.

On 13th April 1891, matters very nearly reached a crisis. For months past there had been rumours of an intended attack on the town by a party of four hundred Pioneers, who were supposed to be gathering at Durban ; and when Sir John Willoughby arrived at the little port on the *S.S. Norseman* accompanied by the paddle-steamer *Agnes* and the steam launch *Shark*, Beira assumed that the invasion was actually beginning. As a matter of fact, Sir John Willoughby's army consisted of five white men, and ninety-one native labourers, the latter being in the employ of the contractors who were making the road, the old Pioneer officers, Johnson, Heany, and Borrow. The cargo consisted of two hundred and thirty-six tons of food supplies, some galvanised iron for building storehouses, and a mail-coach.

On nearing Beira, the Portuguese gunboat *Auxiliar* was discovered on the look-out, and followed the *Norseman* down the harbour. It was quickly apparent that the Portuguese intended to be unpleasant. The *Agnes* was ordered to anchor under the guns of the corvette *Liberal*, whilst, on Sir John Willoughby landing and requesting permission to proceed up the Pungwe River with the *Agnes* and the *Shark*, he was curtly informed that the

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river was closed, although he was told that the passengers might, if they chose, land at the town itself. When he went to the Custom-house and tendered the three per cent. transit duty on the cargo, and requested clearance, he was informed that nothing was to be allowed to go up to the British territory. For two days, he endeavoured to clear his cargo; then, on the 15th, he informed the Governor that he had deposited the money to cover the duties with an agent, and intended starting up stream without permission. In doing so, he was perfectly within his rights, in view of the *modus vivendi* which had been arranged by the two Foreign Offices, pending the settlement of the whole question.

However, before the *Agnes*, with two lighters in tow, had proceeded a quarter of a mile, the gunboat *Tamega* fired her first shot. Meanwhile, another gunboat, the *Limpopo*, steamed up alongside the lighters, her decks swarming with excited soldiers, and trained her guns at fifty yards range on the unfortunate natives. One or two other shots were fired, without any one being hit, and then, having made his protest before the whole town, Sir John Willoughby gave the order to stop. On landing, in compliance with the orders of the military commandant, Sir John and his companions were received with hoots and jeers by the rabble in uniform, even some of the officers, both military and naval, joining in the demonstration.

The Governor informed the British that they were not prisoners, though he would not allow the vessels to be moved again, and so, for the time, the work of making the road was suspended. The real explanation of the incident seems to be that the troops were so entirely out of hand, that the Governor dare not run the risk of letting

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the British ascend the river, feeling confident in his own mind that they would have been shot down from the banks before they had gone very far. Sir John Willoughby must have found it interesting to compare the disorderly mob at Beira with the splendidly disciplined little column which had marched into Mashonaland some eight months previously.

The last act in the Portuguese drama, and, as a matter of fact, the last event of the actual Pioneer days, took place only a month later. Macequece had, as has been mentioned, been evacuated towards the end of April, although as far back as January, Jameson had reported that the main British force was camped some miles away, on the inland side. However, when on 11th May a Portuguese force of two hundred and fifty white soldiers and five hundred natives marched up to the station, they found it unoccupied. The fact seems to have caused an undue amount of elation, and the commandant went so far as to order Captain Heyman out of Manicaland. The British force consisted of forty-five men, Pioneers and police, and its sole piece of ordnance was one 7-pounder; moreover, it was extremely short of provisions. Still, there was never any question of retiring, in fact an attack on Macequece was actually under consideration, when the Portuguese force was seen to be advancing, confident that its overwhelming numbers would give it an easy victory over the ragged, half starved band camped on Chua Hill—so confident was it, in fact, that the machine guns it possessed had been left behind in the fort.

The British waited cheerfully, with their 7-pounder masked by some tents. The Portuguese troops were

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armed with new magazine rifles having a flat trajectory, and, probably for this reason, their fire passed over the heads of the British. The latter, however, were all trained shots, and their Martini-Henrys did great execution. Almost before the fight had begun, the black troops began to grow unsteady, but when the 7-pounder was unmasked and started firing canister, the unsteadiness turned to absolute panic, and they fled, followed immediately after by the white troops. The Portuguese officers behaved well, trying to beat their men back with the flats of their swords; but all to no effect. The battle of Chua was over. Then, seeing there was no use in remaining to be shot down, the three senior officers strolled away slowly, pausing to lift their hats just before they were finally hidden from view behind some rising ground. One of them, Captain Bettencourt, was wounded in the neck, another in the arm; seven of the rank and file were killed, and a considerable number wounded. There were no casualties on the British side.

Captain Heyman lost no time in taking advantage of his victory. He marched straight down to Macequece and occupied it, without encountering any further resistance. To his starving men, the large stores of food seemed perhaps the most important part of the loot; but in addition to this there were five guns, and a fine supply of ammunition. The Portuguese army had abandoned everything in blind terror.

In one sense, however, the British triumph was short lived. Lord Salisbury, thinking matters had gone quite far enough, ordered a withdrawal, and, on May 30th, a neutral zone five miles in width was arranged, pending the signing of the Anglo-Portuguese treaty, which was finally ratified twelve days later, June 11th, 1891.

CONCLUSION.

WITH the ratification of the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of June 11th, 1891, the story of the struggle for the North really comes to an end, for, from that point onward, progress was ensured right up to the Great Lakes. Except in so far as regarded the delimitation of the borders of Northern Rhodesia, a question which was settled amicably, or at least without open controversy, Rhodesia may be said to have become merely a matter for the Colonial Office ; the Foreign Office had no further concern with it.[§]

At first sight, it may have been thought that the dispute with the Portuguese in East Africa should not have been included under the title of *The Northward Trek*, for it seemed to represent a distinct deviation from the original line of expansion ; but, as a matter of fact, such was not really the case. The Mozambique territory was coveted, not so much for any value either the land or the minerals might possess, but because it seemed to form the quickest and cheapest route into Mashonaland, and, for that reason, the Pioneers longed to add it to the country they had already acquired.

With the settlement of the quarrel with Portugal, and the consequent opening up of the Beira route, so many white men poured into Mashonaland that the actual Pioneers were soon in the minority. The settler had arrived, and, with his coming, the days of actual treks, of sudden

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changes in the latitude of the frontier of civilisation, ceased. From that time onwards, expansion northwards became a natural process. True, the country was still in an unsatisfactory position as regarded the natives. There were two wars to be fought, Lobengula had yet to be driven out of Bulawayo to fill an unmarked grave somewhere near the Zambesi ; there were crises to be passed through ; the Rinderpest and the African Coast Fever were still undreamed of ; and only a few were really convinced that the Boer War was inevitable ; yet, none the less, the future of Rhodesia had been secured. Ill-fortune might, and did, retard the day of prosperity ; but that day was absolutely certain to dawn. The problems still remaining to be solved were, after all, domestic ones. For all practical purposes, Germans, Boers, and Portuguese had been eliminated from the question. It is for that reason that the story really ends in 1891, this particular story ; subsequent events form, not another chapter, but another tale altogether, a tale which it is still too early to write, because it is, as yet, almost impossible to get the true perspective. In it, the figure of Rhodes dwarfs everything else, not the Rhodes of the early days, the Colonial by adoption scheming for a greater Cape Colony, but a Rhodes who, amazed at the greatness of what had been achieved, seemed to readjust, almost to remodel, his ideas, and to become great enough to carry on the work.

When Rhodes died, leaving so much unfinished, it was generally believed that the country named after him would feel the blow for years ; yet since that time progress has been both more steady and more rapid than it had before. Many men who were pessimists in 1902, now admit gladly that they were mistaken. As a matter of fact,

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there is no room for a Dictator. Rhodesia has grown up since the Boer War, and the old semi-patriarchal form of government would be out of place. Men are able now to stand on their own feet, and there is no longer the old feeling that the Company is to blame for everything which goes wrong.

In a sense, too, the character of the Company itself has changed. There is no more Empire-building to be done. The days when its directors were of necessity politicians as well have passed away for ever. Nowadays, the Board practically consists of the business managers of the country. They may form an oligarchy; but an oligarchy of sane men is infinitely preferable to a democracy run amok, like those to be found in many, if not most, of the self-governing colonies. Rhodesians have many grievances to-day, some real, some imaginary, but it is safe to predict that they would have infinitely more if, instead of being ruled by a board of business men, whose interests coincide exactly with theirs, they elected a very much larger number of unskilled tyrants. It is to be hoped that, for many years to come, Rhodesians will be able to spend their whole time in building up the prosperity of their country, spend it profitably, both for themselves and for the Empire, instead of wasting it in the worship of that ugly latter-day fetish, Responsible Government.

The old days of Rhodesia are past, never to return. Most of the old hands have disappeared, and the new men belong to a different order. They know little, and perhaps care little, of what has gone before. From their point of view—a very natural one, after all—the history of Rhodesia began when they themselves entered the country, in a train. There is always plenty to eat in these latter days,

CONCLUSION

always plenty to drink. The mail arrives with unfailing regularity, every week ; the paper is delivered at the house every morning. The only hint of Romance left is the black cloud, only about the bigness of a man's hand, low down on the horizon, the native question ; and, after all, the natives, or at least most of them, are far away, down in the granite country to the East, where, doubtless, the native commissioners are keeping them in order.

Why should a man who had ice all the way up in the train trouble to ask about the bully beef and mealie meal days ? He will never know them. He took just over three days from Cape Town to Bulawayo, thirteen hundred miles ; so what interest is it to him to learn that in the wet season the twenty odd miles from Gwelo to Selukwe often took over a week ? The bullock wagon does not come into his scheme of things. He will never sit in a leaky grass hut with the rain forming great pools on the mud floor, whilst he watches in helpless despair his only white companion dying of blackwater fever. There is little blackwater fever in Rhodesia now, and men die decently, in hospitals, and a duly ordained priest reads the Last Service over them. He does not sleep with a loaded shotgun within reach, for the lions have long since departed to the North and the East, and the natives are supposed to be harmless.

And yet it will be a pity if memory of the old days dies out. A little romance is a good thing, even in the life of a successful man, even the thought of the romance in other peoples' lives. For that reason, the story of the Pioneer Column should be remembered, for it was all romance. Had the members of that column been merely keen business men they would never have undertaken the venture, and the newcomers would not be reaping the

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reward of their work. It would be well for the Rhodesians of to-day to remember this, and when they look round, and see the growing prosperity of their country, and try and picture to themselves how much greater the prosperity of the future will be, it would be well, too, for them to pause a moment, and look back, and ask themselves how much is due, after all, to their own efforts, and how much to the men of the past, the Pioneers of THE NORTHWARD TREK.

APPENDIX A.

TRANSVAAL CONSUL IN MATABELELAND.

DE VOLKSSTEM, *May 4th*, 1888.

The following proclamation appears in the *Staats Courant* :—

“ Be it hereby made known, that the Government of the South African Republic, with the advice and consent of the Executive Council, has resolved, according to existing treaties between this Republic and Matabeleland (concluded with the Matabele Kings Moselikatze and Lobengula), and on the request of the King Lobengula, to appoint a representative in the above country with the title of Consul who will have his domicile in the Capital of the aforesaid King.

“ Mr. Pieter Daniel Cornelys Johannes Grobler has been appointed to this post of representative of the South African Republic. It is to the interest of the subjects of this Republic, who stay in Matabeleland, either temporarily or permanently, to give their names and addresses to the Consul aforesaid.

“ Every one who wishes to go to Lobengula’s territory, either for hunting, trading, or otherwise, may procure a permit from the Government of the South African Republic.

“ Such a permit may, however, be refused without any reason for it being given.

“ The application for such a permit must be handed in to the State Secretary, stating the object of the journey.

“ It is to the interest of all persons, who hold such a permit, to have a copy made thereof by the above-mentioned Consul as soon as possible, in order that he may inform the King Lobengula of the same.

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“As this system of permits has been established by King Lobengula’s own request, who also wishes to be protected in this manner against an influx of evil-doers and the like, warning is hereby expressly given to all who venture into Matabeleland without permits, that they expose themselves to danger at their own risks.

“If any disputes arise, either with natives or others, or amongst one another, the subjects of the South African Republic have at once to betake themselves to their aforesaid representative.”

APPENDIX B.

THE MOFFAT TREATY.

The Chief, Lo Bengula, Ruler of the tribe known as the Amandebele, together with the Mashona and Makalaka, tributaries of the same, hereby agrees to the following articles and conditions :—

That peace and amity shall continue for ever between Her Britannic Majesty, her subjects, and the Amandebele people; and the contracting Chief Lo Bengula engages to use his utmost endeavours to prevent any rupture of the same, to cause the strict observance of this treaty, and so to carry out the spirit of the treaty of friendship which was entered into between his late father, the Chief Umsiligaas, with the then Governor of the Cape of Good Hope in the year of our Lord 1836. It is hereby further agreed by Lo Bengula, Chief in and over the Amandebele country with its dependencies as aforesaid, on behalf of himself and people, that he will refrain from entering into any correspondence or treaty with any Foreign State or Power to sell, alienate, or cede, or permit or countenance any sale, alienation, or cession of the whole or any part of the said Amandebele country under his chieftainship,

APPENDIX C

or upon any other subject, without the previous knowledge or sanction of Her Majesty's High Commissioner for South Africa.

In faith of which I, Lo Bengula, on my part, have hercunto set my hand at Gubulawayo, Amandebele, this eleventh day of February, and of Her Majesty's reign the fifty-first.

(Signed) LO BENGULA (his X mark).

Witnesses (Signed) W. Graham.
G. B. Van Wyk.

Before me,
(Signed) J. S. MOFFAT,
Assistant Commissioner.

11th February 1888.—I certify the above a true copy.

(Signed) J. S. MOFFAT.
Assistant Commissioner.

11th February 1888.

APPENDIX C.

THE CHARTER.

At the Court at Balmoral the 15th day of October, 1889,

Present—

The Queen's Most Excellent Majesty in Council.

Whereas there was this day read at the Board a Report of a Committee of the Lords of Her Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, dated the 14th day of October 1889, in the words following, viz. :—

“Your Majesty having been pleased by your Order of the 23rd day of July 1889, to refer unto this committee a Petition of the Most Noble the Duke of Abercorn and others, praying for the grant of a Charter of Incorporation

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by the name or title of the 'British South Africa Company.' The Lords of the Committee, in obedience to Your Majesty's said Order of Reference, have this day taken the said Petition into consideration, and do agree humbly to report, as their opinion to Your Majesty, that a Charter may be granted by Your Majesty in terms of the Draft hereunto annexed."

Her Majesty having taken into consideration the said Report and the Draft Charter accompanying it, was pleased, by and with the advice of her Privy Council, to approve thereof, and to order, as it is hereby ordered, that the Right Honourable Henry Matthews, one of Her Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, do cause a warrant to be prepared for Her Majesty's Royal Signature for passing under the Great Seal of the United Kingdom a Charter in conformity with the said Draft which is hereunto annexed.

C. L. PEEL.

Draft Charter referred to in foregoing Order.

VICTORIA, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Queen, Defender of the Faith,

To all to whom these presents shall come, Greeting :

Whereas a Humble Petition has been presented to Us in Our Council by the Most Noble James Duke of Abercorn, Companion of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath ; the Most Noble Alexander William George, Duke of Fife, Knight of the Most Ancient and Most Noble Order of the Thistle, Privy Councillor ; the Right Honourable Edric Frederick Lord Gifford, V.C. ; Cecil John Rhodes, of Kimberley, in the Cape Colony, Member of the Executive Council and of the House of Assembly of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope ; Albert Beit, of 29 Holborn Viaduct, London, Merchant ; Albert Henry George Gray, of Howick, Northumberland, Esquire ; and

George Cawston, of 18 Lennox Gardens, London, Esquire, Barrister-at-law.

And whereas the said Petition states amongst other things—

That the Petitioners and others are associated, for the purpose of forming a Company or Association, to be incorporated, if to Us should seem fit, for the objects in the said Petition set forth under the corporate name of the British South Africa Company.

That the existence of a powerful British Company, controlled by those of Our subjects in whom We have confidence, and having its principal field of operations in that region of South Africa lying to the north of Bechuana-land and to the west of Portuguese East Africa, would be advantageous to the commercial and other interests of Our subjects in the United Kingdom and in Our Colonies.

That the Petitioners desire to carry into effect divers concessions and agreements which have been made by certain of the chiefs and tribes inhabiting the said region, and such other concessions, agreements, grants and treaties as the Petitioners may hereafter obtain within the said region or elsewhere in Africa, with the view of promoting trade, commerce, and good government (including the regulation of liquor traffic with the Natives) in the territories which are or may be comprised or referred to in such concessions, agreements, grants and treaties as afore-said. That the Petitioners believe that if the said concessions, agreements, grants and treaties can be carried into effect, the condition of the Natives inhabiting the said territories will be materially improved and their civilisation advanced, and an organisation established which will tend to the suppression of the slave trade in the said territories, and to the opening up of the said territories to the immigration of Europeans, and to the lawful trade and commerce of Our subjects and of other nations.

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That the success of the enterprise in which the Petitioners are engaged would be greatly advanced if it should seem fit to us to grant them Our Royal Charter of incorporation as a British Company under the said name or title, or such other name or title, and with such powers, as to Us may seem fit for the purpose of more effectually carrying into effect the objects aforesaid. That large sums of money have been subscribed for the purposes of the intended Company by the Petitioners and others, who are prepared also to subscribe or to procure such further sums as may hereafter be found requisite for the development of the said enterprise, in the event of our being pleased to grant to them Our Royal Charter of incorporation as aforesaid.

Now, therefore, we having taken the said Petition into Our Royal consideration in Our Council, and being satisfied that the intentions of the petitioners are praiseworthy and deserve encouragement, and that the enterprise in the petition described may be productive of the benefits set forth therein, by Our Prerogative Royal and of our especial grace, certain knowledge and mere motion, have constituted, erected, and incorporated, and by this Our Charter for Us and Our heirs and Royal Successors, do constitute, erect, and incorporate into our body politic and corporate by the name of the British South Africa Company, the said James Duke of Abercorn, Alexander William George Duke of Fife, Edric Frederick Lord Gifford, Cecil Rhodes, Alfred Beit, Albert Henry George Gray and George Cawson, and such other persons and such bodies as from time to time become and are members of the body politic and corporate by these presents constituted, erected, and incorporated, with perpetual succession and a common seal, with power to break, alter, or renew the same at discretion, and with the further authorities, powers, and privileges conferred, and subject to the conditions imposed by this Our Charter: And We do hereby accordingly will, ordain, give, grant, constitute, appoint and declare as follows (that is to say)—

(1) The principal field of the operations of The British South Africa Company (in this Our Charter referred to as "the Company") shall be the region of South Africa lying immediately to the north of British Bechuanaland, and to the north and west of the South African Republic, and to the west of the Portuguese Dominions.

(2) The Company is hereby authorised and empowered to hold, use, and retain for the purposes of the Company and on the terms of this Our Charter the full benefit of the concessions and agreements made as aforesaid, so far as they are valid, or any of them, and all interests, authorities and powers comprised or referred to in the said concessions and agreements: Provided always that nothing herein contained shall prejudice or effect any other Valid and Subsisting Concessions or agreements which may have been made by any of the chiefs or tribes or tribes aforesaid, and in particular nothing herein contained shall prejudice or affect certain concessions granted in and subsequent to the year 1880 relating to the territory usually known as the district of the Tati; nor shall anything herein contained be construed as giving any jurisdiction, administrative or otherwise, within the said district of the Tati, the limits of which district are as follows:—viz. from the place where the Shashi river rises to its junction with the Tati and Ramaquaban rivers, thence along the Ramaquaban river where it rises and thence along the watershed of those rivers.

(3) The Company is hereby further authorised and empowered, subject to the approval of one of Our Principal Secretaries of State ("herein referred to as Our Secretary of State") from time to time to acquire by any concession, agreement, grant or treaty, all or any rights, interests, authorities, jurisdictions, and powers of any kind or nature whatever, including powers necessary for the purposes of government, and the preservation of public order in or for the protection of territories, lands, or property, comprised or referred to in the concessions

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and agreements made as aforesaid or affecting other territories, lands, or property in Africa, or the inhabitants thereof, and to hold, use, and exercise such territories, lands, property, rights, interests, authorities, jurisdictions, and powers respectively for the purposes of the Company, and on the terms of this Our Charter :

(4) Provided that no powers of government or administration shall be exercised under or in relation to any such last-mentioned concessions, agreement, grant, or treaty until a copy of such concession, agreement, grant or treaty, in such form and with such maps or particulars as Our Secretary of State approves, verified as he requires, has been transmitted to him, and he has signified his approval thereof either absolutely or subject to any conditions or reservations ; and provided also that no rights, interests, authorities, jurisdictions or powers of any description shall be acquired by the Company within the said district of the Tati as hereinbefore described, without the previous consent in writing of the owners for the time being of the concessions above referred to relating to the said district, and the approval of Our Secretary of State.

(5) The Company shall be bound by and shall fulfil all and singular stipulations on its part contained in any such concession, agreement, grant or treaty as aforesaid, subject to any subsequent agreement affecting those stipulations approved by Our Secretary of State.

(6) The Company shall be and remain British in character and domicile, and shall have its principal office in Great Britain, and the Company's principal representative in South Africa and the Directors shall always be natural-born British subjects, or persons who have been naturalised as British subjects by or under an Act of Parliament of Our United Kingdom, but the Article shall not disqualify any person nominated a Director by this Our Charter, or any persons whose election as a Director shall have been approved by Our Secretary of State, from acting in that capacity.

(7) In case at any time any difference arises between any chief or tribe inhabiting any of the territories aforesaid and the Company, that difference shall, if Our Secretary of State so require, be submitted by the Company to him for his decision, and the Company shall act in accordance with such decision.

(8) If at any time Our Secretary of State thinks fit to dissent from, or object to, any of the dealings of the Company with any foreign power, and to make known to the Company any suggestion founded on that dissent or objection, the Company shall act in accordance with such suggestion.

(9) If at any time Our Secretary of State thinks fit to object to the exercise by the Company of any authority, power, or right, within any part of the territories aforesaid, on the ground of there being an adverse claim to or in respect of that part, the Company shall defer to that objection until such time as any such claim has been withdrawn or finally dealt with or settled by Our Secretary of State.

(10) The Company shall to the best of its ability preserve peace and order in such ways and manners as it shall consider necessary, and may with that object make ordinance (to be approved by Our Secretary of State), and may establish and maintain a force of police.

(11) The Company shall to the best of its ability discourage and, so far as may be practicable, abolish by degrees, any system of slave trade or domestic servitude in the territories aforesaid.

(12) The Company shall regulate the traffic in spirits and other intoxicating liquors within the territories aforesaid, so as, as far as practicable, to prevent the sale of any spirits or other intoxicating liquor to any Natives.

(13) The Company as such, or its officers as such, shall not in any way interfere with the religion of any class or tribe of the peoples of its territories aforesaid, or of any of the inhabitants thereof, except so far as may be

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necessary in the interests of humanity, and all forms of religious worship or religious ordinances may be exercised within the said territories, and no hindrance shall be offered thereto except as aforesaid.

(14) In the administration of Justice to the said peoples or inhabitants, careful regard shall always be to the customs and laws of the class or tribe or nation to which the parties respectively belong, especially with respect to the holding, possession, transfer and disposition of lands and goods, and testate or intestate succession thereto, and marriage, divorce, and legitimacy and other rights of property and personal rights, but subject to any British laws which may be in force in any of the territories aforesaid, and applicable to the peoples or inhabitants thereof.

(15) If at any time Our Secretary of State thinks fit to dissent from or object to any part of the proceedings or system of the Company relative to the people of the territories aforesaid or to any of the inhabitants thereof, in respect of slavery or religion or the administration of justice or any other matter, he shall make known to the Company his dissent or objection, and the Company shall act in accordance with his directions duly signified.

(16) In the event of the Company acquiring any harbour or harbours, the Company shall freely afford all facilities for or to Our Ships therein without payment except reasonable charges for work done, or services rendered or materials or things supplied.

(17) The Company shall furnish annually to Our Secretary of State, as soon as conveniently may be after the close of the financial year, accounts of its expenditure for administrative purposes, and of all sums received by it by way of public revenue, as distinguished from its commercial profits during the financial year, together with a report as to its public proceedings and the conditions of the territories within the sphere of its operations. The Company shall also, on or before the commencement of each financial year, furnish to Our Secretary of State

an estimate of its expenditure for administrative purposes, and of its public revenue (as above defined) for the ensuing year. The Company shall in addition from time to time furnish to Our Secretary of State any reports, accounts, or information with which he may require to be furnished.

(18) The several officers of the Company shall, subject to the rules of official subordination and to any regulations that may be agreed upon, communicate freely with Our High Commissioner in South Africa, and any others Our officers who may be stationed within any of the territories aforesaid, and shall pay due regard to any requirements, suggestions, or requests, which the High Commissioner or other officers shall make to them or any of them, and the Company shall be bound to enforce the observance of this Article.

(19) The Company may hoist and use on its buildings and elsewhere in the territories aforesaid, and on its vessels, such distinctive flag indicating the British Character of the Company as Our Secretary of State and the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty shall from time to time approve.

(20) Nothing in this Our Charter shall be deemed to authorise the Company to set up or grant any monopoly of trade : provided that the establishment of or the grant of concessions, for banks, railways, tramways, docks, telegraphs, waterworks, or other similar undertakings, or the establishment of any system of patent or copyright approved by Our Secretary of State, shall not be deemed monopolies for this purpose. The Company shall not, either directly or indirectly, hinder any Company or persons who now are, or hereafter may be, lawfully and peacefully carrying on any business, concern, or venture within the said District of the Tati hereinbefore described, but shall, by permitting and facilitating transit by every lawful means to and from the District of the Tati, across its own territories or where it has jurisdiction in that behalf, and by all other reasonable and lawful means, encourage, assist and protect all British subjects who now are, or

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hereafter may be, lawfully and peacefully engaged in the prosecution of a lawful enterprise within the said District of the Tati.

(21) For the preservation of elephants and other game, the Company may make such regulations and (notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained) may impose such license duties on the killing or taking of elephants or other game as they may see fit: Provided that nothing in such regulations shall extend to diminish or interfere with any hunting rights which may have been or may hereafter be reserved to any native chiefs or tribes by treaty, save so far as any such regulations may relate to the establishment and enforcement of a close season.

(22) The Company shall be subject to and shall perform and undertake all the obligations contained between Ourselves and any other State or Power whether already made or hereinafter to be made, in all matters relating to the observance of this Article, or to exercise within the Company's territories for the time being, of any jurisdiction exercisable by Us under the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts, the Company shall conform to and observe and carry out all such directions as may from time to time be given in that behalf by Our Secretary of State, and the Company shall appoint all necessary Officers to perform such duties, and shall provide such Courts and other requisites as may from time to time be necessary for the administration of justice.

(23) The original share capital of the Company shall be £1,000,000, divided into 1,000,000 shares of £1 each.

(24) The Company is hereby further especially authorised, and empowered for the purpose of this Our Charter from time to time—

(i) To issue shares of different classes or descriptions to increase the share capital of the Company, and to borrow moneys by debentures or other obligations.

(ii) To acquire and hold, and to charter or otherwise deal with, steam vessels and other vessels.

APPENDIX C

(iii) To establish or authorise banking companies and other companies, and undertakings or associations of every description, for purposes consistent with the provisions of this Our Charter.

(iv) To make and maintain roads, railways, telegraphs, harbours, and any other works which may tend to the development or improvement of the territories of the Company.

(v) To carry on mining or other industries, and to make concessions of mining, forestal, or other rights.

(vi) To improve, develop, clear, plant, irrigate, and cultivate any lands included within the territories of the Company.

(vii) To settle any such territories and lands aforesaid, and to aid and promote immigration.

(viii) To grant land terms of years or in perpetuity, and either absolutely or by way of mortgage or otherwise.

(ix) To make loans or contributions of money or money's worth, for promoting any of the objects of the Company.

(x) To acquire and hold personal property.

(xi) To acquire and hold (without license in mortmain or other authority than this Our Charter) lands in the United Kingdom, not exceeding five acres in all at any one time, for the purposes of the offices and business of the Company, and (subject to any local law) lands in any of Our Colonies or Possessions and elsewhere, convenient for carrying on management of the affairs of the Company, and to dispose from time to time of any such lands when not required for that purpose.

(xii) To carry on any lawful commerce, trade, pursuit, business, operations, or dealing whatsoever in connection with the objects of the Company.

(xiii) To establish and maintain agencies in Our Colonies and Possessions and elsewhere.

(xiv) To sue and be sued by the Company's name of incorporation, as well in Our Courts in Our United

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Kingdom, or in Our Courts in Our Colonies or Possessions, or in Our Courts in foreign countries or elsewhere.

(xv) To do all lawful things incidental or conducive to the exercise or enjoyment of the rights, interests, authorities and powers of the Company in this Our Charter expressed or referred to, or any of them.

(25) Within one year after the date of this Our Charter, or such extended period as may be certified by Our Secretary of State, there shall be executed by the Members of the Company for the time being a Deed of Settlement, providing so far as necessary for—

(i) The further definition of the objects and purposes of the Company.

(ii) The classes or descriptions of shares into which the capital of the Company is divided and the calls to be made in respect thereof, and the terms and conditions of membership of the Company.

(iii) The division and distribution of profits.

(iv) General meetings of the Company; the appointment by Our Secretary of State (if so required by him) of an Official Director, and the number, qualification, appointment, remuneration, rotation, removal, and powers of Directors of the Company, and of other officers of the Company.

(v) The registration of Members of the Company, and the transfer of Shares in the capital of the Company.

(vi) The preparation of annual accounts to be submitted to the Members at a General Meeting.

(vii) The audit of those accounts by independent auditors.

(viii) The making of bye-laws.

(ix) The making and using of Official Seals of the Company.

(x) The constitution and regulation of Committees or Local Board of Management.

(xi) The making and execution of supplementary deeds of settlement.

(xii) The winding-up (in case of need) of the Company's affairs.

(xiii) The government and regulation of the Company and of its affairs.

(xiv) Any matters usual or proper for or in respect of a Chartered Company.

(26) The Deed of Settlement shall, before the execution thereof, be submitted to and approved by the Lords of Our Council, and a certificate of their approval thereof signed by the Clerk of Our Council shall be endorsed on this Our Charter and be conclusive evidence of such approval, and on the Deed of Settlement, and such Deed of Settlement shall take effect from the date of such approval, and shall be binding upon the Company, its members, officers, and servants, and for all other purposes whatsoever.

(27) The provisions of the Deed of Settlement or of any Supplementary Deed for the time being in force, may be from time to time repealed, varied, or added to by a Supplementary Deed, made and executed in such manner as the Deed of Settlement prescribes: Provided that the provisions of such Deed relative to the official Director shall not be repealed, varied, or added to without the express approval of Our Secretary of State.

(28) The Members of the Company shall be individually liable for the debts, contracts, engagements, and liabilities of the Company to the extent only of the amount, if any, for the time being unpaid, on the shares held by them respectively.

(29) Until such Deed of Settlement as aforesaid takes effect, the said James Duke of Abercorn shall be the President, the said Alexander William George Duke of Fife shall be Vice-President, and the said Edric Frederick Lord Gifford, Cecil John Rhodes, Alfred Beit, Albert Henry George Gray, and George Cawston, shall be the Directors of the Company, and may on behalf of the Company do all things necessary or proper to be done

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under this Our Charter by or on behalf of the Company : Provided always, the said James Duke of Abercorn, Alexander William George Duke of Fife, and Albert Henry George Gray, shall not be subject to retire from office in accordance with its provisions, but shall be and remain Directors of the Company until death, incapacity to act, or resignation, as the case may be.

(30) And We do further will, ordain, and declare that this Our Charter shall be acknowledged by Our Governors and Our naval and military officers and Our Consuls and Our other officers in Our Colonies and Possessions, and on the high seas, and shall recognise and be in all things aiding to the Company and its officers.

(31) And We do further will, ordain, and declare that this Our Charter shall be taken, construed, and adjudged in the most favourable and beneficial sense for, and the best advantage of, the Company as well as in Our Courts in Our United Kingdom, and in Our Courts in Our Colonies or Possessions, and in Our Courts in Foreign Countries or elsewhere, notwithstanding that there may appear to be in this Our Charter any non-recital, mis-recital, uncertainty or imperfection.

(32) And We do further will, ordain, and declare that this Our Charter shall subsist and continue valid, notwithstanding any lawful change in the name of the Company or in the Deed of Settlement thereof, such change being made with the previous approval of Our Secretary of State signified under his hand.

(33) And We do further will, ordain, and declare that it shall be lawful for Us, Our heirs and successors, and We do hereby expressly reserve to Ourselves, Our heirs and successors, the right and power by writing under the Great Seal of the United Kingdom at the end of twenty-five years from date of this Charter, and at the end of every succeeding period of ten years, to add to, alter, or repeal any of the provisions of this Our Charter, or to enact other provisions in substitution for or in addition to any of its existing pro-

visions : Provided that the right of power thus reserved shall be exercised only in relation to so much of this Our Charter as relates to administrative and public matters. And We do further expressly reserve to Ourselves, Our heirs and successors, the right to take over any buildings or works belonging to the Company, and used exclusively or mainly for administrative or public purposes on payment to the Company of such reasonable compensation as may be agreed, or as, failing agreement, may be settled by the Commissioners of Our Treasury. And We do further appoint, direct, and declare that any such writing under the said Great Seal shall have full effect and be binding on the Company, its members, officers, and servants, and all other persons, and shall be of the same force, effect, and validity as if its provisions had been part of and contained in these presents :

(34) Provided always, and We do further declare, that nothing in this Our Charter shall be deemed or taken in anywise to limit or restrict the exercise of any of Our rights or powers with reference to the protection of any territories, or with reference to the government thereof, should we see fit to include the same within our dominions.

(35) And We do, lastly, will and ordain and declare, without prejudice to any power to repeal this Our Charter by law belonging to Us, Our heirs and successors, or to any of Our Courts, ministers, or officers independently of this present declaration or reservation, that in case at any time it is made to appear to Us in Our Council that the Company has substantially failed to observe and conform to the provisions of this Our Charter, or that the Company is not exercising its powers under the concessions, agreements, grants, and treaties aforesaid so as to advance the interests which the Petitioners have represented to Us to be likely to be advanced by the grant of this Our Charter, it shall be lawful for Us, Our heirs and successors, and We do hereby expressly reserve and take to Ourselves, Our heirs and successors, the right and power by writing

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under the Great Seal of Our United Kingdom to revoke this Our Charter, and to revoke and annul the privileges, powers, and rights hereby granted to the Company.—In Witness whereof We have caused these Our Letters to be made Patent.

Witness Ourselves at Westminster the [29th] day of [October] in the fifty [third] year of our reign.

By warrant under the Queen's Sign Manual.

[The Charter was passed by the Queen on the day indicated within brackets, and published in the *London Gazette* of the 19th December 1889.]

APPENDIX D.

THE MESSAGE TO LOBENGULA.

(1) I, Lord Knutsford, one of the Queen's Principal Secretaries of State, am commanded by Her Majesty to send this further message to Lobengula. The Queen has kept in her mind the letter sent by Lobengula, and the message brought by Umshete and Babaan in the beginning of this year, and she has now desired Mr. Moffat, whom she trusts, and whom Lobengula knows to be his true friend, to tell him what she has done for him and what she advises him to do.

(2) Since the visit of Lobengula's Envoys, the Queen has made the fullest inquiries into the particular circumstances of Matabeleland, and understands the trouble caused to Lobengula by different parties of white men coming to his country to look for gold; but wherever gold is, or wherever it is reported to be, there it is impossible for him to exclude white men, and, therefore, the wisest and safest course for him to adopt, and that which will give least trouble to himself and his tribe, is to agree, not with one or two white men separately, but with one

approved body of white men, who will consult Lobengula's wishes and arrange where white people are to dig, and who will be responsible to the Chief for any annoyance or trouble caused to himself or his people. If he does not agree with one set of people, there will be endless disputes among the white men, and he will have all his time taken up in deciding their quarrels.

(3) The Queen, therefore, approves of the concession made by Lobengula to some white men, who are represented in his country by Messrs. Rudd, Maguire, and Thompson. The Queen has caused inquiry to be made respecting these persons, and is satisfied that they are men who will fulfil their undertakings, and who may be trusted to carry out the working for gold in the Chief's country without molesting his people or in any way interfering with their kraals, gardens, or cattle. And as some of the Queen's highest and most trusted subjects have joined themselves with those to whom Lobengula gave concessions, the Queen now thinks Lobengula is acting wisely in carrying out his agreement with these persons, and hopes that he will allow them to conduct their mining operations without interference or molestation from his subjects.

(4) The Queen understands that Lobengula does not like deciding disputes among white men or assuming jurisdiction over them. This is very wise, as these disputes would take up much time, and Lobengula cannot understand the laws and customs of white people; but it is not well to have people in his country who are subject to no law, therefore the Queen thinks Lobengula would be wise to entrust to that body of white men, of whom Mr. Jameson is now the principal representative in Matabeleland, the duty of deciding disputes and keeping the peace among white persons in his country.

(5) In order to enable them to act lawfully and with full authority, the Queen has, by her Royal Charter, given to the body of men to undertake this duty, and will hold them responsible for their proper performance of

THE NORTHWARD TREK

such duty. Of course this must be as Lobengula likes, as he is king of the country, and no one can exercise jurisdiction in it without his permission ; but it is believed that this will be very convenient for the Chief, and the Queen is informed that he has already made such an arrangement in the Tati district, by which he is there saved trouble.

(6) The Queen understands that Lobengula wishes to have some one from her residing with him. The Queen, therefore, has directed her trusted servant, Mr. Moffat, to stay with the Chief as long as he wishes. Mr. Moffat is, as Lobengula knows, a true friend to himself and the Matabele tribe, while he is also in the confidence of the Queen, and will from time to time convey the Queen's words to the Chief, and the Chief should always listen to and believe Mr. Moffat's words.

(Signed) KNUTSFORD,

Her Majesty's Secretary of State for the
Colonies.

Downing Street,
15th November 1889.

APPENDIX E.

NOMINAL ROLL OF THE PIONEER FORCE.

Rank.	Name.	Address or Particulars of Death.	Killed.	Died Natural Death.	Resident in Rhodesia.	Resident Elsewhere.	Residence Unknown.
1	Major Johnson, F.	Erin House, Clapham Park, S.W.	1	...
2	Capt. Burnet, E.	Killed, Matabeleland, 1893	1
3	„ Heany, M.	Bulawayo	1
4	„ Hoste, H. F.	Salisbury	1
5	„ Roach, J. J.	Killed, 1900, Western Transvaal, with Lord Methuen's Column	1
6	„ Selous, F. C.	Worplesdon, Surrey	1	...
7	Lieut. Beal, R.	Died, Beira, 1907	...	1
8	„ Biscoe, E. C. Tyndale.	Liddington Manor, Swindon	1	..
9	„ Borrow, H. J.	Killed, Shangani, 1893	1
10	„ Burnett, R. G.	Elsie's Buildings, Kimberley	1	...
11	„ Campbell, A.	Tullichewan, Dumbarton, N.B.	1	...
12	„ Dennison, A.	Killed, 1900, Western Transvaal, with Methuen's Column	1
13	„ Farrell, E. O. C.	Bulawayo	1
14	„ Fry, W. E.	Pretoria?	1	...
15	„ Mandy, F.	Died, Kimberley, year unknown	...	1
16	„ Nicholson, R. G.	Pietersburg district, Transvaal	1	...
17	Dr. Brett, Jas.	Died, Gwelo, 1897	...	1
18	„ Litchfield, J.	Somewhere in England	1	...
19	„ Tabuteau, A. J. O.	Died, Cape Town, year unknown	...	1
20	Rev. Surridge, F. H.	India, address unknown	1	...
21	„ Hartman, Father S. J.	Matabeleland?	1
22	R.M.S. King, W. F.	Umtali?	1
23	Q.M.S. Vialls, C. C.	Protectorate?	1	...
24	O.R.S. Dixon, W.	Cape Colony?	1	...
25	P.M.S. Spreckley, J. A.	Killed, Transvaal	1

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Rank.	Name.	Address or Particulars of Death.	Killed.	Died Natural Death.	Resident in Rhodesia.	Resident Elsewhere.	Residence Unknown.
26	S.S.M. Gie, M. C.	Cape Town ?	1
27	,, Fraser, A. S.	Saddler, Long Street, Cape Town	1
28	F.Sergt. Wallace, J.	Died, Salisbury, year unknown	...	1
29	B.S.M. Wheaton, J.	c/o De Beers ?	1
30	I.S.M. Brown, H. I.	Cape Town ?	1
31	,, Mahon, J.	Died, Hartley Hills, 1891	...	1
32	Condtr. Alexander, T.	Kimberley ?	1
33	,, Hunan, C.	Salisbury District	1
34	,, Morris, A.	Murdered, 1896 Rebellion, Marondellas	1
35	,, Palmer, W.	Salisbury District	1
36	,, Rowland, J. R.	Died, Salisbury, 1896 Rebellion	...	1
37	,, Stevenson, F. L.	Died, Salisbury, 1892 ?	...	1
38	,, Solomon.	Kimberley ?	1
39	Sergt. Birkley, W. H.	Killed, Shangani, 1893	1
40	,, Drysdale, J.	Died, Tanganika	...	1
41	,, Elliott, G.	?	1
42	,, Finnucane, E.	Killed, Mashonaland, 1896 Rebellion	1
43	,, Mishull, H.	?	1
44	,, Nesbitt, R. H.	Bulawayo ?	1
45	,, Ogilvie .	Mining Commissioner, Umtali	1
46	,, Suckling, E.	Killed, dynamite accident, Mazoe, 1891	1
47	Corp. Beut, E. A.	c/o Father Parson, Yateley, near Sandhurst	1
48	,, Berrington, E.	Manager, Ayrshire Mine, Lomagundi	1
49	,, Butcher, E.	Grahamstown ?	1
50	,, Camp, C.	c/o E. O. V. Rifles, Cape Town	1	...
51	,, Chase, A.	Umtali	1
52	,, Corderoy, J. W.	Umtali or London	1
53	,, Crawford, J. S.	Umtali	1
54	,, Eyre, A.	Died, Salisbury, 1899	...	1
55	,, Hamilton, H. R.	Bulawayo ?	1
56	,, Hill, W.	Died, Salisbury (? year)	...	1
57	,, Hosking, W. H.	Umtali ?	1
58	,, Montague, H.	Umtali ?	1
59	,, Nesbitt, C.	Jaggerpoort (?)	1
60	,, Schermbrucker, F.	Johannesburg ? or dead	1
61	,, Steward, A.	Died, Klondyke	...	1
62	,, Vintcent, L.	Died, Lomagundi, 1891	...	1
63	Trooper Adcock, F. W.	Johannesburg	1
64	,, Aggett, W. J.	?	1
65	,, Armstrong, O. R.	Died, Cape Town, Fever	...	1
66	,, Arnott, S.	Salisbury District	1	...

APPENDIX E

Rank.	Name.	Address or Particulars of Death.	Killed.	Died Natural Death.	Resident in Rhodesia.	Resident Elsewhere.	Residence Unknown.
67	Trooper Baker, W. V. . .	?	1
68	,, Banks, A. B. . .	?	1
69	,, Barry, J. W. . .	Umtali	1
70	,, Barter, J. A. G. . .	Transvaal ?	1
71	,, Bird, A. H. S. . .	Solicitor, Western Circuit, England	1
72	,, Borcas, J. P. . .	?	1
73	,, Bowden, M. P. . .	Died, Umtali	1
74	,, Bowen, G. J. . .	Mining Commissioner, Salisbury	1
75	,, Bradley, B. . .	Johannesburg ?	1
76	,, Bradley, C. . .	Umtali	1
77	,, Brand, T. T. . .	Orange River Colony	1	...
78	,, Brown, W. H. . .	Salisbury	1
79	,, Campbell, A. D. . .	Murdered, near Salisbury, 1896	1
80	,, Campbell, Pat. W. . .	Killed, South African War, 1900	1
81	,, Chiappini, L. . .	?	1
82	,, Christison, T. J. . .	Cape Town, N.W.R.	1
83	,, Christopherson, G. E. . .	England ?	1
84	,, Clay, W. N. . .	Died, Salisbury, 189 ?	...	1
85	,, Clinton, W. J. . .	?	1
86	,, Colquhoun, F. C. . .	Killed, Shangani, 1893	1
87	,, Cornwall, W. L. . .	Johannesburg, dead ?	1
88	,, Coryndon, R. T. . .	Administrator of Swaziland	1	...
89	,, Cowie, W. M. . .	Queenstown ?	1
90	,, Cripps, L. . .	Umtali	1
91	,, Darling, J. F. . .	Salisbury	1
92	,, Darter, A. . .	c/o Darter Brothers, Cape Town	1	...
93	,, Downing, G. G. D. . .	Vincenti Lamboge ?	1	...
94	,, Drabble, O. R. . .	Rusape, Mashoualand	1
95	,, Drennam, G. N. . .	Mossel Bay ?	1	...
96	,, Durell, W. D. . .	Dead ?	...	1
97	,, Dykes, L. L. B. . .	Died, Bulawayo ?	...	1
98	,, Edgill, E. R. . .	Murdered, near Gwelo, 1896	1
99	,, Edmonds, J. A. . .	Salisbury District	1
100	,, Ehlert, F. . .	Murdered in Matoppo, 1896	1
101	,, Eliot, A. . .	?	1
102	,, Everett, F. . .	Died, Gwelo ?	...	1
103	,, Featherstonehaugh, H. W. . .	Jaggersfontein ?	1
104	,, Ferguson, F. W. . .	Died, Victoria, year unknown	...	1
105	,, Fletcher, P. C. . .	Bulawayo District
106	,, Francis, J. L. . .	Birkenhead ? (brother in Kimberley)	1
107	,, Frost, Reg. . .	c/o Heany or Colorado ?	1	...

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Rank.	Name.	Address or Particulars of Death.	Killed.	Died Natural Death.	Resident in Rhodesia.	Resident Elsewhere.	Residence Unknown.
108	Trooper Fry, Tom . . .	?	1
109	„ Gayland, G. E. . . .	?	1
110	„ Graham	Murdered, Matabeleland, 1906, at Inyati	1
111	„ Griffiths, L.	B.S.A. Police, Bulawayo ?	1
112	„ Griffiths, H. F. . . .	Inspector Police, Basuto-land ?	1
113	„ Grimmer, J.	Died, Caledon, C.C., just after Cecil Rhodes	...	1
114	„ Halkett, A. C.	Killed, waggon accident, Macequece, in 189 ?	...	1
115	„ Hall, Geo.	Died, Tate, 189 ?	...	1
116	„ Harty, J. G.	Dead ?	...	1
117	„ Harvey, J. T.	Near Port Elizabeth (Addo Bush)	1	...
118	„ Hay, J. H.	Died, Salisbury, in 189 ?	...	1
119	„ Hepworth, E. E.	Murdered, Umzeswe, 1896	1
120	„ Histon, G.	? Telegraph Department	1
121	„ Holmes, A. T.	Salisbury	1
122	„ Hunter, F. T.	Died, near Salisbury, in 189 ?	...	1
123	„ Inskipp, P. S.	30 Burton Court, Chelsea, S.W.	1	...
124	„ Jameson, R.	Died, Bulawayo, 189 ?	...	1
125	„ Jay, H. B.	Near Swindon, Wilts	1	...
126	„ Judd, W.	Killed, Shangani, 1893	1
127	„ Krohn, A. F.	Bulawayo ?	1
128	„ Kronstein, L.	Bulawayo ?	1
129	„ Langerman, F. H. . . .	Cape Town	1	...
130	„ Larson, C.	Cape Town ?	1
131	„ Law, R.	Murdered near Marondellas	1
132	„ Lea, A.	Bulawayo	1
133	„ Logan, C. A.	Died Umtali 189 ?	...	1
134	„ Lovemore, C. B.	Middleburg, Cape Colony ?	1
135	„ Lovemore, H. C.	P.O. 238, Johannesburg	1
136	„ Lust, J.	Kimberley	1
137	„ M'Call, J.	H.M.S. <i>Excellent</i> ?	1
138	„ Mackay, W.	Tilton Turlle, Sussex, England	1	...
139	„ M'Lachlan, A.	Beira Railway ? Dead	1
140	„ M'Lelland, R. R.	Salisbury ?	1
141	„ M'Robert, J. N.	Committed suicide, Hartly, 189 ?	1
142	„ Mandy, G. S. T.	Kimberley	1
143	„ Masters, C.	Died. Where ?	...	1
144	„ Moberley, W. F. G. . . .	Dead ?	...	1
145	„ Moore, J. F. W.	?	1
146	„ Mosenthal, F. C.	Bulawayo	1
147	„ Murch, R.	Some Fire Brigade	1
148	„ Nesbitt, Alec T.	Mazoe	1
149	„ Nesbitt, F.	Killed, near Bulawayo, 1896	1
150	„ Nesbitt, W. M.	Kimberley ?	1

APPENDIX E

Rank.	Name.	Address or Particulars of Death.	Killed.	Died Natural Death.	Resident in Rhodesia.	Resident Elsewhere.	Residence Unknown.
151	Trooper Neumeyer, Leo.	Murdered by Boers, O.F.S., 1900	1
152	„ Nowers, D.	?	1
153	„ O'Connell, J.	?	1
154	„ O'Meara, E. A.	Johannesburg ?	1
155	„ Ore, C. A.	America ?	1
156	„ O'Toole, V. C. E.	Died, Salisbury, 1891	...	1
157	„ Patterson, A. J. F.	Died, Mazoe Valley, 189 ?	...	1
158	„ Pengelly, H. A.	Bulawayo District	1
159	„ Pockock, E. J.	Died, Salisbury, 1906	...	1
160	„ Pusey, G. H.	Salisbury	1
161	„ Puzey, A.	Bulawayo ?	1	...
162	„ Rutland, T. W.	Beira Railway	1
163	„ Scallan, Jas.	Humansdorp ?	1
164	„ Selby, W. J.	?	1
165	„ Seward, J. E.	Murdered, Matabeleland, 1896	1
166	„ Sheppard, J. H.	Died, near Bulawayo	...	1
167	„ Shepperson, F.	Died, Mashonaland	...	1
168	„ Slater, E.	Died, Salisbury	...	1
169	„ Somerville, G.	Died, Umtali	...	1
170	„ Stamford, A. F.	Murdered, Lomagundi, 1896	1
171	„ Stier, W. K.	Died, Hartley	...	1
172	„ Taylor, R.	?	1
173	„ Tregenza, E. G.	Died, Salisbury	...	1
174	„ Treneman, E. G.	?	1
175	„ Tulloch, Alex.	Umtali	1
176	„ Uppington, J.	Died, Salisbury	...	1
177	„ Van Eyk, C. J.	?	1
178	„ Venables, J. W. E.	East London	1
179	„ Walker, J.	Last seen Tangle, C.C., 1896	1
180	„ Walker, R.	?	1
181	„ Warren, A. H.	} One died, Beira, 189 ?	...	1
182	„ Warren, R. J.	
183	„ Watney, P. H.	Kosberg, near Cape Town	1	...
184	„ Whitmore, E. H.	Probably T. H. Whitmore, Bulawayo	1
185	„ Wimble, B.	Johannesburg	1
186	„ Wyatt, H. F.	?	1
		Total	23	42	30	26	66

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APPENDIX F.

ORDINANCES MADE BY THE BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA COMPANY.

ORDINANCE NO. 1 OF 1891.—ORDINANCE TO PROVIDE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF DISCIPLINE AND GOOD ORDER IN THE BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA COMPANY POLICE FORCE.

Whereas in the tenth section of the Charter granted by Her Majesty the Queen on the 29th October one thousand eight hundred and eighty-nine, to the British South Africa Company (hereinafter referred to as “the Company”) it is provided that the Company shall to the best of its ability preserve peace and order in such ways and manners as it shall consider necessary, and may with that object make Ordinances (to be approved by one of Her Majesty’s principal Secretaries of State) and may establish and maintain a force of police :

And whereas a force of police has been established and is being maintained by the Company within the field of its operation :

And whereas it is expedient to make provision for maintaining discipline and good order in the Company’s police force :

And whereas it is expedient to assimilate the discipline of the Company’s police force to that of the Bechuanaland Border Police :

And whereas it is expedient to make provision for the review of the proceedings of Boards of Officers of the Company’s police :

It is therefore ordained by the British South Africa Company, as follows :

(1) The regulation framed under Section vi. of the Cape Mounted Riflemen Act of the Colony of the Cape

of Good Hope, No. 9, 1878, and Part II. of the said Act, together with the schedule thereto, shall *mutatis mutandis* be in force and be applicable to all members of the Company's police :

Provided always that Boards of Officers of the Company's police shall have the jurisdiction conferred upon Superior Courts of law by the first clause of Section ix. of the said Act, subject to review as hereinafter provided ; and provided further that such Boards of Officers shall be invested with such higher jurisdiction as last aforesaid, pending the establishment of a Superior Court of first instance in hand for the Company's principal field of operations, or for any part thereof.

(2) All proceedings of Boards of Officers of the Company's police shall be subject to review at as early a date as practicable by the officer for the time being acting as Administrator of Mashonaland, and such review shall be carried out in terms of Section 23 of the Laws and Regulations of the Government of British Bechuanaland, under Proclamation No. 2, B.B., 1885, so far as applicable.

God save the Queen.

Given at No. 19 St. Swithin's Lane, in the City of London, the head office of the Company, this first day of July, one thousand eight hundred and ninety-one.

ABERCORN, President.

FIFE, Vice-President.

C. H. WEATHERLEY, Secretary.



Approved :

KNUTSFORD, Secretary of State.

3rd July 1891.

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BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA COMPANY ORDINANCE NO. 2 OF 1891. REGULATING TRADING AND THE DELIVERY OF FIREARMS.

In pursuance of the powers for making Ordinances conferred on the British South Africa Company by or under Her Majesty's Charter of the 29th day of October 1889, and of every power enabling the Company in that behalf :

It is hereby ordained by the British South Africa Company (hereinafter called "the Company") as follows :—

(1) The limits of this Ordinance shall be Mashonaland, that is to say, Fort Tuli and an area ten miles round that fort, and the territories north of the 22nd parallel of south latitude, but excluding the territory known as the Disputed Territory lying between the Shashi and Macloutsie rivers, and all territories belonging to the Chief Khama of the Bamangwato and the territory known as the district of the Tati.

(2) No person shall be allowed to trade at any place within the limits of the Ordinance unless he shall have first obtained a license for that purpose from the Company.

(3) Every such license shall remain in force for the term stated therein, not exceeding in any case the term of twelve months from the date thereof.

(4) Such license may authorise the holder either to move from place to place for the purpose of his trade, or to establish some fixed trading station at a place to be approved of by the Company.

(5) The Company reserves power to refuse to issue any such license on the original application, or to refuse to issue a fresh license on the expiration of any preceding license.

(6) In any case in which a renewal of a license shall be refused by the Company, and in any case in which a license

shall be forfeited as hereinafter provided, the holder of such license shall be permitted at any time within three months (unless the same shall have become liable to seizure) to remove the material of any building which he may have erected at his trading station, together with any moveable property belonging to him, and failing such removal within the time appointed, such materials and property may be removed and sold by the Company, and the proceeds of such sale be applied, as far as may be necessary, to the payment of all expenses incurred, and the balance shall be paid to the owner of the same. No claim to compensation for loss incurred by such removal will be admitted. But such trader will be allowed to continue trading to the end of the three months on paying in advance at the beginning of each of these months the sum of £1 sterling.

(7) For the purposes of this Ordinance the term "trading" shall be taken to include exchange or barter.

(8) The sale or gift or disposal in any way to any native of wine or beer or any spirituous liquor is strictly prohibited. Any person convicted of acting in contravention of this prohibition shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding the sum of £20 sterling, and in case of a second or any subsequent conviction shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding the sum of £40 sterling, and in the case of a holder of any trading license, he shall, whether upon a first or any subsequent conviction, be liable also to the forfeiture of his license, at the discretion of the Company, and all wine, beer, or spirituous liquor that may be found in the possession of the person convicted shall be forfeited. No wine, beer, or spirituous liquor shall be brought within the limits of this Ordinance without the permission, in writing, of the Company first had and obtained, and if any person shall introduce any wine, beer, or spirituous liquors, without having previously obtained the permission in writing above mentioned, such wine, beer, or spirituous liquor shall be forfeited, and

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such person shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding £20 sterling.

(9) Any person trading without a license, or after the expiration of the terms for which it shall have been granted, or in violation of the conditions thereof, or after the same have been forfeited, shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding £10 sterling.

(10) It shall be lawful for the Company, or any Magistrate within the limits of his jurisdiction, at any time to demand the production, by any person trading, of his license, and any such person refusing or failing to produce the same shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding £10 sterling.

(11) Any trading station or premises, or wagon, or other vehicle, used or suspected of being used for the purposes of trade, shall at all times be liable to the examination of any person thereto authorised in writing, by the Company, or any Magistrate within the limits of his jurisdiction, and the owner or person in charge of any such station, premises, wagon, or vehicle who shall obstruct such examination, shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding £10 sterling.

(12) The amount payable for a trading license shall be £10 for one year, or such other sum as the Company shall from time to time fix: Provided that the Company may in the case of a travelling trader make and fix an additional charge of £1 for every vehicle beyond one employed by him in his business. All licenses expire on the 31st December of each year, or on such other day as shall be fixed by the Company. A license taken out before the 30th June in any year shall be paid for at the full rate of an annual license, but if taken out after June 30th, then only one-half of the annual sum will be charged. All licenses shall be paid for in full at the time of issue.

(13) Every wagon entering within the limits of this Ordinance must do so under authority of a permit signed by such person as shall be authorised by the Company, and

any wagon found within the said limits shall be liable to seizure by the Company or any Magistrate, unless some person in charge or custody of such wagon shall forthwith on demand produce such permit. The persons authorised to sign such permits shall be notified in the *Government Gazette* of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope.

(14) No transfer of any license will be valid unless the same be approved in writing by some duly authorised officer of the Company.

(15) No gunpowder or other explosive, and no cartridges, and no gun, pistol, or other firearms, and no lock, stock, barrel, or any other part of any gun, pistol, or other firearms, and no percussion caps, shall be brought within the limits of this Ordinance, without the permission, in writing, of the Company or of a Magistrate first had and obtained; and if any person shall bring any of the said articles within the said limits, without having previously obtained the permission in writing above mentioned, such article or articles shall be forfeited, and such person shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding £100 sterling, or to imprisonment for any period not exceeding two years.

(16) Any person applying for any such permission as aforesaid shall do so in writing, setting forth the place to which it is intended to take the articles described in such application, and no officer of the Company or Magistrate shall grant any such permission as aforesaid to any person to bring any of the articles aforesaid within the said limits until he shall have transmitted such written application with his report thereon to the Administrator in Mashonaland, and shall have received the authority of that officer to grant the permission sought.

(17) No person shall, within the limits of this Ordinance, supply to any native any gun, pistol, or other firearms, or any lock, stock, barrel, or other part of a gun, pistol, or other firearm, or any percussion caps, or any gun-

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powder or other explosives, or any cartridges, or any lead or any other material for bullets, or shot, without permission, in writing, of the Company or of a Magistrate, under a penalty not exceeding £100 sterling, or under pain of imprisonment for any period not exceeding two years. The Company shall not nor shall any officer of the Company or any Magistrate be bound to assign any reason for refusing to sanction any such supply.

(18) Within so much of the limits of this Ordinance as is comprised within Article VIII of the General Act of the Brussels Conference of 1889-90, the provisions of that Article and of Article IX of the said General Act shall be observed in accordance with any regulations which may, from time to time, be framed and published by Her Majesty's High Commissioner for South Africa, by notice in the *Government Gazette* of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope. The aforesaid Articles are set forth in the Schedule of this Ordinance.

(19) Any penalties by this Ordinance may be sued for before the Administrator in Mashonaland, or a Magistrate having jurisdiction, and all such penalties may be recovered by the seizure and sale of any property belonging to the person convicted, and one-half of the penalties recovered under this Ordinance shall in each case be paid to the person on whose information the conviction shall have been obtained, and the balance shall be paid to the Company. Upon non-payment of any such fine or penalty, the person liable to make payment thereof shall (where no other term of imprisonment is by law prescribed) be subject to be imprisoned with or without hard labour for any period not exceeding six months.

(20) The power and provisions of this Ordinance may be exercised and executed on behalf of the Company by the Administrator for Mashonaland or by any other duly authorised officer of the Company.

BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA COMPANY ORDINANCE No. 3 OF
1901, REGULATING COINAGE AND WEIGHTS AND
MEASURES.

In pursuance of powers for making Ordinances conferred on the British South Africa Company by or under Her Majesty's Charter of the twenty-ninth day of October one thousand eight hundred and eighty-nine and of every other power enabling the company on that behalf :

It is hereby ordained by the British South Africa Company as follows :—

The Standard Coinage, Weights and Measures from time to time in use in the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope shall be the standard Coinage, Weights and Measures to be used within the limits of this Ordinance, namely, Mashonaland, that is to say, Fort Tuli, and an area ten miles round that fort and its territories north of the 22nd parallel of South Latitude, but excluding the territory known as the Disputed Territory lying between the Shashi and Macloutsie rivers, and all territories belonging to the Chief Khama of the Bamangwato and the Territory known as the district of the Tati.

God save the Queen!

Given at 19 St. Swithin's Lane in the city of London, the head offices of the Company, this thirtieth day of July, one thousand eight hundred and ninety-one.

(Signed) GIFFORD
 GEORGE CAWSTON } Directors (L.S.)
 C. H. WEATHERLEY, Secretary.

Approved KNUTSFORD.

31st July 1891.

THE NORTHWARD TREK

THE SCHEDULE.

Article VIII.

The Experiences of all Nations who have intercourse with Africa having shown the pernicious and preponderating part played by firearms in slave trade operations, as well as in internal war between the native tribes, and this same experience having clearly proved that the preservation of the African populations, whose existence it is the express wish of the Powers to safeguard, is a radical impossibility if restrictive measures against the trade in firearms and ammunition are not established, the Powers decide, in so far as the present state of their frontiers permits, that the importation of firearms, especially of rifles and improved weapons, as well as of powder, balls, and cartridges, is, except in the cases and under the conditions provided for in the following Articles, prohibited in the territories comprised between the 20th parallel of North Latitude and the 22nd parallel of South Latitude, and extending westward to the Atlantic Ocean and eastward to the Indian Ocean and its dependencies, comprising the islands adjacent to the coast as far as 100 nautical miles from the shore.

Article IX.

The introduction of firearms and ammunition, where there shall be occasion to authorise it in the possession of the Signatory Powers which exercise rights of Sovereignty or Protectorate in Africa, shall be regulated, unless identical or more rigorous regulations have been already applied, in the following manner in the zone laid down in Article VIII. :

All imported firearms shall be deposited, at the cost, risk, and peril of importers in a public warehouse placed under the supervision of the administration of the State. No withdrawal of firearms or imported ammunition shall

take place from such depôts, without the previous authorisation of the Administration. This authorisation shall be, except in cases hereinafter specified, refused for the withdrawal of all arms of precision such as rifles, magazine guns, or breech-loaders, whether whole or detached pieces, their cartridges, caps, or other ammunition intended for them.

At the seaports and under conditions affording the needful guarantees, the respective Governments may permit private depôts, but only for ordinary powder and flint-lock muskets, and to the exclusion of improved arms and their ammunition.

Independently of the measures directly taken by Governments for the arming of the public force, and the organisation of their defence, individual exceptions shall be admitted for persons affording sufficient guarantee that the arms and ammunition delivered to them will not be given, assigned, or sold to third persons and for travellers provided with a declaration of their Government, stating that the weapon and ammunition are destined exclusively for their personal defence.

All arms in the cases provided for in the preceding paragraphs shall be registered and marked by the authorities appointed for the supervision, who shall deliver to the persons in question licences to bear arms indicating the name of the bearer, and showing the stamp with which the arm is marked. These licences are revocable in case of proof of improper use, and will be issued for five years only, but may be renewed.

The rule above set forth as to placing in depôt shall also apply to gunpowder. From depôts can be withdrawn for sale only flint-lock guns with unrifled barrels, and common gunpowders called trade powders (*poudres-de-traite*). At each withdrawal of arms and ammunition of this kind for sale, the local authorities shall determine the regions in which these arms and ammunition may be sold. The regions infected by the slave trade shall always

THE NORTHWARD TREK

be excluded. Persons authorised to take arms or powder out of the public depôts (warehouses) shall present to the Administration every six months detailed lists indicating the destination of the arms and powder sold, as well as the quantities still remaining in the storehouses.

God save the Queen !

Given at 19 St. Swithin's Lane in the city of London, the head offices of the Company, this thirtieth day of July one thousand eight hundred and ninety-nine.

GIFFORD,
GEORGE CAWSTON, } Directors. (L.S.)
C. H. WEATHERLEY, Secretary.

Approved KNUTSFORD.

31st July 1901.

APPENDIX G.

THE ANGLO-PORTUGUESE TREATY.

TREATY BETWEEN HER MAJESTY AND HIS MAJESTY THE
KING OF PORTUGAL, DEFINING THEIR RESPECTIVE
SPHERES OF INFLUENCE IN AFRICA.

Signed at Lisbon, 11th June 1891.

[Ratifications exchanged at London, 3rd July 1891.]

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, &c., &c., &c., and His Most Faithful Majesty the King of Portugal and Algarves, &c., &c., &c., with a view to settle definitely the boundaries of their respective spheres of influence in Africa, and being animated with

the desire to confirm the friendly relations between the two Powers, have determined to conclude a Treaty to this effect, and have named as their respective Plenipotentiaries, that is to say :—

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, Sir George Glynne Petre, Knight Commander of the Most Distinguished Order of St. Michael and St. George, Companion of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Her Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Court of His Most Faithful Majesty, &c. ; and His Most Faithful Majesty the King of Portugal and Algarves, Joaquim Thomas Lobo d'Avila, Count Valbom, Councillor of His Majesty and of State, Peer of the Realm, Grand Cross of the Military Order of Our Lord Jesus Christ, Knight of the Military Order of St. Bento d'Aviz, and Grand Cross of various foreign Orders, &c., His Majesty's Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, &c. ; Who, having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found in good and due order, have agreed upon and concluded the following Articles :—

Article I.

Great Britain agrees to recognise as within the dominion of Portugal in East Africa the territories bounded—

(1) To the north by a line which follows the course of the River Rovuma from its mouth up to the confluence of the River M'Sinje, and thence westerly along the parallel of latitude of the confluence of these rivers to the shore of Lake Nyassa.

(2) To the west by a line which, from the above-mentioned frontier on Lake Nyassa, follows the eastern shore of the lake southwards as far as the parallel of latitude $13^{\circ} 30'$ south ; thence it runs in a south-easterly direction to the eastern shore of Lake Chiuta, which it

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follows ; thence it runs in a direct line to the eastern shore of Lake Chilwa of Shirwa, which it follows to its south-easternmost point ; thence in a direct line to the easternmost affluent of the River Ruo, and thence follows that affluent, and, subsequently, the centre of the channel of the Ruo to its confluence with the River Shiré.

From the confluence of the Ruo and Shiré the boundary will follow the centre of the channel of the latter river to a point just below Chiwanga, thence it runs due westward until it reaches the watershed between the Zambesi and Shiré, and follows the watershed between those rivers, and afterwards between the former river and Lake Nyassa until it reaches parallel 14° of South Latitude.

From thence it runs in a south-westerly direction to the point where South Latitude 15° meets the River Aroangwa or Loangwa, and follows the mid channel of that river to its junction with the Zambesi.

Article II.

To the south of the Zambesi, the territories within the Portuguese sphere of influence are bounded by a line which, starting from a point opposite the mouth of the River Aroangwa or Loangwa, runs directly southwards as far as the 16th parallel of South Latitude, follow that parallel to its intersection with the 31st degree of Longitude east of Greenwich, thence running eastward direct to the point where the River Mazoe is intersected by the 33rd degree of Longitude east of Greenwich ; it follows that degree southward to its intersection by the 18° 30' parallel of South Latitude ; thence it follows the upper part of the eastern slope of the Manica plateau southwards to the centre of the main channel of the Sabi, follows that channel to its confluence with the Lunte,¹ whence it strikes direct to the north-eastern point of the frontier of the South African Republic, and the frontier of Swaziland to the River Maputo. It is understood that in tracing the

¹ *Lundi.*

frontier along the slope of the plateau, no territory west of Longitude $32^{\circ} 30'$ east of Greenwich shall be comprised in the Portuguese sphere, and no territory east of Longitude 33° east of Greenwich shall be comprised in the British sphere. The line shall, however, if necessary, be deflected so as to leave Mutassa in the British spheres, and Massi Kessi¹ in the Portuguese.

Article III.

Great Britain engages not to make any objection to the extension of the sphere of influence of Portugal south of Delagoa Bay, as far as a line following the parallel of the confluence of the River Pongolo with the River Maputo to the sea-coast.

Article IV.

It is agreed that the western line of division separating the British from the Portuguese sphere of influence in Central Africa shall follow the centre of the channel of the Upper Zambesi, starting from the Katima Rapids up to the point where it reaches the territory of the Barotse Kingdom. That territory shall remain within the British sphere; its limits to the westward, which will constitute the boundary between the British and Portuguese spheres of influence, being decided by a joint Anglo-Portuguese Commission, which shall have power, in case of difference of opinion, to appoint an Umpire.

It is understood on both sides that nothing in the Articles shall affect the existing rights of any other States. Subject to this reservation, Great Britain will not oppose the extension of Portuguese administration outside of the limits of the Barotse country.

Article V.

Portugal agrees to recognise, as within the sphere of influence of Great Britain on the north of the Zambesi,

¹ *Macequce.*

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the territories extending from the line to be settled by the Joint Commission mentioned in the preceding Article to Lake Nyassa, including the islands in that Lake south of parallel $11^{\circ} 30'$ South Latitude, and to the territories reserved to Portugal by the line described in Article I.

Article VI.

Portugal agrees to recognise as within the sphere of influence of Great Britain to the south of the Zambesi, the territories bounded on the east and north-east by the line described in Article II.

Article VII.

All the lines of demarcation traced in Articles I. to VI. shall be subject to rectification by agreement between the two Powers, in accordance with local requirements.

The two Powers agree that in the event of one of them proposing to part with any of the territories to the south of the Zambesi, assigned by these Articles to their respective spheres of influence, the other shall be recognised as possessing a preferential right to the territories in question, or any portion of them, upon terms similar to those proposed.

Article VIII.

The two Powers engage that neither will interfere with any sphere of influence assigned to the other by Articles I. to VI. One Power will not, in the sphere of the other, make acquisitions, conclude Treaties, or accept sovereign rights or Protectorates. It is understood that no Companies nor individuals subject to one Power can exercise sovereign rights in a sphere assigned to the other except with the assent of the latter.

Article IX.

Commercial or mineral Concessions and rights to real property possessed by Companies or individuals belonging to either Power shall, if their validity is duly proved, be recognised in the sphere of the other Power. For deciding on the validity of mineral Concessions given by the legitimate authority within thirty miles of either side of the frontier south of the Zambesi, a Tribunal of Arbitration is to be named by common agreement. It is understood that such Concessions must be worked according to local Regulations and Law.

Article X.

In all territories in East and Central Africa belonging to or under the influence of either Power, missionaries of both countries shall have full protection. Religious toleration and freedom for all forms of Divine worship and religious teaching are guaranteed.

Article XI.

The transit of goods across Portuguese territories situated between the East Coast and the British sphere shall not, for a period of twenty-five years from the ratification of this Convention, be subjected to duties in excess of 3 per cent. for imports or for exports. These dues shall in no case have a differential character, and shall not exceed the Customs dues levied on the same goods in the above-mentioned territories.

Her Majesty's Government shall have the option, within five years from the date of the signature of this Agreement, to claim freedom of transit for the remainder of the period of twenty-five years on payment of a sum capitalizing the annual duties for that period at the rate of £30,000 a year.

Coin and precious metals of all descriptions shall be

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imported and exported to and from the British sphere free of transit duty.

It is understood that there shall be freedom for the passage of subjects and goods of both Powers across the Zambesi, and through the districts adjoining the left bank of the river situated above the confluence of the Shiré, and those adjoining the right bank of the Zambesi situated above the confluence of the River Luenha (Ruenga), without hindrance of any description and without payment of transit dues.

It is further understood that in the above-named districts each Power shall have the right, so far as it may be reasonably required for the purpose of communication between territories under the influence of the same Power, to construct roads, railways, bridges, and telegraph lines across the district reserved to the other. The two Powers shall have the right of acquiring in these districts on reasonable conditions the land necessary for such subjects, and shall receive all other requisite facilities. Portugal shall have the same rights in the British territory on the banks of the Shiré and in the British territory on the banks of Lake Nyassa.

Any railway so constructed by one Power on the territory of the other shall be subject to local Regulations and Laws agreed upon between the two Governments, and, in case of differences of opinion, subject to arbitration as hereinafter mentioned.

The two Powers shall also be allowed facilities for constructing on the rivers within the above districts, piers and landing-places for the purpose of trade and navigation. Differences of opinion between the two Governments as to the execution of their respective obligations, incurred in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph, shall be referred to the arbitration of two experts, one of whom shall be chosen on behalf of each Power. These experts shall select an Umpire, whose decision, in case of difference between Arbitrators, shall be final. If the two

experts cannot agree upon the choice of an Umpire, the Umpire shall be selected by a Neutral Power to be named by the two Governments.

All material for the construction of roads, railways, bridges, and telegraph lines shall be admitted free of charge.

Article XII.

The navigation of the Zambesi and Shiré, without excepting any of their branches and outlets, shall be entirely free for the ships of all nations.

The Portuguese Government engages to permit and to facilitate transit for all persons and goods of every description over the water-ways of the Zambesi, the Shiré, the Pungwe, the Busi, the Limpopo, and Sabi, and their tributaries, and also over the land-ways which supply means of communication where these rivers are not navigable.

Article XIII.

Merchant ships of the two Powers shall in the Zambesi, its branches and outlets, have equal freedom of navigation, whether with cargo or ballast, for the transportation of goods and passengers. In the exercise of this navigation the subjects and flags of both Powers shall be treated, in all circumstances, on a footing of perfect equality, not only for the direct navigation from the open sea to the inland ports of the Zambesi, and *vice versa*, but for the great and small coasting trade, and for the boat trade on the course of the river. Consequently, on all the course and mouths of the Zambesi, there will be no differential treatment of the subjects of the two Powers; and no exclusive privilege of navigation will be conceded by either to companies, corporations, or private persons.

The navigation of the Zambesi shall not be subject to any restriction or obligation based merely on the fact

THE NORTHWARD TREK

of navigation, in regard to landing-station or depot, or for breaking bulk, or for compulsory entry into port. In all the extent of the Zambesi the ships and goods in process of transit shall be submitted to no transit dues, whatever their starting-places or destination. No maritime or river toll shall be levied based on the sole fact of navigation, nor any tax on goods on board of ships. There shall only be collected taxes or duties which shall be an equivalent for services rendered to navigation itself. The tariff of these taxes or duties shall not warrant any differential treatment. The affluents of the Zambesi shall be in all respects subject to the same rules as the river of which they are tributaries.

The roads, paths, railways, or lateral canals, which may be constructed with the special object of correcting the imperfections of the river route on certain sections of the course of the Zambesi, its affluents, branches, and outlets, shall be considered, in their quality of means of communication, as dependencies of this river, and as equally open to the traffic of both Powers. And, as on the river itself, so there shall be collected on these roads, railways, and canals only tolls calculated on the cost of construction, maintenance, and management, and on the profits due to the promoters.

As regards the tariff of these tolls, strangers and the natives of the respective territories shall be treated on a footing of perfect equality.

Portugal undertakes to apply the principles of freedom of navigation enunciated in this Article on so much of the waters of the Zambesi, its affluents, branches, and outlets as are or may be under her sovereignty, protection, or influence. The rules which she may establish for the safety and control of navigation shall be drawn up in a way to facilitate, as far as possible, the circulation of merchant ships.

Great Britain accepts, under the same reservations, and in identical terms, the obligations undertaken in the preceding Articles in respect of so much of the waters

of the Zambesi, its affluents, branches, and outlets, as are or may be under her sovereignty, protection, or influence. Any question arising out of the provisions of this Article shall be referred to a Joint Commission, and, in case of disagreement, to arbitration. Another system for the administration and control of the Zambesi may be substituted for the above arrangements by common consent of the Riverain Powers.

Article XIV.

In the interest of both Powers, Portugal agrees to grant absolute freedom of passage between the British sphere of influence and Pungwe Bay for all merchandise of every description, and to give the necessary facilities for the improvement of the means of communication.

The Portuguese Government agrees to construct a railway between Pungwe and the British sphere. The survey of this line shall be completed within six months, and the two Governments shall agree as to the time within which the railway shall be commenced and completed. If an agreement is not arrived at, the Portuguese Government will give the construction of the railways to a Company which shall be designated by a Neutral Power, to be selected by two Governments, as being in its judgment competent to undertake the work immediately. The said Company shall have all requisite facilities for the acquisition of land, cutting timber, and free importation and supply of materials and labour. The Portuguese Government shall either itself construct or shall procure the construction of a road from the highest navigable point of the Pungwe, or other river which may be agreed upon as more suitable for traffic, to the British sphere, and shall construct or procure the construction in Pungwe Bay and on the river of the necessary landing-places. It is understood that no dues shall be levied on goods in transit by the river, the road, or the railway exceeding the maximum of 3 per cent. under the conditions stipulated in Article XI

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Article XV.

Great Britain and Portugal engage to facilitate telegraphic communication in their respective spheres. The stipulations contained in Article XIV., as regards the construction of a railway from Pungwe Bay to the interior, shall be applicable in all respects to the construction of a telegraph line for communication between the coast and the British sphere south of the Zambesi.

Questions as to the points of departure and termination of the line, and as to other details, if not arranged by common consent, shall be submitted to the arbitration of experts under the conditions prescribed in Article XI.

Portugal engages to maintain telegraphic service between the coast and the River Ruo, which service shall be open to the use of the subjects of the two Powers without any differential treatment.

Great Britain and Portugal engage to give every facility for the connection of telegraphic lines constructed in their respective spheres.

Details in respect of such connexion, and in respect to questions relating to the settlement of through tariff and other charges, shall, if not settled by common consent, be referred to the arbitration of experts under the conditions prescribed in Article XI.

Article XVI.

The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged, at Lisbon or London as soon as possible.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention, and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms : Done in duplicate at Lisbon, the eleventh day of June, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-one.

(L.S.) GEORGE G. PETRE.

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ENVIRONS OF GRAHAM-TOWN

26

Mt. Kapiam

Large lakes in the country

T. E. M. B. I.





SOUTH AFRICA

compiled from the 'S.S. Maps in the COLONIAL OFFICE' 1897 through Survey

1. The 1:50,000 scale maps of the Cape and Natal Provinces were compiled by the Survey Department, Cape Town, in 1897. The 1:100,000 scale maps of the Orange Free State and Transvaal were compiled by the Survey Department, Pretoria, in 1897. The 1:250,000 scale maps of the Cape and Natal Provinces were compiled by the Survey Department, Cape Town, in 1897. The 1:500,000 scale maps of the Orange Free State and Transvaal were compiled by the Survey Department, Pretoria, in 1897.

- 1. Mountains
- 2. Hills
- 3. Ranges
- 4. Passes
- 5. Rivers
- 6. Streams
- 7. Canals
- 8. Lakes
- 9. Swamps
- 10. Forests
- 11. Cultivated Land
- 12. Towns
- 13. Villages
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CAPE-TOWN
Free Range Measure

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